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A bstract
In this dissertation I investigate how mass media outlets might act politically by using 
their agenda-setting power, i.e. by affecting through their coverage the importance read­
ers and viewers attach to different issues. According to the issue ownership hypothesis, 
as introduced by Petrocik [1996], the choice of the topic being covered can have relevant 
persuasive effects, to the extent that citizens think that a given political party is better 
at handling problems related to it, compared to its opponent(s).
I first construct a simple model of electoral competition with two candidates, two
issues and one newspaper, which has room for only one story to be published. The model 
shows how rational citizens are influenced in their voting choice by the story featured 
on the newspaper, but tend to overreact to stories that go contrary its known editorial 
policy.
From an empirical point of view, I first study the coverage devoted by the New York 
Times to Democratic and Republican issues, during the 1946-1997 period. I find that 
the Times has a Democratic partisanship with some watchdog aspects, since during 
presidential campaigns it systematically gives more emphasis to the Democratic issues 
of civil rights, health care, labour and social welfare, but only so when the incumbent 
president is a Republican, i.e. he is perceived as weak on those issues.
Building on a joint work with James Snyder and Valentino Larcinese, I then study
the coverage of economic issues by a large sample of U.S. newspapers during the last 
decade. I find that newspapers with pro-Democratic endorsement pattern systematically 
give more coverage to high unemployment when the incumbent president is a Republican 
than when the president is Democratic, compared to newspapers with pro-Republican 
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Chapter 1
Introduction and literature 
review
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Inform ation  and issu e  salience
Information is a necessary ingredient in the process of making rational decisions. In its 
more immediate sense, information is understood as the amount of knowledge about 
a given topic, object or situation. From this point of view, the amount of information 
available to an individual is conditional to the topic itself. However, in a kind of recursive 
fashion, rational individuals also entertain some knowledge about the importance of 
the various topics and objects that belong to a given universe. Within a utilitarian 
perspective, the relevance of different topics is of course a relativistic concept, as it is 
linked to the preferences of the different individuals judging about it.
On this account, the importance of the various topics has a dual nature, since it 
both depends on a subjective element, i.e. the preferences of the individual, and on 
an objective one, i.e. the information about events external to the individual himself 
or herself. For example, individuals might differ in the relative value they intrinsically 
attach to their personal and professional life respectively. However, information about 
external events could affect the relative importance of these two domains at a given 
time: this would be the case if e.g. an individual happens to learn that he is at risk of 
losing his job.
Indeed, in order to identify and understand the role played by external events in 
shaping the importance individuals attach to different issues or domains, the temporal 
dimension is a crucial aspect to take into account. Starting with a baseline psychological 
state in which an individual attaches a set of weights to different issues, newly available 
information might alter this state, by inducing the individual in question to think that 
something must be done regarding a given topic or situation, or that there is no further 
need to deal with it. From this perspective, because of its Latin etymology (“things that 
must be done”), the term “agenda” is very suitable as a definition of the set of priorities
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characterising an individual or a group.1
The effects of information on the priorities of individuals are relevant both for private 
and collective choices. When deciding about the allocation of common goods, individuals 
are endowed with a limited amount of time and resources, and must first decide about 
which of the various aspects of their collective experience to take care of. The temporal 
dimension is again essential: at any given point in time individuals must figure out which 
issue should be their priority, since any problem left untackled might worsen, eventually 
becoming impossible or unbearably expensive to solve.
This line of reasoning applies to any social group; in particular it applies to polities, 
i.e. politically organized groups. In a nutshell, the priorities entertained by members 
of a given polity affect collective outcomes in an indirect way, i.e. passing through the 
formal and informal mechanisms of decision making characterising that polity. Within 
large polities, the priorities and beliefs of citizens about matters of common interest 
can be aggregated into a concept of public opinion. Public opinion matters to collective 
outcomes even in autocratic regimes, to the extent that the ruler cannot freely decide 
on those outcomes, but is to some degree constrained by the overall consensus of the 
population. In democratic societies, where citizens typically decide on common mat­
ters through majority voting, public opinion does not solely act as a constraint on the 
temporary discretionary power of those holding some kind of office, but should directly 
permeate collective outcomes, as it represents a summary of the agendas entertained by 
citizens.
1.1 .2  T h e m ass m edia as in form ation  suppliers and agenda setters
How do citizens acquire information about the state of affairs of their polity, be it a 
neighborhood, a city, a region or a country? How do they know that problems related 
to a given issue have taken place? On some issues citizens can rely on direct experience 
to obtain valuable pieces of information. This is certainly true for relevant economic 
figures like the inflation and the unemployment rate, whereas citizens can directly learn 
about the purchasing power of money and the job status of people belonging to the 
reference group. As more thoroughly discussed in section 4.6, it is comparatively more 
difficult to have a direct experience of the state of the public budget or the trade deficit. 
Outside the economics field, crime and health care represent other issues where direct 
experience plays a relevant role; on the other hand, it is hard for citizens to get directly 
acquainted with foreign policy events. It must be also noted that, the larger the size 
of the relevant polity, the smaller the fraction of issues on which direct experience is 
informationally useful to citizens. Moreover, to the extent that citizens care about the 
general situation regarding an issue and not only its local or personal aspects, direct 
experience, even if available, might be little informative or even misleading.
1 Information about “external events” also includes any knowledge regarding the preferences or choices 
of other individuals. To the extent that they are positively or negatively affected by the degree of affinity 
between their preferences and those of their reference group, individuals might play a coordination game, 
i.e. change their agenda in order to make it more or less similar to the average one in their reference 
group.
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In all those instances where direct experience or word of mouth cannot provide 
citizens with adequate information, the mass media have often filled the gap. Mass media 
outlets acquire, process and disseminate information; because of the typically large fixed 
cost and small marginal costs involved in this process, forms of mass communication 
appeared only when a sufficiently large demand for “news” (i.e. updated information 
about current affairs) did emerge.2
On one side the mass media respond to citizens’ demand for information. On the 
other one, exactly because the public needs the information to form an opinion and 
decide on common matters, there are clear incentives on the supply side of the media 
market to influence and possibly control the information being provided, in order to 
indirectly affect those opinions and decisions. Many social actors might be interested in 
influencing the supply of information by the mass media; in the absence of preexisting 
media outlets, they could do so by directly establishing new ones. Historically, the 
government itself played a major and anticipatory role, creating powerful means of mass 
communication for propaganda purposes. In fact, the term propaganda denotes the use 
of the mass media by the ruling government to create and stabilise public consensus.3
Demand of information and supply of persuasion: at first sight, the political role of 
mass media appears to be essentially defined by these two powerful forces. Citizens rely 
on the mass media to acquire news about current events, but they face the risk that 
“somebody” distorts the supply of news in order to move opinion in a direction which 
is favorable to him (or her). This Manichean perspective, whereas ordinary citizens are 
good folks desiring honest information while the goverment and/or interest groups play 
in the shadows distorting it, is mitigated by the fact that citizens themselves might like 
the idea of receiving information that is distorted towards their prior views and beliefs, 
in order to avoid a sense of cognitive dissonance.4
As discussed above, information is often about the comparative importance of dif­
ferent issues: an individual learning that relevant events have taken place with respect 
to a given topic is induced to think that this topic is more or less salient than what 
thought before. When the mass media are the source of this information, any influence 
they might exert on the priorities of the audience typically goes under the tag of agenda 
setting effects. The seminal empirical contribution by McCombs and Shaw [1972] on 
the 1968 presidential elections in Chapel Hill, North Carolina shows a strong correla­
tion between the media agenda (i.e. the relative amount of space and time devoted to 
the different issues by the news media) and the public agenda (i.e. which issues are 
considered to be the most important by citizens).5
2For comprehensive accounts on the history of mass communication, see Briggs and Burke [2005] 
and Fang [1997]. Johann Carolus’ Relation aller Furnemmen und gedenckwiirdigen ( “Collection of all 
distinguished and commemorable news”), published in 1605 in the city of Strasburg, is widely acknowl­
edged as the first periodical newspaper. The London Gazette (1665), the first English newspaper, was 
preceded in 1643 by the Mercurius Aulicus, the first collaborative newsbook. On this, see Raymond 
[1996].
3For an inclusive account on the history of propaganda, see Jowett and O’Donnell [2006].
4This argument was first formalised by Mullainathan and Shleifer [2005]. See section 1.2.4 below.
5See section 1.2.1 below. Of course this correlation might be due to reverse causality (media outlets 
cater to the tastes of viewers and readers and hence give more coverage to the topics that their customers
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The agenda setting role of mass media outlets is politically relevant, to the extent 
that the political and electoral choices of citizens are affected by their issue salience, 
i.e. the comparative importance they attach to different issues. In the context of a 
representative democracy, citizens might be more willing to vote for a given candidate 
if they are convinced that the most relevant problems pertain to issues on which they 
perceive that candidate as more competent. On this account, the increased salience 
of a given issue interacts with the prior assessment on the comparative competence of 
candidates and political parties. Using the terminology introduced by Petrocik [1996], 
this is a theory of issue ownership: a political party owns an issue if the majority of 
citizens believes that members of that party are on average better at handling problems 
related to it, than candidates belonging to the other party or parties.
It could also be the case that citizens do not have strong a priori views on the 
comparative ability of different political actors on a given issue; rather, they might first 
consider the recent performance of the incumbent government on that issue in order to 
decide whether they are more confident in its actual skills or in the expected skills of 
the opposition. Indeed, these policy fields whose ownership depends on the incumbent’s 
recent record -like the economy or foreign policy- are defined by Petrocik performance 
issues.6 In this case one can argue that an increased amount of coverage devoted to 
an issue is more favorable to the incumbent government, the more satisfactory is the 
current state of affairs on the issue itself.
The main focus of the dissertation is hence the political role of mass media as agenda 
setters. The long-term or performance-based ownership of a given issue determines 
whether an increased coverage of that issue would be favorable to one political party or 
the other. This is the main identifying assumption, on the basis of which the agenda set­
ting behaviour of mass media outlets is investigated here, both from a game-theoretical 
and an empirical point of view.
1.1.3 A  th eoretica l m od el o f  electoral co m p etitio n  w h en  m ass m edia  
have agenda se ttin g  effects
On the theoretical side, it is crucial to understand the consequences of issue coverage by 
mass media outlets on the political and electoral behaviour of rational citizens. Under 
the assumption that news cannot be fabricated, I link the agenda setting power of mass 
media outlets to the fact that the space and time to print or broadcast stories are limited 
resources, so that -in the presence of an excess number of newsworthy events- editors and 
journalists must make an excluding choice, i.e. decide what to cover and what to disre­
gard. Moreover, as made clear by an extensive cognitive psychology literature, rational 
individuals are endowed with a limited amount of attention, which must be assigned to
consider ex ante more interesting), but some robust experimental evidence shows that the existence and 
strength of agenda setting effects proper. See again section 1.2.4 for additional references.
6Consistently with Petrocik’s focus on the United States (which is also the focus of the empirical 
analyses I perform in chapters 3 and 4), I have framed the discussion on issue ownership in the context 
of a representative democracy. However, similar insights would apply to an autocratic regime, to the 
extent that its survival depends on public consensus, and that this consensus is a function of the approval 
rate of the ruling government on the various policy issues, weighted by their salience.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 12
different and competing tasks: this poses further constraints on the information flows 
from media channels to the ears, eyes and minds of readers and viewers.
To illustrate the consequences of agenda setting by mass media, in chapter 2 I develop 
a simple model of electoral competition with two policy issues, two candidates and a 
single newspaper. Rational voters would like to know whether a given issue requires 
some action by the politician to be elected: this is the case if a problem related to 
that issue is known to have occurred. A problem regarding a given issue amounts to a 
publishable story on the newspaper, but on the newspaper itself there is room for only 
one story, so that -when problems related to both issues have occurred- its managing 
editor must decide what to publish and what to leave behind. In this simple setup, the 
ex ante probability with which the story about one issue is published when the other one 
would be equally publishable (because of the occurence of the related problem) defines 
the editorial policy of the newspaper. In accord with the issue ownership hypothesis, 
citizens entertain a priori views on which candidate, once elected, would be better at 
handling problems related to a policy issue, and they agree that one candidate owns one 
issue, while the other candidate is more competent on the other. Voters would then like 
to elect the candidate who is better at handling the issue that is more likely to be in 
need of a policy intervention, conditional on the information provided by the newspaper.
The assumed impossibility of fabricating news and the limited amount of space on 
the newspaper imply that -for any editorial policy- an unbiased citizen, i.e. somebody 
with no a priori preference in favor of any of the two candidates, would find it rational 
to vote for the candidate owning the issue which is featured on the newspaper itself, 
because of the uncertainty regarding the actual occurence of the other problem. If this 
unbiased citizen is the median one, its vote is pivotal and elections are won by that 
candidate. Prom this it follows that -at least ex post- each candidate would like the 
newspaper to cover the owned issue at the expense of the other. This contrast between 
the news preferences of the two candidates has a clear zero-sum component. However, 
there are good reasons to think that the incumbent politician might enjoy a comparative 
advantage in its attempt at influencing media coverage. This comparative advantage 
might for example depend on the fact that media outlets are already closely watching the 
policies implemented by the incumbent government, since citizens are directly affected 
by them. Before the elections the government could thus concentrate its efforts on owned 
issues, in order to tilt media coverage in that direction.
In the chapter I thus compare different scenarios regarding the editorial policy of 
the newspaper. In the spin case the newspaper is captured by the incumbent politician, 
so that in the presence of both stories the one on the owned issue is published for sure. 
If on the other hand the editorial policy is balanced, the editor of the newspaper would 
publish each story with equal probabilities. Finally, if the story about the issue owned 
by the challenger is published for sure, the editorial policy is of a watchdog type.
While the issue which is ex post covered on the newspaper determines the identity of 
the winner, the ex ante editorial policy affects the vote margin. Under the simplifying 
assumption that both problems are equally likely to arise, if the editorial policy is
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balanced the publication of each story triggers the same increase in the number of votes 
accruing to the candidate owning it, taking the case of no story being published as a 
benchmark. On the other hand, if there is spin the positive effect of a story about the 
problem owned by the incumbent on his vote share is smaller than the negative effect of 
a story about the problem owned by the challenger. Vice versa in the case of a watchdog 
policy. Thus the model implies that negative news for the incumbent produce a stronger 
electoral reaction than good news, if voters are aware of the fact that mass media are 
captured by the incumbent himself.
If the two problems are equally serious, voters’ welfare does not depend on the 
editorial policy. However, if the problem owned by the challenger is more serious than 
the incumbent’s one, but not too serious (i.e. the publication of the story owned by the 
incumbent still triggers his victory), aggregate social welfare is maximised by a watchdog 
editorial policy.
As discussed above, the demand for information on the media market must face the 
risk that news supply is altered for persuasion purposes. The final part of chapter is 
devoted to the analysis of the incentives for the incumbent politician to spin the news 
in his favor, and induce the newspaper’s editor to publish for sure the story about 
the problem on which he is perceived as more competent, when the other story as 
well could be published. Under the assumption that he is office-motivated and that 
spin activity is costless, the model shows that the incentives to spin the news are not 
straightforward. On this account, one must distinguish between an ex ante perspective, 
i.e. before the uncertainty about the state of the world is resolved, and an ex post 
one, which is relevant when it is known that both problems have occurred, so that 
they can potentially be published as stories on the newspaper. Ex post it is always 
optimal for the incumbent to make his favorite story sexier and have it published for 
sure. On the other hand ex ante incentives depend on whether uninformed voters are 
present: if all voters are informed, ex ante as well the incumbent prefers to exert spin 
to the maximum extent. This is the case because by moving the editorial policy in his 
favor the incumbent is simply maximising the probability of being elected for sure (and 
correspondingly minimising the one of being certainly defeated).
If uninformed voters are present, the outcome of the elections is uncertain and ex ante 
incentives depend on the shape of the distribution of the ex ante bias of rational voters, 
i.e. their idiosyncratic willingness to vote one candidate or the other, before knowing 
which problems have occurred. Since readers are assumed to be rational Bayesian up­
daters, the probability for the incumbent to win the elections, conditionally on the type 
of news being published, is decreasing in the favorability of the editorial policy, even 
if it is of course higher when the newspaper publishes the favorable story. This is due 
to the fact that the publication of the favorable story under a more favorable editorial 
policy is more likely to disguise the presence of the other problem, so that the vote 
margin for the incumbent is lower and hence his probability of winning the elections. 
On the other hand, -again under an editorial policy that is completely tilted in favor of 
the incumbent- the publication of the unfavorable story would be due to the absence
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of the story about the problem owned by the incumbent himself, so that his vote mar­
gin is similarly compressed, together with his probability of electoral success. Hence 
an editorial policy that is more tilted towards the story about the incumbent’s problem 
would give a higher ex ante weight to a higher probability of electoral success, but would 
at the same time depress both probabilities of winning conditional on the story being 
published. I define these two contrasting channels as a weight effect and a slope effect, 
respectively.
When the distribution of the ex ante bias is unimodal, i.e. there are more moderate 
than radical voters, the weight effect dominates over the slope effect, and the incumbent 
maximises his ex ante payoff by exerting spin to the maximum extent and have the 
story about the owned problem being published for sure. On the other hand, with a 
polarised distribution of the bias, i.e. when there are more radical citizens than moderate 
ones, the slope effect prevails and the model delivers the interesting and prima facie 
counterintuitive result that the incumbent would prefer a watchdog editorial policy by 
the newspaper. A polarised distribution implies that there are few moderate citizens that 
would be convinced to vote for the incumbent by the publication of the more favorable 
story, which in turn is conducive to a smaller weight effect, while the size of the slope 
effect is left unaltered. Of course in this case a relevant credibility issue emerges, since 
ex post incentives drive the incumbent in the opposite direction of complete spin.
1.1.4 T h e p o litica l role o f m ass m edia as agenda setters: an em pirical 
look
As described above, in chapter 2 I construct a simple game-theoretical model which 
shows how issue coverage by mass media outlets can affect the electoral choices of rational 
voters. From a different but connected perspective, the variation in the amount of 
coverage devoted to long-term and performance issues by a given media outlet might 
be informative about its political position. In order to extract information about the 
ideological stance of a media outlet from its agenda setting behaviour, it is necessary to 
exploit some exogenous variation in the degree with which coverage of a given issue is 
favorable to different political parties or actors.
A case study: Dem ocratic and Republican issues on the New York Times, 
1946-1997
In the case of long-term issue ownership (i.e. issues about which a majority of citizens 
permanently believes that a given party is more competent than its opponent), one could 
exploit the variation in coverage inside and outside the electoral campaign. The argu­
ment goes as follows: to the extent that citizens, on top of their ideological preferences, 
make up their mind about whom to vote as elections get closer, it is reasonable to believe 
that the agenda setting power of mass media outlets correspondingly becomes politi­
cally more valuable during the campaign. On the other side, the ex ante perceptions 
of the public about issue ownership determine whether the increased coverage during 
the campaign of a given issue is favorable to one party or the other. Hence, a given
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 15
media outlet could be defined as leaning towards party A if during electoral campaigns 
it systematically gives more coverage to issues owned by that party, with decreased or 
stable coverage of the issues owned by party B.
Other factors might however affect the time variation in issue coverage by a media 
outlet. First, one should control for the political activity of the incumbent govern­
ment across the different policy issues, in order to disentangle whether variation in issue 
coverage arise from a partisan attitude or simply track changes in newsworthy events. 
Moreover, the media outlet could cover issues differently as a function of the political af­
filiation of the incumbent government, even after controlling for the activity of the latter 
across issues. Finally, issue coverage during electoral campaigns, on top of the partisan 
component, could depend on the political affiliation of the incumbent government. A 
newspaper, TV or radio channel can be defined as an electoral watchdog if during the 
campaign it gives more coverage to issues over which the incumbent is perceived as less 
competent than the challenger and/or it devotes less coverage to issues owned by the 
incumbent. Vice versa, a media outlet displaying the opposite behaviour can be defined 
as an electoral lapdog.
In chapter 3 I apply this empirical strategy to describe the political behaviour of 
the New York Times, from 1946 to 1997. In order to do so, I analyse a random sam­
ple of articles that appeared on the Times during the time period, gathered by Frank 
Baumgartner and Bryan Jones within the Policy Agendas Project.
The main finding of this case study in issue coverage is that the New York Times 
has a Democratic partisanship, with some watchdog aspects, since during presidential 
campaigns it systematically gives more emphasis to topics owned by the Democratic 
party, but only so when the incumbent President is a Republican. This set of Democratic 
topics comprises stories about civil rights, health care, labor and employment, and social 
welfare.
The magnitude of the effect is sizeable: when the incumbent President is a Republi­
can, there are 26 percent more stories about Democratic issues during the three months 
of the presidential campaign than outside of it. The increase is actually larger (around 
33 percent) when considering the period starting from the 60s. On the other hand, when 
the incumbent President is a Democrat, there is no statistically significant change in the 
count of Democratic stories during the presidential campaign. This is true both for the 
entire sample and for the post-1960 subperiod, and is consistent with the fact that the 
partisan effect and the watchdog effect almost cancel each other.
The typical claim in the literature on issue ownership is that the majority of U.S. 
citizens perceives the Republican party as more competent on the issues of crime and 
defense. However, data from Gallup polls and the National Election Study (NES) show 
that this is true only for defense, as in only three presidential campaigns over a total of 
twelve there is a reversal in the ownership of the issue. On the other hand, in three cases 
out of seven citizens perceived the Democratic party as more competent than the GOP 
on the crime issue.7 The coverage of these two topics is hence separately analysed. When
7On this account, the Gallup and NES data gathered for the chapter contributes to the literature
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considering the entire time span, there is no statistically significant variation in the count 
of stories about these two topics during the presidential campaign. This asymmetric 
behaviour on Democratic and Republican topics during presidential campaigns lends 
support to the hypothesis of a Democratic partisanship of the Times.
In fact, when looking at the 1961-1997 subsample, the Times gives more coverage to 
stories about defense during the presidential campaign, when the incumbent president 
is a Democrat and there is no reversal in the ownership of the issue. Just because the 
ownership reversal occurs in 1964, 1980 and 1996, this effect would account for the 1968 
campaign. When there is ownership reversal the Times ceteris paribus dedicates less 
room to defense stories during the presidential campaign. Moreover, when the incumbent 
president is a Republican there is actually a decrease in the count of stories about 
defense as the presidential campaign starts. Taken together, these results corroborate 
the hypothesis of a watchdog attitude of the Times, because during the presidential 
campaign there is less coverage of the defense issue when the incumbent President is 
perceived as more competent on it than the opponent. Regarding the Law & Crime 
issue, there is no comparable pattern of change in the coverage, both for the entire time 
period and the post-1960 subsample.
Given the more symmetric behaviour with respect to Democratic topics and the 
defense issue, the 1961-1997 evidence lends more support to the watchdog hypothesis, 
and somewhat detracts from the Democratic partisanship one. It is however important 
to bear in mind the intrinsic salience of the Vietnam War, which could explain in part 
the results on the coverage of the defense issue during the 60s.
The description of issue coverage on the New York Times crucially exploits the 
exogeneity of election dates in the U.S. institutional system, so that it is possible to 
attach a political significance to variations in that coverage, which are triggered by 
the start of presidential campaigns. However, this empirical strategy does not allow to 
disentangle the role of demand and supply factors as determinants of this agenda setting 
behaviour by the Times. In particular, one cannot tell whether the partisan behaviour 
of the Times is due to the fact that owners and/or editors and/or journalists planned to 
drive readers on the Democratic side, or that they were simply preaching to the choir, 
i.e. readers themselves appreciated an increased coverage of Democratic issues during 
the campaign. By the same token, stakeholders on the supply side could have traded 
off monetary rewards against the “moral payoff’ of acting as watchdogs with respect 
to the incumbent president, consistently with the journalistic norm. As a demand-side 
explanation, readers might be exactly asking for a more intense scrutiny of those issues 
that are likely to have been disregarded by the incumbent president during the term.
All these interpretations are consistent with the data, in the lack of some exogenous 
variation in the ideological stance on the demand and/or the supply side. On this 
account, it is true that different members of the Ochs-Sulzberger family took over the 
post of publisher of the Times, but there were no sizeable and abrupt changes in their
itself on issue ownership, in that it covers a much wider time window than the one analysed by the 
seminal contribution of Petrocik.
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ideological position to be exploited.
Partisan coverage of economic news: a large sample of U.S. newspapers in 
the last decade
Performance issues -like foreign policy or the management of the economy- represent 
another fruitful terrain on which it is possible to investigate the political behaviour of 
mass media outlets as agenda setters. To the extent that the responsibility regarding 
the status of a performance issue is attributed to the incumbent government, one can 
argue that the coverage of that performance issue by a given media outlet is more 
sympathetic to the incumbent if it takes place when the situation on the issue itself 
is good, than if taking place during difficult times. If the data allows it, one should 
check whether a given media outlet systematically gives a different amount of coverage 
to a similarly good or bad situation under governments of different political affiliations. 
Compared to foreign policy, it is easier to operationalise this kind of empirical approach 
with data on the coverage of economic issues, because of the availability of objective and 
largely undisputed statistical measures of their status. In the presence of data on a long 
enough time period, a measure of the partisan bias on a given economic issue by a media 
outlet would be given by the differential reaction to a worse condition on the issue as a 
function of the political affiliation of the incumbent government. Take the case of the 
unemployment rate, which is a “bad” , since a high value and/or increasing value of it 
denotes a bad news. One can trace out the amount of coverage devoted to unemployment 
by that media outlet as a function of the underlying level of the unemployment rate 
and the political affiliation of the incumbent government. The media outlet would be 
defined as partisan in favor of party A if it systematically gives less coverage to high 
unemployment when party A rules than when party B does, and vice versa for low 
unemployment.
Such difference in the slope of coverage could work as an absolute measure of the 
political bias characterising that media outlet if the time window under consideration 
is long enough, with sufficient orthogonal variation in the unemployment rate and the 
political affiliation of the government. If the time period is on the contrary short, the 
interpretation of the differential slope as an absolute measure of political bias is much 
less legitimate, because of the likely influence of unobserved time effects, which could be 
linked to the presence of other newsworthy events. For example, if a strongly relevant 
event happens to occur when party A governs and unemployment is high, all media 
outlets could deflect their attention from unemployment to cover this other story, but 
the identification strategy laid out above would wrongly classify media outlets as more 
in favor of party A than what they actually are.
When only a short time sample is available, the only legitimate claims that can 
be advanced regard the relative political position of media outlets. In particular, one 
could check whether the differential coverage of economic issues -as a function of the 
political affiliation of the incumbent government and the underlying value of the relevant 
economic variable- is significantly correlated with some measure of the explicit political
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position of different media outlets.
Chapter 4, which is based on a paper I have coauthored with Valentino Larcinese 
and James M. Snyder, Jr., exactly exploits this type of empirical strategy, in order to 
investigate the coverage of economic issues by a large number of U.S. newspapers over 
the last decade (and back to the previous decade for a smaller sample of newspapers). 
Running keyword-based searches on the NewsLibrary electronic archive, we collected 
monthly and quarterly data on the number of articles that each newspaper published 
about some relevant economic issues. We match these data on coverage with the actual 
economic figures and the party affiliation of the incumbent president The focus on 
the president is justified by the fact that -as shown by an extensive political science 
literature- the performance of the economy under the term has a strong influence on 
his (or his party’s) vote during the next presidential elections, while there is no robust 
evidence about the economy affecting outcomes in congressional elections.
As explained above, the empirical exercise consists in studying whether there is 
any significant cross-sectional correlation between the differential coverage of economic 
issues by newspapers -as a function of the underlying figure and the political affiliation 
of the incumbent president- and more explicit measures of their political orientation, in 
particular the propensity to endorse Democratic vs. Republican candidates in electoral 
races.8 In other terms, the exercise presented in chapter 4 amounts to investigating 
if the political orientation of newspapers “spills over” from the editorial page, where 
endorsements appear, to the news section, where the power to set the agenda can be 
used in a partisan fashion by differentially covering the same economic figures as a 
function of the the incumbent president’s party. This would be a manifestation of what 
we call agenda bias.
Our focus is on four key economic variables, which all represent “bads” : the unem­
ployment rate, the inflation rate, the federal deficit, and the trade deficit. The idea is 
that the public might blame the incumbent president for high values of these variables, 
or correspondingly reward him for low values. In a nutshell, we study whether news­
papers with a higher propensity to endorse Democratic candidates give less coverage to 
a high and/or rising economic figure under a Democratic than a Republican president, 
compared to the coverage by newspapers with a higher propensity to endorse Republi­
cans. As more formally illustrated in section 4.3.3, this is done by analysing -within a 
regression framework- a three-way interaction term.
We find some fairly robust evidence of agenda bias in the coverage of the unemploy­
ment rate: newspapers with a pro-Democratic endorsement stance significantly publish 
fewer stories about unemployment when the national unemployment rate is high and 
the president is a Democrat, than when the unemployment is equally high and the pres­
ident is a Republican, as compared to newspapers with a pro-Republican endorsement 
pattern. The size of the estimated effects is not negligible: when the unemployment 
rate was one percentage point above the average, newspapers with a strong propensity
8A (political) endorsement is the public declaration by a given individual or group that h e/sh e/it  
supports a candidate in an electoral race. In Anglo-Saxon countries like the U.S. or U.K. it is common 
for newspapers to explictly endorse candidates.
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to endorse Republican candidates responded with 15% more articles per month under 
Bill Clinton than under George W. Bush. Considering the same one percent increase, 
newspapers with a strong pro-Democratic endorsement policy have 9% less news on 
unemployment under Clinton than under Bush. Regarding different time windows, the 
result on agenda bias in the coverage of unemployment is more robust when looking at 
the subsample of newspapers belonging to a chain or with large circulation. On this ac­
count, one could argue that managing editors and journalists of large-scale newspapers 
are more conscious of the political consequences of their agenda setting power, and act 
accordingly. In other terms, the link between the endorsement policy and the coverage 
of economic news might be less noisy when focusing on this subset of newspapers.
On the other hand, there is no evidence of partisan bias in the coverage of the 
three other economic variables we consider. Taken together, the significance of results 
on unemployment and the lack of significance on inflation and the two deficits might 
induce to think that there is little agenda bias on U.S. newspapers regarding economic 
issues. However, as more thoroughly discussed in section 4.6, the lack of agenda bias 
on inflation could be explained by the low salience of the issue itself, which is in turn 
related to the low level of the inflation rate during the time period under consideration. 
By the same token, because of the dire and directly observable consequences of a high 
inflation rate on people’s lives, it would be interesting to check whether agenda bias on 
inflation in fact occurred during the 70s and early 80s, i.e. in a period where a two- 
digit inflation rate was not a rare event. Regarding the budget deficit and the trade 
deficit, one could instead argue that they are more arcane variables, whose influence on 
presidential approval is far from clear, since their effects on the personal lives of citizens 
are not immediate and can hence be substantially discounted.
On this account, survey data from the American National Election Studies 1992- 
2004 show that unemployment came in second as the “most important problem facing 
the nation” (with crime being the first one): nearly 10% of respondents mentioned it. 
As a comparison, less than 0.5% of respondents mentioned inflation, and even counting 
generously, only about 1.5% of respondents mentioned trade-related issues.
As discussed above, it is crucial to identify the respective influence of demand and 
supply factors on the partisan position of media outlets. In their study of the ideological 
slant of the language used by U.S. newspapers Gentzkow and Shapiro [2007] conclude 
that this slant mainly depends on the political position of readers in the relevant markets 
and far less on the identity of newspaper owners.9
Following this line of reasoning, we investigate whether the agenda bias found for 
unemployment coverage depends on demand, i.e. the partisanship of readers. While 
newspapers with higher sales in Democratic areas indeed give more coverage to high un­
employment under Bush than under Clinton, as compared to those sold in Republican 
areas (consistently with Gentzkow and Shapiro [2007]), this correlation is no longer sig­
nificant when controlling for the ideological leaning of endorsements, properly interacted. 
On the other hand endorsement partisanship still matters, i.e. Democratic-endorsing
9See section 1.2.4 below.
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newspapers ceteris paribus systematically give more coverage to high unemployment 
under Bush than under Clinton, in comparison to Republican-endorsing ones. Agenda 
bias in economic news thus appears to be more connected with the ideological position 
of editors, i.e. a supply factor, rather than with the one of readers.
This is also confirmed by a case study on the succession of Otis Chandler in the 
60s as publisher of the Los Angeles Times, the newspaper owned by his family since 
1884. The LA Times used to have a clear conservative slant, which Chandler decided to 
overturn, in order to make the paper stand as a credible rival of the New York Times. 
The data show that before 1965 the LA Times systematically gave more coverage to 
high unemployment and inflation under a Democratic president than a Republican one, 
while this differential reactivity disappears in the post-1965 period. Indeed, in the 60s 
-after Otis Chandler took office- the propensity for the LA Times to endorse Democratic 
candidates steeply increased, but this was not matched at all by a comparatively rapid 
surge in the Democratic vote in the relevant geographical area.
Prom a methodological point of view, a salient characteristic of the approach taken up 
in the chapter is the coding of newspaper articles through an automatic keyword search, 
instead of a human-based content analysis. One clear advantage of this procedure is 
that -by definition- it is not intensive in the usage of (costly) human capital. Its low 
cost allows to gather data on a large number of news outlets for a long time span, with 
the only restriction consisting in what is available in existing digital archives. More 
importantly, one can straightforwardly replicate an automatic search, since it is based 
on a known set of words and/or sentences that are used as classifiers. These advantages 
must of course be traded off against the cost of achieving a lower degree of precision than 
the one obtainable with human-based content analysis. As I will argue more extensively 
in chapter 4’s concluding section, any study of mass media behaviour which attempts at 
reaching a standard of scientific rigor should try and exploit the replicability of machine- 
based content analysis.
1.1.5 S tru cture o f  th e  th esis
To sum up, the thesis is organised as follows: in the next section of this chapter I will 
overview the related literature. Chapter 2 is devoted to the analysis of the theoretical 
model of electoral competition with mass media as agenda-setters. Chapter 3 features 
the study of the agenda setting behaviour of the New York Times on Democratic and 
Republican issues, while chapter 4 presents the results on the coverage of economic issues 
by U.S. newspapers, as correlated with their endorsement choices. Chapter 5 concludes, 
with some discussion of the areas for future research on the topic. Proofs, tables and 
figures appear at the end of each chapter.
1.2 Literature review
The main thread of the dissertation consists in understanding how mass media outlets 
might act in a political fashion through their agenda setting power, i.e. their capability of
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influencing the priorities of readers and viewers across issues by changing the amount of 
coverage devoted to them. This project is essentially multi-disciplinary, as it crosses over 
the boundaries of economics, political science and communication studies as separate 
fields of social science.
In this section I will survey the literature that is related to the theoretical and em­
pirical findings contained in the next chapters. The theory of agenda setting effects, 
as developed within the field of communication studies, is described in section 1.2.1. 
Particular attention is devoted to the issue ownership hypothesis (Petrocik [1996]), ac­
cording to which the topic itself covered by media outlets can have sizeable political 
consequences, to the extent that readers and viewers consider a given party or candi­
date as more competent on that topic.
In the context of a representative democracy, the broad political implications of the 
agenda setting power of media outlets must certainly be studied within a theoretical 
model of voting which allows for the presence of multiple policy issues citizens care 
about. Agenda setting effects can thus be thought as a change in the salience structure 
entertained by voters. As section 1.2.2 illustrates, while reasonably weak conditions are 
sufficient to rule out voting cycles10 in collective choice models with only one policy 
issue, these conditions are prohibitively narrow in multidimensional policy spaces. In 
order to obtain stable equilibria within these spaces, the subsequent literature has added 
further restrictions and qualifications to the voting game, which are briefly described 
there. Finally, the section deals with the few voting models where the salience structure 
is not exogenously given.11
Besides the contributions on multidimensional policy spaces, there is a recent and 
growing political economy literature which attempts at explicitly incorporating mass 
media behaviour within models of electoral competition. Section 1.2.3 offers an overview 
and a classification of those. The first group of models is based on a notion of politics 
as a distributive process, whereas the presence of mass media outlets affects those who 
are informed and hence targeted by favorable policies. The second group includes those 
models that are based on a political agency mechanism, i.e. voters punish or reward the 
incumbent politician on the basis of his past performance, and the mass media might 
provide valuable information about it. The third group of papers is explicitly focused 
on the agenda setting behaviour of mass media outlets and on the implications of this 
on the political equilibrium.
The last section of the survey is devoted to the recent theoretical and empirical 
contributions on mass media bias. The theoretical side of this literature has developed 
models where demand or supply factors determine the emergence of politically biased 
media outlets. On the other hand, its empirical counterpart has put forward various 
measures of the political position of media outlets, which are meant to be replicable,
10As discussed in section 1.2.2, a voting cycle occurs if a policy alternative A beats alternative B in 
pairwise ballot, which in turn beats alternative C. But alternative C beats alternative A, so that the 
voting agenda (i.e. the sequence according to which alternatives are put to vote) affects the winning 
alternative.
11 The models with an endogenous salience structure which depends on the role played by mass media 
outlets are mentioned in section 1.2.2 but are discussed in the following section.
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meaningful and synthetic. It is indeed clear that any rigorous discussion about the 
political role of mass media cannot dispense with the availability of reliable indicators 
of their ideological position.
1.2.1 M ass m edia  effects on public opinion: agenda se ttin g , fram ing  
and issue ow nership
The theory of agenda setting effects is built around the idea that mass media are capable 
of influencing the importance readers and viewers attach to different issues12. As aptly 
summarised by Cohen [1963], the press “may not be successful much of the time in 
telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what 
to think about. The world will look different to different people depending on the map 
that is drawn for them by writers, editors, and publishers of the paper they read.” In 
his Public Opinion book, Lippmann [1922] argued that news provided by mass media 
outlets are a primary source of information, and sometimes the only one, about public 
affairs: in the absence of information provided by mass media, most events related to 
public affairs would in fact be “out of reach, out of sight, out of mind” for the large 
majority of citizens. It follows that editors and journalists can possibly have sizeable 
degrees of freedom in the choice of what is newsworthy and this way they can influence 
the perception of citizens about which issues are relevant and to what extent.
As mentioned above, McCombs and Shaw [1972] is the seminal empirical contribution 
in which such concept of agenda-setting effects has been put to test: during the 1968 
U.S. presidential election, a sample of voters in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, was asked 
to name what were the key issues of the campaign. These reported rankings were then 
matched with the pattern of news coverage that had characterised available newspapers 
and network television news in the previous month: the found correlation between these 
measures of the media and the public agenda was always of a positive sign and typically 
very large in magnitude.
After McCombs and Shaw [1972], there has been a host of empirical studies striving 
to test for the presence of agenda-setting effects, either replicating their simple corre­
lation exercise, or adopting more sophisticated empirical designs, ranging from cross 
sectional and longitudinal to experimental ones. The cross-sectional evidence, as wit­
nessed by the Erbring et al. [1980] study, does not lend support to the presence of 
“unconditional” agenda setting effects; on the contrary, these agenda setting effects ap­
parently depend -in their presence and strength- on contingent characteristics of viewers 
and readers. In particular, only individuals who do not talk about political issues with 
their friends and relative are affected by the media agenda. On the contrary, individuals 
that are embedded in a network of informal political communication with their “neigh­
bors” seem to be substantially insulated from the agenda setting effects of the mass 
media to which they are exposed.
As discussed by Erbring et al. [1980] themselves and Iyengar et al. [1982], agenda
12This survey of the literature on agenda-setting effects is largely based on Iyengar and Simon [2000] 
and McCombs [2002].
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 23
setting effects have an intrinsically dynamic nature, in the sense that most of the varia­
tion in the media and the public agenda seem to occur along the time dimension, with 
cycles in the attention devoted to different issues by news providers and the general 
public. Indeed, longitudinal studies of the agenda setting hypothesis typically find a 
significant correlation between the media and the public agenda13, but the causal struc­
ture of the relationship is not entirely clarified. Omitted variable bias and endogeneity 
are a serious concern for this type of studies.
One could for example argue that the positive correlation between the media and the 
public agenda depend on the fact that they both follow the stream of real world events 
occuring. However, it is possible that editors and journalists, in the choice of newsworthy 
stories within the dense space of real world events, follow criteria that are systematically 
different than the ones that the general public would use, when deciding which events 
are salient. Indeed, if agenda setting effects are present, real world events could affect 
the public agenda through two different channels, i.e. in a direct fashion through the 
perception of citizens and indirectly through the effect on mass media coverage. On the 
other hand, a positive correlation between the issue coverage by mass media and the 
public agenda could be due to the fact that news providers “ride the wave” of public 
attention, i.e. they choose to cover more extensively those issues that ex ante are a 
matter of public concern.
Adopting a simultaneous equation approach, Behr and Iyengar [1985] analyse the 
links between real world events, television news coverage and the public agenda in the 
U.S. during the 1974-1980 period. They focus on the issues of energy, inflation and 
unemployment, showing that only in the case of unemployment real world cues have a 
direct influence on public concern. Regarding inflation and energy, public concern is 
driven by news coverage; moreover, the relationship between news coverage and public 
concern appears to be unidirectional, i.e. media agenda influences public concern, and 
not vice versa, in accord with the pure theory of agenda-setting effects.
Experimental evidence, as the one provided by Iyengar et al. [1982], lends the 
strongest support to the agenda setting hypothesis. Indeed, this approach has the 
advantage of creating some truly random variation in the explanatory variable of interest, 
i.e. the media agenda. Participants in the experiment run by Iyengar et al. [1982] were 
randomly assigned to a treatment and a control group. Both groups had to view what 
were alleged to be recordings of the previous evening’s TV news programme: those in the 
control group watched the original programme, while individuals in the treatment viewed 
an altered version of it, with increased coverage of a given national issue. Before and 
after the experiment, individuals in both groups were administered a questionnaire about 
the most important problem. Controlling for the ex ante personal agenda, individuals 
in the treatment group systematically attached a higher ex post importance than those 
in the control to the issue with magnified media coverage.14
13T w o  notable examples are Funkhouser [1973], and MacKuen and Coombs [1981].
14Eisensee and Stromberg [2007] adopt an intriguing instrumental variable approach to show the effects 
of mass media coverage on policy. They show that the amount of disaster relief funds provided by the 
U.S. government to developing countries is an increasing function of TV coverage of these disasters,
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The theory of agenda setting effects applies to the macro-level, i.e. to the influence 
of media coverage on the importance attached by the public to the various issues. But 
this influence can go a step further and affect at the micro-level the way readers and 
viewers think about a given issue.
As noted by McCombs [2002], the effects of mass media on public opinion have some 
kind of fractal structure: not only can mass media coverage highlight some topic as 
an object of attention, but -given this topic- it can emphasise some attributes of it, 
making them salient. Indeed, the theory of issue priming15 describes how readers and 
viewers, when assessing a given situation or individual, are pushed towards giving a 
higher weight to the aspect emphasized by the mass media. For example, Iyengar and 
Kinder [1987] find that the intense coverage of the Iranian hostage crisis during the last 
days of the 1980 presidential campaign induced citizens to assess Carter and Reagan on 
their supposed ability to deal with terrorist threats, instead of other topics.
More generally, a given topic or event can be looked at and dealt with from different 
perspectives: such framing of the message about an event or an issue is typically meant 
to increase the support of the audience to the position held by the sender of the message 
itself. These issue framing effects appear to be sizeable and capable to induce opinion 
change at the individual level. For example, regarding the specific issue of government 
spending in the U.S., Republicans often focus on it in broad and general terms, pointing 
out the overall need to cut this spending. On the contrary Democrats highlight specific 
spending programmes, like health care and food stamps. Jacobi [2000] analyses data 
from the 1992 National Election Study and finds that the opposition to increases in 
government spending is significantly lower when the question about it is worded in 
terms of specific programmes.
Political actors find it advantageous to frame a given issue in different ways: re­
garding the previous example, Republicans are thought to be more willing to cut public 
expenditures and therefore taxes; in fact, their position is more easily supported if cit­
izens think more about the total amount being spent, than about specific programmes 
that are thus financed. Conversely, Democrats are typically more eager to sponsor wel­
fare programmes and any hint to specific spending items could activate support for their 
position, because citizens identify themselves as direct recipients of these programmes 
and/or are driven by altruistic feelings.
Besides more complicated framing effects, it could be the case that voters on average 
believe that candidates coming from a given party are better at handling problems 
related to a given issue. This is the concept of issue ownership, as introduced by Petrocik 
[1996]. By analysing news content, answers to open-ended questions about issue salience 
and the vote itself for presidential elections between 1960 and 1992, Petrocik shows that 
in their political speeches candidates tend to emphasise owned issues: Democrats focus
which in turn negatively depends on the presence of other unrelated newsworthy events, such as the 
Olympic Games. The authors offer two different explanations for this effect. Media coverage might 
directly change the information set of politicians, or indirectly trigger their reaction by increasing the 
salience of the topic among the public. In both cases an agenda-setting mechanism is in place.
15See Krosnick and Miller [1996] for a review of the literature on issue priming.
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on civil rights and welfare issues, while Republicans give more emphasis to law Sz crime 
and defense. He also shows that, when issues owned by the Democratic (Republican) 
party are salient, self-identified Republicans (Democrats) are less willing to go and 
vote for their candidate, indipendents tend to vote for the Democratic (Republican) 
candidate, and the turnout of Democrats (Republicans) increases, together with their 
vote for their favorite candidate. Moreover, when deciding how to cast their vote, citizens 
appear to be taking into account how the incumbent is faring on performance issues, 
e.g. the management of the economy and/or of foreign policy. By performance issues 
Petrocik refers to those ones for which there is no long term ownership, i.e. citizens do 
not have strong a priori views on which party is better at handling them, so that the 
crucial determinant of ownership is the recent performance of the incumbent party on 
the issue itself.
On top of the survey-based results provided by Petrocik [1996], there is also some 
experimental evidence suggesting the presence of issue ownership effects. In the con­
text of the 1992 senatorial and presidential campaigns in California, Ansolabehere and 
Iyengar [1994] show that viewers of randomised political ads on TV were more likely 
to express a voting preference for the candidate that deals with the owned issue rather 
than the same candidate dealing with the non-owned one, in their case the Republican 
talking about crime instead of unemployment, and vice versa for the Democrat.
1.2 .2  P o litica l equilibrium  in m u ltid im en sional p o licy  spaces
The theory of social choice revolves around the problem of how a group of individuals 
can jointly decide about the allocation of goods through a set of established rules. The 
normative part of social choice is focused on the existence and features of a decision 
rule which can aggregate individual preferences in a “satisfactory” fashion, i.e. by 
meeting a set of reasonable criteria. In particular Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem (Arrow 
[1950], here in the stronger version of Arrow [1963]) states that no decision rule can 
be at the same time non-dictatorial (i.e. not reflecting the preferences of only one 
individual), universal (i.e. producing a complete and consistent social ordering for any 
possible preference ordering entertained by individuals), Pareto-efficient and insensitive 
to irrelevant alternatives.
On the other hand, the positive theory of social choice (borrowing a term used by 
Persson and Tabellini [2002]) is not concerned with the optimality of decision rules, but 
rather with the description of the equilibrium outcomes that would arise as a function 
thereof. Given their overwhelming use in actual social groups and polities, it is no 
surprise that majority voting mechanisms are the main focus of this theory. In the 
presence of more than two alternatives or candidates being voted, the crucial descriptive 
concept is the so called Condorcet winner, i.e. an alternative that would win a majority 
vote against any other alternative. If there is no Condorcet winner, electoral cycles 
can arise, in the sense that a platform A, which wins against platform B which in turn 
prevails over platform C, could be beaten by platform C. It follows that in the lack of 
a Condorcet winner the winning platform depends on the order with which platforms
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are matched in a pairwise vote. On the other hand, the presence of a Condorcet winner 
implies stability and predictability, in the sense that the procedural aspects of the voting 
process (namely the agenda, i.e. the sequence of pairwise votes) do not affect the final 
outcome. As pointed out by Riker [1980], if a Condorcet winner exists the equilibrium 
outcome of the voting game is solely dictated by tastes, i.e. by the shape of individual 
preferences. On the other hand, in the lack of a Condorcet winner the equilibrium 
outcome is also a functon of institutions, of which agenda control is a crucial aspect.
Formally, for a given social group or polity, the presence or lack of a Condorcet 
winner depends on the dimensionality of the vector p  of policies over which its members 
vote, and on the features of their preferences over these policies. 16 In fact, when the 
policy space is unidimensional (i.e. p  is a scalar), there are some fairly weak conditions 
on voters’ preferences, under which a Condorcet winner always exists, and coincides 
with the bliss point of the voter that is ranked as median. A sufficient condition for this 
result is that voters’ preferences are single peaked (Black [1948]), while a more general 
one is the single-crossing property suggested by Gans and Smart [1996].
On the other hand, when the policy space and voters’ heterogeneity are multidi­
mensional, a Condorcet winner in the voting game exists under much more restrictive 
conditions of symmetry on the arrangement of voters’ preferences (Plott [1967], Davis, 
de Groot and Hinich [1972]): a platform p* is a Condorcet winner if any hyperplane 
passing through it separates the policy space in such a way that there is an equal num­
ber of bliss points in either of the two subspaces being created. Some weaker conditions 
for the existence of a Condorcet winner can instead be found if the policy space is 
still multidimensional but the heterogeneity of voters’ preferences is shrunk to being 
unidimensional (Grandmont [1978]).
These general results apply to a direct democracy, i.e. a situation in which policy 
platforms are directly voted by an assembly of citizens; in fact, modern democracies are 
representative, in that the most relevant policy choices are made by elected representa­
tives, to whom citizens have delegated the power to decide on their behalf. Consistently 
with Riker’s remark, the delegated nature of political institutions imposes some restric­
tions on the structure of the voting game. Indeed, the subsequent literature has focused 
on the way realistic institutional features, once incorporated in a game-theoretic setup, 
might pin down the equilibrium outcome, i.e. avoiding the indeterminacy of Condorcet 
cycles.
If citizens are electing their representatives and not directly choosing policy plat­
forms, it is likely that their vote is not only affected by the platforms candidates pro­
pose, but also by other factors over which candidates have less control, or no control at 
all, e.g. an ideological bias in favour of one or the other candidate. Probabilistic voting 
models (Hinich [1977], Coughlin and Nitzan [1981], Ledyard [1981, 1984]) are based 
on this idea of an uncertainty faced by candidates regarding the relationship between
16As noted by Riker [1980] among others, there is a parallel here between the normative and the 
positive branch of social choice: it is much easier to obtain a fair decision rule (for the normative 
theory) or a stable outcome (for the positive one) if one restricts the domain of individual preferences 
being considered, either in their shape or in the distribution across members of the polity.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 27
proposed policy platforms and the way citizens vote. This uncertainty implies that the 
probability of receiving a vote from each citizen is a continuously differentiable mapping 
of policy platforms, and not a step function as in the deterministic set up . 17 In this 
case, a unique equilibrium of the voting game exists, given that some mild technical 
conditions on the joint distribution of these external factors are satisfied.
Citizen-candidate models, as introduced by Osborne and Slivinsky [1996] and Besley 
and Coate [1997], are based upon the idea that each member of the polity (by paying a 
fixed utility cost) may run as a candidate, but cannot precommit to offer policy platforms 
that there are different from the one she would prefer as a private citizen. This two-stage 
game of candidates’ entry and voting typically features a sub-game perfect equilibrium 
with multiplicity as a generic outcome of the entry stage. However, Condorcet cycles 
are ruled out. If candidates are citizens who cannot precommit, but moreover, in order 
to run for elections, they must belong to already established political parties, then the 
parties’ constituencies might constrain the identity of candidates and henceforth the 
policy platforms that can be offered to voters. This is of course a restriction with 
respect to the general model with any citizen being a potential candidate, but it reflects 
a relevant feature of modern democracies, in which parties behave as barriers to entry 
in the political arena. The model presented in chapter 2 is in fact based on this idea of 
political parties determining candidates’ characteristics ex ante, with candidates from 
one party being more competent on one policy issue than the other, and vice versa for 
the other issue.
A common feature of all the models of electoral competition discussed above is that 
the importance attached by citizens to the various issues (i.e. the different dimensions 
of the vector p ) is exogenously given, as it is embedded in their utility function. Indeed, 
this “salience structure” or “public agenda” has important implications on the features 
of the political equilibrium itself. For example, in citizen-candidate models with political 
parties, as in Besley and Coate [2000, 2003], the fact that citizens are equipped with 
only one vote to cast in the presence of multiple policy issues implies the possibility 
that -on non-salient issues- the position preferred by the majority of voters might not 
be implemented in equilibrium. This “inefficiency” result can be actually avoided if the 
non salient issue is unbundled from the salient one, i.e. by letting citizens decide on it 
with an additional and separate vote.
In the political economy literature proper there are very few exceptions to this hy­
pothesis of an exogenous salience structure. Cantillon [2001] studies how different elec­
toral mechanisms provide different incentives for political parties to introduce emerging 
issues in their platforms. She assumes that each party, besides deciding which position 
to take on each of the I  issues, has a fixed endowment of “effort” that can be distributed 
across issues: the effort’s share e f  devoted to issue i by party A  determines the weight 
f ( e f )  given by voters in evaluating party A’s position on the issue itself. It follows that 
for each party j  there is an endogenous salience structure, which is induced by the vector
17In the deterministic case, a given citizen votes for sure for one candidate if she offers strictly more 
than what offered by the challenger, and would only randomise his vote between the two candidates if 
the two platforms deliver the same utility level.
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of efforts {e^}(=1. A relevant feature of the model is that these salience structures are 
party-specific: one could interpret them as representing the precommitment of party j, 
in case its candidate has been elected, to dedicate a fraction ej of time and resources to 
issue i.
Two other game-theoretic models of endogenous issue salience are Stromberg [2001] 
and Bernhardt et al. [2006]. However, because of the crucial role played by the mass 
media as agenda-setters in both of them, their description will be postponed to section 
1.2.3.
1.2.3 P o litica l econ om y m od els w ith  m ass m edia
There is a growing political economy literature which takes into explicit account the role 
played by the mass media as providers of information to citizens. Within this literature, 
one can trace at least three different ways of analysing the links between mass media 
behaviour and the political/electoral process.
The first approach, which is due to Stromberg [2001, 2004a, 2004b], is focused on 
the idea that the distinction between informed and uniformed voters depends on the 
access to mass media channels. Politicians are more willing to offer favourable policies to 
informed citizens, i.e. citizens that have access to the mass media. Indeed, these citizens 
are potentially aware of the fact that they have been targeted by favourable policies, 
and can thus reward politicians with their vote. In turn, the increasing returns’ nature 
of information supply that is intrinsic of the mass media makes it optimal to publish 
articles and broadcast programmes which target large and sufficiently affluent groups. 
In a world without the mass media, small and internally homogenous groups, which are 
able to organise themselves into lobbies, can typically obtain favourable policies18, at 
the expense of large and unorganised groups, e.g. consumers. 19 On the contrary, the 
presence and diffusion of the mass media creates a countervailing force in favour of these 
large groups. In support of his theory, Stromberg provides evidence about the territorial 
allocation of public funds from the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) 
program in the U.S. during the early 30s, as a function of radio diffusion.
The second line of research investigates the links between the information provided 
by the mass media and the accountability of elected politicians. In an asymmetric 
information environment, voters must assess the performance of the incumbent politician 
with respect to the assigned policy tasks. The more mass media outlets inform citizens 
about this performance, the more will they be able to punish or reward the incumbent 
with their vote. The incumbent politician will hence have stronger ex ante incentives 
to exert effort. Besley and Burgess [2001] develop a simple model of political agency, 
in which the effort a reelection-seeking incumbent puts is an increasing function of 
media access by citizens. The authors test the model against panel data on the sixteen 
major Indian states during the 1958-1992 period, and find that the responsiveness of
18However, this is not the case if in a citizen-candidate frawework voters strategically elect a politician 
with the opposite bias. See Besley and Coate [2001].
19Larcinese [2007] provides UK-based evidence on this overprovision of news that are of interest to a 
worthy audience.
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state governments to falls in food production and flood damage, as proxied by public 
distribution of food and expenditure on calamity relief, is stronger where newspaper 
circulation is higher: in particular, what seems to matter is the circulation of newspapers 
written in the local language.
Again within a political agency framework, the model by Besley and Prat [2006] is 
based on the idea that politicians face clear electoral incentives to alter the set of news 
citizens read and watch. In their model bad quality politicians have an incentive to 
bribe mass media outlets in order to induce them not to publish the news about their 
bad quality. This media capture by the incumbent government is less likely to occur 
when there are more independent mass media outlets. This is the case, because each of 
them must be paid the entire additional revenue that would accrue to the only outlet 
that would publish the bad news.
Finally, as mentioned in section 1.2.2, some political economy models are explicitly 
based on the idea that the mass media affect readers and viewers by changing their 
agenda, i.e. the importance attached to different policy issues.
On this account, in one specification of his model, Stromberg [2001] assumes that the 
incumbent politician must allocate a fixed budget between a general program of public 
expenditures, and a specific one, which delivers utility only to a subset of citizens. The 
utility of each program depends on the incumbent’s competence and on some local 
factors, which are indipendently distributed across citizens: newspapers can publish 
news about the two programs, that consists of reports about the realised utility of a 
sample of citizens. The more news are published about each program, the more voters 
are able to precisely extrapolate the incumbent’s competence on it: it follows that in 
their electoral choice citizens give more weight to the program about which they receive 
more precise information. This is a micro-founded way of depicting the political effects 
of mass media as agenda setters: the set of priorities entertained by citizens happens to 
change because of an induced change in their information set, not their preferences.
Along similar lines, Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn [2006] propose a model of electoral 
competition with two mass media outlets, which must decide their editorial policy, i.e. 
how much coverage to give to good and bad news about the two running candidates. 
They assume that citizens enjoy politically relevant news because of their entertainment 
value, and prefer to read stories that are consistent with their political position. Within 
this framework, the authors show that the polarisation of the electorate might lead to 
inefficient electoral outcomes, if it is the case that the newspaper read by the median 
voter is a biased one, i.e. -according to its editorial policy- it would only publish stories 
that are favourable to one of the two candidates.
1.2.4 M ass m edia bias: th eory  and ev id en ce
The recent years have witnessed an increasing amount of research on the topic of mass 
media bias. On the theoretical side, the main purpose of this literature is to explain 
the fact that mass media outlets often have a partisan position on political matters. 
According to some authors, the crucial riddle to solve is why media outlets en masse
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support a given political side, be it the conservative or the liberal one. 20 Differently 
from the literature explored in section 1.2.3, the focus here is on media markets by 
themselves, with less emphasis given to the interaction with the political and electoral 
process.
The empirical side of this literature is instead concerned with the construction of 
replicable, meaningful and synthetic measures of the political position of mass media 
outlets, thus avoiding the lack of scientific rigour characterising any type of anedoctal 
evidence. While the literature on mass media effects surveyed in section 1.2.1 investigates 
the causal link between media coverage and public opinion, the empirical contributions 
on mass media bias are focused on media coverage by itself, striving to find reliable ways 
to code it on a political/ideological scale. 21
Theory
Game-theoretic models of the political slant of media outlets can be easily classified 
according to whether the source of the bias is on the demand or the supply side of 
the market. Mullainathan and Shleifer [2005] and Gentzkow and Shapiro [2006] and 
the already cited Besley and Prat [2006] propose demand-driven theories, while Sutter 
[2001] and Baron [2006] focus on the supply side.
The crucial assumption in Mullainathan and Shleifer [2005] has a behavioural flavour: 
they posit that readers and viewers hold beliefs they would like to see confirmed by news 
providers. When news customers share common beliefs, profit-maximizing media outlets 
find it optimal to select and/or frame stories in order to pander to those beliefs. When 
beliefs are instead heterogenous, news providers differentiate their offer and segment the 
market, by providing news stories that are slanted towards the two extreme positions in 
the spectrum of beliefs.
On the other hand, the model by Gentzkow and Shapiro [2006] does not rely on 
behavioural assumptions, i.e. on a departure from full rationality. If readers and viewers 
are Bayesian updaters, have a priori views on the state of the world and are uncertain 
about the quality of the information about it being provided by media outlets, then the 
latter have an incentive to slant stories towards their customers’ prior, in order to build 
and keep a reputation for high-quality journalism. The reason for this is that Bayesian 
agents would tend to believe that pieces of information that go against their prior in 
fact originate from low-quality news providers.
The two models discussed above share the assumption of profit maximization by 
news providers. In a different context, Besley and Prat [2006] build a model in which 
mass media capture by the incumbent government (that translates into the suppression 
of unfavourable news) occurs because media outlets trade off profits from sales and
20The exponential increase in the number of technical papers on mass media bias is however dwarfed 
by the parallel expansion of the anedoctal-style literature on the topic, especially in the United States. 
The typical finding of these books is an overall media bias on the opposite side of the author’s political 
convictions. See e.g. Goldberg [2002] and Franken [2003].
21 This empirical endeavour of course presupposes the presence, possibly the relevance, of persuasion 
effects as the ones described in section 1 .2 .1 .
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advertising against a direct or indirect bribe from the government itself. In this model 
the profit-maximization assumption is kept, but two different sources of income are 
traded off by media outlets. Thus, media bias takes place as a favourable treatment of 
the incumbent government.
Baron [2006] proposes a supply-driven explanation for a persistent media bias, i.e. 
for a generalised slant of media outlets in favor of a given political position. This is the 
case if journalists, which are an essential input for news production, are characterised 
by a common ideological stance, i.e. they are all on average conservative or liberal. It 
follows that media outlets maximise profits by slanting news stories towards the political 
bias of journalists, in order to benefit from a lower wage being demanded by the latter 
in equilibrium.
In fact, the main alternative explanation for media bias on the supply side is that the 
owners themselves have political preferences that are traded off against the pure profit 
maximization motive. Depending on the relative strength of these two motivations, a 
more or less intense slant of the news towards the owner’s political preferences would 
emerge in equilibrium. This argument is put forward by Sutter [2001] . 22
Evidence
As mentioned above, the empirical literature on media bias attempts at finding replicable 
and intuitive measures of the ideological position of media outlets. A straightforward 
way to do this consists in investigating their explicit political behaviour. For example, in 
countries like U.K. and the U.S., during electoral campaigns newspapers suggest readers 
which candidates to vote. On this account, Ansolabehere et al. [2006] analyse the 
political orientation of endorsements by U.S. newspapers in statewide and congressional 
races, using a panel data design. They find an upward trend in the average propensity to 
endorse a candidate, and in particular an incumbent one. There are also some changes 
in the average ideological slant of endorsements: while in the 40s and in the 50s there 
was a clear advantage to Republican candidates, this advantage continuously eroded in 
subsequent decades, to the extent that in the 90s there is a slight Democrats’ lead in 
the average endorsement choice.
Endorsements are explicit statements, typically made on editorial pages, which are 
separate from the other sections of a newspaper. One might instead be interested (and 
more concerned) about the implicit political behaviour of media outlets. Potentially, 
this is a more insidious way for media outlets to act politically, exactly because readers 
and viewers might not be entirely aware of the persuasion they are subject to . 23
22The preferences of advertisers represent another potential source of bias for the mass media. In 
particular, there might be a conflict between those preferences and the ones entertained by readers and 
viewers, for example on the level of accuracy in news reporting. On this, see Ellman and Germano [2006]. 
Also, Baron [2005] investigates the biases arising from the fact that interest groups are an important 
source of news for the mass media regarding the specific sectors where they are involved.
2 3However, as discussed in the previous subsection, the ideological position of a given media outlet 
can be driven by demand itself, i.e. the ideological position of its readers or viewers. In other terms, 
readers and viewers are not persuaded into a new political stance, but simply confirmed in their present 
one.
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One can distinguish two broad approaches to the task of teasing out this implicit 
ideological stance. According to the first approach, followed by Groseclose and Milyo 
[2005] and Gentzkow and Shapiro [2007], mass media outlets are classified on the basis 
of the resemblance between what they report and what political actors of a known 
ideological position do. The second approach, to which the empirical exercises presented 
in chapters 3 and 4 belong, is instead based on the idea of directly looking at the variation 
in the type of topics covered by media outlets, or in the tone of this coverage. The paper 
by Lott and Hassett [2004] is an example of this empirical strategy.
Groseclose and Milyo [2005] have pioneered a subtle cross-sectional design to estimate 
the ideological position of U.S. mass media outlets. They start by tracing out which 
think tanks are quoted by various mass media outlets within news stories; in turn, the 
position of each think tank in the political spectrum is calculated as the weighted sum of 
the adjusted ADA scores24 of those representatives in the House and in the Senate that 
quote it in a non negative way. Adopting a maximum likelihood technique, the authors 
obtain the stark result that all sampled news providers -except Fox News’ Special Report 
and the Washington Times- are located to the left of the average Congress member, i.e. 
there are signs of a liberal bias in the U.S. news media. However, the news media also 
show a remarkable degree of centrism, in the sense that “[...]all outlets but one have 
ADA scores between the average Democrat and average Republican in Congress.” The 
only media outlet that is located to the left of the average Democrat -in terms of think 
tank quotes within news stories- is the Wall Street Journal.
While Groseclose and Milyo focus on think tank quotes only, Gentzkow and Shapiro 
[2007] provide another measure of media bias which is based on the similarity between 
the overall language used by U.S. daily newspapers and congressmen. Exploiting the 
Congressional Record, they identify “partisan” words and phrases -  i.e., those expres­
sions that show the largest difference in the frequency of use between Democratic and 
Republican representatives. For example, Democratic representatives typically use the 
more neutral expression of “estate tax”, while Republican ones provocatively talk about 
the “death tax” . The authors then measure how frequently these expressions appear 
in the sampled newspapers, in order to construct a measure of politically slanted lan­
guage. Estimating a structural model of the demand and supply of ideological slant in 
the media market, Gentzkow and Shapiro conclude that the partisan bias of newspapers 
depends mainly on consumers’ ideological leaning and far less on the identity of owners. 
Newspapers adopting a liberal (conservative) language sell more copies in ZIP codes 
that are more liberal (conservative), as proxied by the propensity of their inhabitants to 
donate to Republican or Democratic candidates. On the other hand, once geographical 
factors are accounted for, the ideological slant of a given newspaper is not significantly 
correlated with the average ideological slant of those belonging to the same chain.
Regarding the second approach, Lott and Hassett [2004] study the coverage of eco­
nomic news by looking at a panel of 389 U.S. newspapers from 1991 to 2004, and from
24Since 1947, the interest group Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) has tracked how U.S. con­
gressmen vote on key policy issues. These votes are used to rank them according to their liberal stance. 
Groseclose et al. [1999] adjust ADA scores in order to make them comparable across time and chambers.
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1985 to 2004 for a subsample comprising the top 10 newspapers and the Associated 
Press. For each release of official data about a set of economic indicators, the authors 
analyse how newspapers decide to report on them, as reflected by the tone of the related 
headlines. The idea is to check whether newspapers display some kind of partisan bias, 
by giving more positive or negative coverage to the same economic datum, as a func­
tion of the political affiliation of the incumbent President. Controlling for the economic 
data being released, the authors find that there are between 9.6 and 14.7 percent fewer 
positive stories when the incumbent President is a Republican. 25
The empirical literature on media bias is closely linked with the one regarding the 
effects of mass media on political attitudes and decisions. On top of the literature 
in communications studies which I surveyed in section 1.2.1, there are some recent 
contributions that do not focus on a specific aspect of media coverage (and its effects 
on individual attitudes), but rather look at some exogenous variation in the diffusion 
of a given media outlet, whose political position is assumed to be known. On this 
account, Gerber, Karlan and Bergan [2006] conduct a randomized control trial just 
prior to the November 2005 gubernatorial election in Virginia and randomly assign 
individuals in Northern Virginia to (a) a treatment group that receives a free subscription 
to the Washington Post, (b) a treatment group that receives a free subscription to the 
Washington Times, or (c) a control group. They find that individuals assigned to the 
Washington Post treatment group were eight percentage points more likely to vote for the 
Democrat in the 2005 election, while those who were assigned to the Washington Times 
were only four percentage points more likely to vote for the Democrat. 26 DellaVigna and 
Kaplan [2007] use a quasi-experimental approach, and exploit the gradual introduction 
of Fox News in cable markets in order to estimate its impact on the vote share in 
presidential elections, between 1996 and 2000. They find that Republicans gained 0.4 
to 0.7 percentage points in the towns which started to broadcast Fox News before 2000.
25As more thoroughly discussed in chapter 4, coding for the tone of an article is harder than for its 
topic. Unless the analyst provides detailed instructions, inter-coder agreement typically falls short of 
acceptable standards. And, when the analyst’s instructions are very detailed, then results are likely to 
be driven by these instructions.
26This latter effect does not reach statistical significance. However, it is not possible to reject at ordi­
nary confidence levels the null hypothesis that the effects of the two treatment groups on the probability 
of voting Democrat are equal.
Chapter 2
The Spin D octor M eets the  
Rational Voter
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter I develop a simple political economy model to illustrate how the agenda 
setting power of the mass media can affect electoral outcomes, by shaping the informa­
tion set enjoyed by voters who are assumed to be rational Bayesian updaters.
When confronted with the problem of electing their representatives for the next 
term, citizens are interested in obtaining pieces of information about the current state 
of affairs and the policy platforms offered by candidates. As discussed in the introduction 
of this dissertation, while on some issues direct experience can provide valuable pieces 
of information to voters, on some others mass media outlets are the only source of 
information.
Given (the knowledge of) candidates’ characteristics and platforms, the expected 
suitability of different candidates to the electoral position may depend on the current 
state of affairs. According to Petrocik’s [1996] theory of issue ownership, citizens have 
an instrumental attitude towards the electoral process, in that they want to elect the 
candidate who is perceived as better at handling the most pressing problems facing the 
country. Moreover, they have a priori views about which political party gathers the 
candidates who have a comparative advantage in solving problems related to a given 
issue. A political party is said to own an issue if citizens believe that its candidates are 
comparatively more able to solve problems related to it, given that they occur, than 
candidates belonging to the other party.
In a multidimensional policy space, as it is the one implicitly assumed by a theory of 
issue ownership, citizens cast their vote on the basis of the vector of weights they attach 
to the different issues. In turn the weight attached to a given issue is an increasing 
function of the number and magnitude of problems related to it that are known to 
have occurred. The idea is that mass media outlets provide pieces of news about which 
problems have occurred in the different fields: by shaping their information set, mass 
media outlets concur in determining the salience structure entertained by citizens, i.e.
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in setting their agenda.
When a problem related to a given issue happens, a story about it can be featured 
on the newspaper or the TV news broadcast. However, it can be the case that problems 
pertaining to different issues take place at the same time, and more than one story can 
potentially be published. The physical space on a newspaper and the airing time for 
a TV news broadcast are scarce resources. This is coupled with the limited amount 
of attention readers and viewers are typically willing or able to spend . 1 For example, 
stories on a newspaper are given an implicit ranking by their position, with a higher 
priority attached to front page ones.
The ranking is even stronger for TV news broadcasts: in this case, the viewer is 
directly forced by the order with which stories are presented, and by the amount of 
time devoted to each of them. In general, the managing editor of the newspaper or 
the TV news program must decide which story is newsworthy, and within this subset 
of published stories she must decide what to emphasize, namely what to publish or 
broadcast as the lead story2.
If citizens are influenced in their voting decision by the topics newspapers and TV 
news broadcasts decide to cover, political parties have strong incentives to reshape or 
manipulate the agenda of mass media outlets at their own advantage. In particular, if 
the issue ownership hypothesis correctly describes how rational citizens vote, then -to be 
euphemistic- each political party would strongly appreciate the fact that media outlets 
emphasize events pertaining to the owned issue. This is what political marketing is 
exactly about.
Take a situation with two parties competing with their candidates for an electoral 
office. Within an issue ownership perspective, first of all each candidate would focus her 
campaign on the set of owned issues3. Moreover, each candidate would try to induce 
news providers to feature stories about these owned issues, and disregard potential pieces 
of news about the policy fields owned by the opponent’s party. Such interaction between 
parties and news providers clearly has some zero sum game features, as the contrasting 
pressures of the two parties on media outlets may end up offsetting each other.
However, the incumbent party may enjoy a comparative advantage in its relationship 
with the mass media. There is a set of reasons for this to be the case. First, there is 
a natural tendency for journalists to watch attentively the activities of the incumbent 
politician, as these produce direct consequences on citizens’ lives. The incumbent politi­
cian can exploit such media attention and purposely concentrate his efforts on owned 
issues: by reporting what the incumbent is doing, journalists end up emphasizing the 
policy fields that are owned by the incumbent. Second, the incumbent politician’s party
1The psychology literature on attention (see e.g. the edited volume by Pashler [1998]) is now flanked 
by a growing number of theoretical and experimental contributions in economics, whereas the process 
of attention allocation is treated as a particular instance of the usual problem of allocating a scarce 
resource. See Gabaix et al. [2006] for an experimental test and a survey of this literature.
2As discussed in section 1.2.1, besides this choice between different facts and issues, journalists and 
news editors can also decide which aspect of any given event to emphasize, i.e. how to frame it.
3In fact, Benoit, Petrocik and Hansen [2003] analyse acceptance speeches and TV ads of U.S. pres­
idential candidates from 1952 through 2000. They show that candidates -and especially Republicans- 
strongly focus their campaign on owned issues.
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can have larger financial resources than the challenger: these resources might be used to 
set up a more efficient public relations department, which outperforms the challenger’s 
one. Third, the incumbent politician can stipulate an implicit agreement with news 
providers: in exchange for a more intense coverage of the owned issues now, he could 
offer easier access to newsworthy pieces of information in the future, of which he is the 
monopolistic supplier, at least as long as he is in office4.
In the simple model presented in this chapter an incumbent politician and a chal­
lenger compete for an electoral office. I assume that there is a single newspaper, and 
two issues about which citizens care: one is owned by the incumbent’s party, the other 
by the challenger’s. Problems pertaining to the two issues can occur, with given and 
independent probabilities: if a problem occurs, a verifiable signal is issued, and can be 
published as a story on the newspaper: however, on the newspaper itself there is room 
for only one story to be published5.
In this simple setup, the ex ante probability with which the story about one issue is 
published when the other one would be equally publishable (because of the occurence 
of the related problem) defines the editorial policy of the newspaper. I hence define as 
“spin” the ability of the incumbent politician to make the story about the owned issue 
more palatable to the newspaper’s editor. If there is spin, given that both problems 
have occurred, the story about the issue owned by the incumbent is always published. 
I compare this regime of media capture through spin to two other polar cases. If the 
editorial policy is one of balanced reporting, the managing editor is indifferent about 
which story to publish, i.e. it is as if he decides by tossing a fair coin. In the watchdog 
case the newspaper always gives priority to the issue that is owned by the challenger’s 
party.
As a function of the editorial policy of the newspaper, the model offers predictions 
about the coverage of issues by the newspaper and the effects of this coverage on the 
electoral outcome.
First -by construction- the model suggests that ex ante it is more likely to read 
stories about the issue owned by the incumbent if there is spin than with balanced 
reporting, and a fortiori in the watchdog case. Second, if all voters are informed by 
reading the newspaper, they elect for sure the candidate whose party owns the issue that 
is featured in the published story. Third, given that the two problems are equally likely 
to arise (symmetric case), if there is spin the negative effect on total votes accruing to 
the incumbent of a story about the challenger’s problem is larger in absolute terms than 
the positive effect of a story about the incumbent’s issue, taking the case of no piece of 
news being published as a benchmark. Vice versa in the watchdog case. These effects
4As discussed by Dyck and Zingales [2003] in the context of financial markets, there is often an 
implicit quid pro quo in the relationship between journalists and corporations as institutional sources of 
information. Corporate sources provide journalists privileged access to information, in exchange for a 
more favourable coverage.
5As noted above, when several newsworthy events take place at the same time, the managing editor 
of the newspaper is confronted with the choice of what to publish and what to disregard, and the relative 
emphasis to give to published stories. In this model I depict these decisions in a very stark fashion, by 
assuming that on the newspaper there is room for only one story to be published.
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are on the contrary equal when reporting is balanced.
The model is also suitable to analyse the social welfare costs of spin, which arise 
when the problem owned by the challenger’s party happens to be more serious than the 
one owned by the incumbent’s.
Finally, under the simple assumptions that the incumbent politician is office-motivated 
and that spin activity is costless, the model is useful to show that the incentives to spin 
the news are not straightforward. Here it is crucial to distinguish between an ex ante 
perspective, i.e. before the uncertainty about the state of the world is resolved, and an 
ex post one, which is relevant when both problems are known to have occurred and can 
potentially be published as stories on the newspaper. Ex post it is always optimal for 
the incumbent to exert spin and induce the editor to publish for sure the favourable 
story. Ex ante incentives on the contrary depend on whether uninformed voters are 
present: if all voters are informed, ex ante as well the incumbent prefers to exert spin 
to the maximum extent.
If uninformed voters are present, ex ante incentives depend on the shape of the 
distribution of the ex ante bias of rational voters, i.e. of their individual predisposition 
to vote one candidate or the other, before knowing what has happened in the issue space. 
When this distribution is unimodal, i.e. there are more moderate than radical voters, 
the incumbent’s ex ante payoff is maximised with complete spin. On the other hand, 
with a polarised distribution of the bias, i.e. when there are more radical Republicans 
and Democrats than citizens with a moderate bias, the model delivers the interesting 
and prima facie counterintuitive result that it would be optimal for the incumbent to 
induce the newspaper to have a watchdog editorial policy, i.e. to publish for sure the 
story about the issue owned by the challenger. Of course in this case a credibility issue 
emerges, as ex post incentives drive the incumbent in the opposite direction of complete 
spin.
The chapter is organised as follows: in section 2.2 I discuss the links between the 
model and the literature overviewed in chapter 1 . Section 2.3 presents and solves the 
model; Section 2.4 concludes, and connects the model to the empirical chapters of the 
dissertation.
2.2 Links to  the literature
The model I develop in this chapter is inherently based upon the literature on agenda 
setting effects, and in particular on the theory of issue ownership (Petrocik [1996]), 
which are discussed in section 1.2.1. The influence of mass media coverage on the pri­
orities entertained by the public is depicted here through an information story, whereas 
newspaper readers are Bayesian rational, but there is a limited amount of space on the 
newspaper itself, so that they do not know whether a story about the other topic could 
have been published. Also, readers share a priori views (which are correct) about the 
relative problem-solving abilities of the two candidates with respect to the two issues. 
In particular, readers know that the candidate from the Republican (Democratic) party
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would completely solve the Republican (Democratic) problem in case it occurs, but could 
not do anything with the other problem. This is a strark way of formally representing 
an issue ownership phenomenon.
The model is also related to the literature on political equilibria in multidimensional 
spaces (section 1.2.2). There are indeed two policy issues citizens care about, but the 
focus of the model is rather on the role played by the mass media than on the strategic 
interactions between candidates. This is the case, because the two candidates cannot 
decide on their policy platforms, which are instead trivially determined by the political 
party they belong to .6 From this point of view, the model is similar to citizen candidate 
models with party control on candidate entry a la Besley and Coate [2000, 2003].
Regarding political economy models with mass media (see section 1.2.3), the model 
is of course characterised by the explicit focus on the agenda setting behaviour of media 
outlets, as in Stromberg [2001] and Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn [2006]. It shares 
with Bernhardt et al. the emphasis on the electoral effects of the editorial policy of 
media outlets. The main difference is that I assume that there is a limited amount of 
space on the newspaper, so that -in the presence of more than one newsworthy event- 
the newspaper’s editor must always decide which story to publish and which one to 
leave out, with no room for the contemporaneous publication of both stories. Within 
the stylised structure of the model, this assumption is meant to portray the fact that 
media outlets face a limited amount of space and attention, and hence must make an 
excluding choice. Also, while Bernhardt et al. focus on the competition between media 
outlets, I do not analyse the case of multiple outlets, but concentrate my attention on 
the incentives to influence the editorial policy of the newspaper faced by the incumbent 
politician, and on the resulting commitment issues.
From this point of view, the model shares with Besley and Prat [2006] the same 
idea that politicians face clear electoral incentives to manipulate the information set 
enjoyed by voters, but its specific focus is different, as my aim is to study agenda- 
setting effects. Moreover, while Besley and Prat assume that the incumbent politician 
tries to manipulate mass media outlets by buying their silence on bad news, in the 
model presented here the incumbent politician is not bribing news providers, but simply 
exerting spin, i.e. is trying to make the story about the owned problem more palatable to 
the taste of the managing editor of the newspaper. In other terms, the focus of my model 
is on agenda setting effects and the role of political marketing in a multidimensional 
policy space, not on the outright suppression of negative news. 7
The model is finally related to the growing literature on mass media bias (see section 
1.2.4). On the theoretical side, it highlights agenda setting effects as a mechanism 
through which mass media outlets can produce relevant electoral effects. Of course it 
shares with Besley and Prat [2006] the focus on the incumbent politician as a likely source
6In section 2.3.5 I however discuss the incentives for the incumbent politician to influence the editorial 
policy of the newspaper.
7To be more precise, when the only problem taking place relates to the issue owned by the challenger’s 
party, the newspaper publishes for sure the corresponding story, with no further possibilities for the 
incumbent to block it.
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of media bias. On the empirical side, the model indeed suggests that the agenda setting 
behaviour of media outlets can be used as a criterion to investigate their ideological 
position. This suggestion is explicitly taken up in the following chapters.
2.3 The model
2.3 .1  S ignals and new s
Citiziens must elect their representative for the next term. There is an incumbent politi­
cian and a challenger: for concreteness, I assume that the incumbent is a Republican, 
while the challenger is a Democrat. Citizens want to elect the politician who is thought 
to be better at handling the most pressing problem facing the country. Moreover, they 
entertain a priori views about the relative abilities of candidates belonging to different 
parties in handling different issues, in accord with the theory of issue ownership. In order 
to keep the model tractable, I assume that there are only two issues, one being owned 
by the Republican party, the other by the Democratic one. In the present context, I 
will define issue “a” as being owned by party “A” if voters prefer to elect a candidate 
from party A, given that they know for sure that some problem is arising in that field, 
while no problem pertaining to other field has happened. To fix ideas, let the issue 
owned by the Republicans be Homeland Security, and Health Care the one owned by 
the Democrats8.
More formally, I assume that the state of nature comprises two events, i.e. x r  G 
{0,1} and x d  £ {0,1}. x r  = 1 stands for the occurence of a problem in the Republican 
field, while x r  =  0 means the lack of such problem; the same applies to x r , .  I assume 
that the two events are independent and that pr(xi = 1) =  pi G (0,1), with i G {R, D}. 
I will also specifically focus on the symmetric case in which p r  = pd  — P-
Given that Xi = 1, with i G {R, D], a verifiable signal Si is issued: this signal can be 
published on the newspaper as a piece of news. Voters read the newspaper and acquire 
valuable information that can be used to optimally cast their vote during the forthcoming 
elections. In the present set up, signals are perfect, i.e. pr(si = 1 \xi = 1) =  1 for both 
fields. Coming back to the initial example, the problem in the Homeland Security field is 
represented by the threat of a terroristic attack and s r  = 1 could stand for the discovery 
of an Al Qaida cell in Chicago; on the other side, the relevant problem in the Health 
Care field could be represented by gaps in coverage in the private insurance system and 
sd  = 1 is the release of figures about the number of individuals not being covered by 
any form of health insurance.
The crucial assumption is that the newspaper can publish only one piece of news 
during the campaign, and thus is confronted with a choice when both problems occur, 
i.e. when x r  =  x d  = 1: this happens with ex ante probability P r - P d -
In the real world, when many events happen, the managing editor of a newspaper 
must decide which event shall become the lead story of the day, and be published 
on the front page. I will denote with_p the probability with which the signal about the
8See section 3.3.1 for an analysis of issue ownership in the U.S., from the 50s to the late 90s.
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Republican problem sr. is published, given that the signal about the Democratic problem 
as well has been issued and can potentially be published. Within this simple setup with 
two issues and room for only one story to be published, p  represents the editorial policy 
of the newspaper. Even if p  is a continuous variable, I will mainly focus my attention on 
three polar cases: in the first case (the one of balanced reporting) the newspaper hasn’t 
any ideological bias and is not subject to any influence by the incumbent politician, and 
thus publishes the Republican news with given probability p  = \  when both problems 
occur. In the second case, there is spin by the incumbent politician, i.e. he is able to 
make the news about the owned problem being published for sure when both problems 
occur, i.e. p  = 1. In the third case the editorial policy is of a watchdog kind and the 
newspaper -in the presence of both problems- would publish the story about the problem 
owned by the challenger’s party.
More formally, n  6  {0 , D, R}  is the piece of news that the newspaper decides to 
publish; of course, when no problem occurs, i.e. with probability (1 — p#)(l — P d )  no 
news with political content can be published and thus nothing appears on the front 
page: n = 0 .  When the Republican problem occurs while the Democratic one does not, 
which happens with probability P r ( 1  — P d ) ,  the Republican news is published for sure, 
i.e. pr(n = R |s# = 1 , sd = 0) =  1. The converse is true when the Democratic problem 
occurs in the lack of the Republican one, i.e. pr(n  =  D  Is# =  0,S£> =  1) =  1; finally, as 
mentioned before, pr(n = R  |s# =  1, sd = 1) =  P- The crucial assumption here is that 
the editor of the newspaper always wants to publish a story (e.g. because of revenue 
reasons) but is left with a choice when more than one story is potentially publishable.
The ex ante probability of reading a Democratic news, given p r ,  P d  and p,  can be 
written as follows:
pr(n = D) = pD(l -  pR ■ p)  (2.1)
which is of course decreasing in p.  Conversely, the ex ante probability of reading a 
Republican news is the following:
pr(n = R) = pR [l -  pD(l -  p)] (2.2)
In the symmetric case, it is straightforward to check that with balanced reporting it is 
equally likely ex ante to read a piece of news about the Republican or the Democratic 
problem. In the presence of spin, it is more likely to read a piece of news about the 
Republican problem than about the Democratic one, and vice versa in the watchdog 
case.
In the asymmetric case, a weaker result can be established:
Proposition 1 In the asymmetric case, with balanced reporting the ex ante probability 
of reading a piece of news about the Republican issue is higher (lower) than the one of 
reading about the Democratic problem iff P r  >  P d  ( p r  < P d ) -
I f  there is spin, the ex ante likelihood of a piece o f news about the Republican problem 
is higher than the one of reading about the Democratic one iff p r  > - When the
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newspaper behaves like a watchdog, it is more likely to read the Republican news if
PR>
Proposition 1 states that in the general case, with balanced reporting it is more 
likely ex ante to read news about the Republican problem than about the Democratic 
one as long as p r  > pp,  i.e. the relationship between the ex ante probabilities of the two 
problems is directly translated into the issue balance of the newspaper. With spin, the 
condition for having a higher ex ante probability of news about the Republican problem 
than about the Democratic one is on the other hand weaker, as < P d -  Vice versa 
when the editorial policy is of a watchdog type.
2 .3 .2  N ew s and votin g  behaviour
As mentioned in the previous section, voters acquire pieces of information about the true 
state of the world by reading the newspaper during the campaign: even if signals are 
perfect, the newspaper has only one slot on the front page and thus voters are equipped 
with a less than perfect information structure. I assume that there is a continuum 
of rational voters who must decide on whether to reconfirm the incumbent or elect 
the challenger: all citizens ex ante know p r  and p£>, and can read the piece of news 
n G { 0 , D , R }  on the newspaper. However, citizens differ among themselves according 
to an ex ante bias 77 in favour of the challenger.
Voters’ optimal decision rule is represented in the following table:
(2.3)
where v{n,p\rf) is the probability of a citizen with bias rj voting for the Republican 
incumbent, when she reads the story n  on the newspaper, as a function of p; E(.) is the 
expectation operator and 77, as mentioned above, is the bias in favour of the Democratic 
challenger. This bias factor 77 is distributed in the population according to the known 
cumulative distribution function G(.), which is symmetric around zero, i.e. G(0) =  
and G(y) — 1 — G( —y ), for all y. One should note how in this model there is no 
aggregate uncertainty, as the factor 77 determines an empirical distribution of votes for 
the two candidates, which is certain9.
The decision rule featured in table 2.3 can be rationalised as follows. Suppose that 
the occurence of the Democratic or the Republican problem implies a utility cost of one 
to each citizen, unless the candidate who owns the issue is elected, in which case the 
problem is solved entirely. On the other hand, the elected candidate cannot do anything 
about the problem he does not own. Conditionally on the editorial policy p and the 
published story n,  the expected utility for a citizen with bias 77 of voting the Republican
9The only exception occurs with the measure-zero fraction of voters for which E ( x r  — x d  | t i ; p )  =  77: 
these voters mix their vote with equal probabilities, as implied by decision rule (2.3).
v ( n , p ; 77) =  1 E{ x R -  XD |n \ p )  > 77
u(n,p; 77) 1— 2 E ( x r  -  XD 1 n \ p )  = 77
v { n , p \  77) = 0 0 E ( x R -  XD |n - p )  < 77
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candidate can be written as
uR(n,p\ rj) =  E ( - x d In\p)
where the utility cost of one is incurred only if the Democratic problem occurs. On the 
other hand, the expected utility of voting Democrat is the following:
u D(n,p ; 77) =  E ( - xr  In;p)  + 77.
This voter would reelect the incumbent if uR(n,p\rf) > U£>{n,p',rf), which corre­
sponds to the decision rule stated above.
Let n(p, n) be the probability of the incumbent being reelected when the story n  is 
published, again as a function of p. Likewise, let f ( p , n ) =  G [E ( x r  — xd  |^;p)] be the 
share of citizens voting for the incumbent when the piece of news n  is published, given 
p. The electoral prospects of the incumbent can be summarised as follows:
II 1—1 <^> f ( P , n )  >  \.—i|CSII f { p , n) = \
7r(p, n) =  0 f ( p , n) < \
The incumbent is reconfirmed in office for sure if more than half of the population votes 
for him; he is for sure defeated if more than a half of citizens votes for the challenger, 
while he stands a 50/50 chance of being reelected if votes are equally split.
Within this framework, it is easy to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2 I f  there is no aggregate uncertainty, the following statements are true:
a. if  the story about the Republican problem is published on the newspaper, the Re­
publican incumbent is reelected for sure;
b. i f  the story about the Democratic problem is published, the challenger is elected for  
sure;
c. I f  no political news appear on the newspaper, the incumbent and the challenger are 
equally likely to be elected.
Proof. In the appendix. ■
The probability for the incumbent to be reelected depends on the voting behaviour 
of the median citizen, namely the one characterised by 77 =  0. In general, when citizens 
read on the newspaper a story about the Republican problem, they are sure that the 
Republican problem is present, as the signal is perfect, but they do not know whether 
the Democratic problem has occurred as well. By Bayes’ rule, the ex post probability 
of xd — 1 given n  =  R  can be calculated as follows:
pr(xD =  1 1 n  = R ) =  PRPDp
Pr ( 1 ~  Pd ) + PRPDP
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This probability is always less than one. Therefore the median voter’s dominant 
strategy when n = R  is to reelect for sure the Republican incumbent, as with some non­
null probability the Democratic problem is truly absent. It is certainly absent under 
the watchdog regime, as in that case it would have been published for sure. For further 
reference, it is important to note that this ex post probability is an increasing function 
of the editorial policy p. By the same token, when n = D, the ex post probability of 
x r  = 1 is given by
p r ( x R  =  l l n  =  D ) =  PRPDi  1 - p )
(1 -  p r ) p d  +  P r P d {  1 -  p)  ’ 
which again is always less than one. Hence, when n = D, the median voter finds 
it optimal to elect the challenger for sure. Furthermore, this ex post likelihood of 
having a Republican problem when n = D  is decreasing in p, in all its relevant range10, 
and equals zero when p =  1. Finally, when n =  0 , citizens are sure that neither 
problem has occurred. In particular, the median voter is exactly indifferent between the 
two candidates, so that the symmetric decision rule dictates v(n  = 0 ,p;p =  0 ) =  
therefore the incumbent is reconfirmed with probability
Consistently with Petrocik’s findings, the model thus suggests a causal link between 
issue coverage by the media during campaigns and the electoral outcome. However, it 
does so within a framework where voters/readers are rational Bayesian updaters, but 
enjoy a less than complete information about the current state of affairs.
2 .3 .3  T h e electora l effects o f new s
What are the overall effects on the electoral outcome of what is published on the newspa­
per, as a function of its editorial policy? In terms of reelection probabilities, proposition 
2  shows that, in the lack of aggregate uncertainty, the winning candidate is for sure the 
one whose owned story11 has been published on the newspaper. This is always the case, 
regardless of the spin regime, i.e. the value taken by the editorial policy p. However, one 
could be interested not only in the probability of the incumbent winning the electoral 
contest, but also in the number of votes he gathers in equilibrium, as a function of n  
and p.
Along these lines, one could take the case of no news, i.e. n  — 0 , as a bench­
mark, and consider the differential effect of a Republican and a Democratic story on 
the overall votes received by the incumbent. More formally, one would be interested 
in comparing |E( f ( p , R)  — /(p , 0 ))| against \E(f (p,  D)  — /(p , 0 ))|, where again E(. )  is 
the expectation operator.
In the symmetric case of P r  = P d  = Pi one can prove the following proposition:
10The intuition behind these two monotonicity results in the ex post probabilities is quite straightfor­
ward. When the piece of news about the Republican problem is published, the higher p, the more likely 
it is that the Democratic problem was indeed present, but the newspaper decided to give room to the 
Republican one. Conversely, when n =  D, the higher p, the less likely it is that the Republican problem 
is present, as it is more likely that it would be directly published on the newspaper as a piece of news.
11 More precisely, a story signalling the presence of a problem in the owned field.
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Proposition 3 In the symmetric case, i f  the editorial policy is balanced, the effect on 
the number of votes accruing to the incumbent of a story about the Republican problem 
is the same in absolute terms as the effect of a story about the Democratic problem.
I f  there is spin, the electoral effect of the Democratic story is larger than the one 
stemming from the Republican story. Vice versa when the editorial policy is o f a watchdog 
type.
Proof. In the appendix. ■
This proposition is focused on the differential effects on the electoral outcome of a 
piece of news about the problem owned by the incumbent (i.e. a story that is favourable 
to the incumbent) versus a story about the problem owned by the challenger (i.e. an 
unfavourable story), as a function of the editorial policy. If such policy is balanced, these 
differential effects on the number of votes gathered by the incumbent are the same. On 
the contrary, in the presence of spin the electoral effect of the less favourable piece of 
news is stronger than the one stemming from the favourable story. In fact, when the 
editorial policy of the newspaper is tilted in favor of the incumbent, voters attach a 
higher ex post probability to the presence of the Democratic problem when n = R, and 
a lower ex post probability to the Republican problem when n = D. When p = 0, 
the publication of the Republican story triggers a vote gain for the incumbent which is 
larger than the loss connected with the publication of the Democratic story.
Thus, the model predicts that, when the media are captured by the incumbent 
government, news that are “bad” from his perspective have a stronger impact on the £ 
number of votes received by him than good news: this result indeed resonates with 
some arguments put forward in the political science literature, for example the claim 
by Campbell et al. [1960] (as quoted in Hibbs [2000]), according to which “[...]A party 
already in power is rewarded much less for good times than it is punished for bad times 
[...]”. Proposition 3 suggests that this difference between the electoral punishment and 
reward of the incumbent’s performance may be linked with the role of mass media as 
agenda setters, and be a function of the comparative advantage of the incumbent himself 
in dealing with them, as compared to the challenger.
2 .3 .4  T he welfare effects o f th e  sp in  regim e
Up to now, I have assumed that the two problems are equally serious from the point of 
view of citizens (see section 2.3.2). Intuitively, this implies that the editorial policy has 
no effects on citizens’ welfare, even if it affects the electoral outcome. Indeed, when both 
problems have occurred and the story to be published depends on the editorial policy 
p , voters are indifferent about which politician to elect, exactly because the solution of 
one problem comes with the other problem being left unsolved, and no problem is more 
serious than the other.
In this section I break the symmetry in the seriousness of the two problems, and 
in particular -in order to focus on the potential welfare costs of media capture by the 
incumbent- I assume that the problem owned by the challenger is more serious than the
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one owned by the incumbent12. To be more specific, the utility cost of the Republican 
problem is again normalised to one, while the utility cost of the Democratic one equals 
cd > 1- It follows that the decision rule (2.3) for a voter with bias 77 can be rewritten as
v{n,p\r}) = 1 E ( x r  -  cDx D 1 n\p)  > 77
v(n,p-rj) 1— 2 E ( x R — C d X d | n\p)  = 77
v{n,p', 77) =  0 E ( x r  -  cDx D \n\p) < rj
If the Democratic problem is more serious than the Republican one, it is straighfor- 
ward to check that the Democratic challenger would a fortiori win when the Democratic 
story is published on the newspaper. When n = R, it is still the case that the Republi­
can incumbent is reelected for sure if the seriousness of the Democratic problem is not 
too large. More formally:
Claim 1 I f  Pd 'Cd < 1> when the Republican story is published the Republican incumbent 
wins the elections for sure, regardless of the editorial policy p.
Proof. In the appendix. ■
The intuition behind this claim is that the seriousness of the Democratic problem 
might induce readers to disregard the publication of the Republican story and vote for 
the Democratic candidate. Also, the more probable the Democratic problem on an ex 
ante basis (as represented by P d ) ,  the larger the effect of the seriousness thereof.
The relevant question here concerns the welfare effects of the editorial policy p. As 
there is a plurality of citizens who differ according to their bias 77, a measure of social 
welfare must aggregate the utilities of these citizens. A relatively agnostic way of doing 
this is to adopt an utilitarian perspective, and calculate total welfare as the unweighted 
sum of citizens’ utilities. If this is the case, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 4 When the problem owned by the challenger’s party is more serious than 
the one owned by the incumbent’s, total welfare of citizens is maximized by an editorial 
policy of a watchdog type (i.e. by p = 0).
Proof. In the appendix. ■
The proposition suggests that the welfare-maximizing editorial policy is the one that 
gives priority to the most serious problem. If this problem happens to be the one owned 
by the challenger’s party, then the socially efficient editorial policy has some watchdog 
flavour into it, as it gives preferential coverage to the topic on which the incumbent’s 
party is perceived as weak13. By the same token, any comparative advantage of the 
incumbent in exerting spin would entail a welfare costs for citizens, to the extent that 
the incumbent exploits such advantage by setting p = 1. This is the topic of the next 
section.
12Again within an issue ownership framework, Gautier and Souberyan [2006] analyse how political 
cycles can arise from the fact that the incumbent politican contributes to the solving of the owned 
problem, henceforth increasing the comparative seriousness of the problem owned by the challenger.
13Bernhardt, Krasa and Polborn [2006] similarly show that the editorial policy of the newspaper read 
by the median voter could induce inefficient electoral outcomes. This happens when the newspaper has 
an editorial policy in favor of one candidate, but the realized quality of the other candidate is higher.
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2.3 .5  T h e in cu m b en t’s incentives to  spin a c tiv ity
Regarding the incumbent’s incentives with respect to spin activity, one can distinguish 
between an ex post perspective, i.e. after the realisation of the contingency in which 
both the Republican and the Democratic problem arise, and an ex ante one, i.e. before 
the state of nature is realised. In the framework developed here the spin activity by 
the incumbent politician can effectively take place only when both the Republican and 
the Democratic story are publishable, and the managing editor of the newspaper could 
be induced to give priority to the incumbent’s story. However, it is relevant to know 
whether such ex post incentives to exert spin are matched by similar incentives ex ante, 
or some commitment issues arise, because of a discrepancy between the ex ante and the 
ex post stage.
I assume that the incumbent politician is risk neutral and office motivated, namely 
he obtains an ego-rent R  > 0 if reelected for the next term and zero otherwise. Moreover, 
in what follows I will assume that the incumbent can directly and at no cost fix p.
As discussed in the previous sections, the model is characterised by a lack of aggregate 
uncertainty, both in the version with the two problems being equally serious, and in 
the one where the Democratic problem is more serious than the Republican one. The 
only knife-edge case occurs when n = 0 , as pivotal voters (i.e. those with 77 =  0 ) 
are indifferent between the two candidates and mix their vote with equal probabilities. 
It is also generally the case that the Republican candidate is reelected for sure when 
n = R  and the challenger wins when n = D.  The only exception occurs when the 
Democratic problem is so serious that there are values of p, such that the Democratic 
challenger would prevail even when n = R  (see Claim 1). Within this framework, it is 
straightforward to prove the following proposition:
Proposition 5 When there is no aggregate uncertainty and the two problems are equally 
serious, both ex ante and ex post it is optimal for the incumbent politician to exert spin 
to the maximum extent and fix p =  1 .
The same holds when the Democratic problem is more serious than the Republican 
one, under the condition that pd • cd < 1.
Proof. In the appendix. ■
The lack of aggregate uncertainty implies that the incumbent politician is not facing 
any commitment issue, as both his ex ante and ex post payoff are strictly increasing 
in p. The former result is in turn due to the fact that he is sure to win the elections 
when n = R, and sure to be defeated when n  = D.  In other words, the probabilities 
of the incumbent being reelected when n =  R  or n =  D  are independent of p: hence, 
by setting p — 1, the incumbent is merely maximizing the probability of the favourable 
event n  =  R  (and of course minimizing the likelihood of n = D),  without any adverse 
effect on the conditional probabilities of winning the elections. It is exactly this lack of 
aggregate uncertainty that makes tt(p, R)  and 7r(p, D)  independent of p.
In order to have a larger picture of the commitment issue, it is useful to consider 
a more general model, which makes the electoral outcome probabilistic, by allowing
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for the presence of noise voters14. However, in order to obtain closed-form solutions, I 
will restrict my attention to the simpler case in which the Democratic and Republican 
problems are equally serious.
More formally, in the general case only a fraction p  £ (0,1] of voters are informed, 
i.e. they read the newspaper during the campaign, and respond in a consistent way 
to what they read. In particular, in order to cast their vote, they follow decision rule 
(2.3), given their individual bias 77. The remainder share of citizens is on the contrary 
made of uninformed individuals, who decide how to vote without reading the newspaper. 
From the point of view of the other political actors featured in the model, how these 
uninformed citizens will vote is not a priori certain. Thus, let £ be the fraction of 
uninformed voters who vote for the challenger: £ is the realization of a symmetric 
random variable with finite support [0,1], cumulative distribution function H(.)  and 
density function h(.). The symmetry of the random variable £ around  ^ implies that 
uninformed voters are unbiased, as the probability that a fraction less than £ votes for 
the incumbent is exactly equal to the probability that a fraction less than £ votes for the 
challenger. Summing up, given p and n £ { 0 , D , R } ,  the incumbent wins the elections 
if
»  • / ( f t  n) +  (1 -  /i)(l -  £) > p[l  -  /(P> n )\ +  (1 “  M) ' £ (2-4)
In order to simplify the analysis, I will henceforth assume that £, the fraction of 
uninformed citizens casting their vote for the challenger, is distributed according to a 
uniform distribution on the interval [0 , 1 ].
Within this general set up, one can prove the following proposition, in which the ex 
ante incentives to engage in spin activity depend on the polarisation of the informed 
electorate:
Proposition 6 When spin activity is costless and uninformed voters are present, ex 
post it is always optimal for the incumbent politician to exert spin to the maximum  
extent and fix p = 1 .
When uninformed voters are present and uniformly distributed, ex ante incentives 
to exert spin depend on the distribution of the ex ante bias 77 of informed voters, in the 
following way:
a) I frj  is distributed according to a unimodal distribution, it is optimal to spin the 
news completely and fix p = 1.
b) I f  77 is distributed according to a uniform distribution, the incumbent politician is 
ex ante indifferent to the final level of spin.
c) I f  77 is distributed according to a U-shaped distribution, it would be optimal for the 
incumbent to fix p = 0.
Proof. In the appendix. ■
14See Baron [1994].
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As detailed in the appendix, there is a tradeoff involved in the ex ante choice of the 
editorial policy p: a higher p gives a higher weight to ir(p, R) > n(p, D ), but both these 
conditional probabilities are themselves decreasing in p. I will call the former a weight 
effect and the second a slope effect.
Regarding the weight effect, by increasing marginally p , the incumbent gives more 
weight to the case in which the Republican news is published, at the expense of the case 
in which the Democratic story is. This effect is of course positive, as the probability 
of being reelected is higher when the story about the owned issue is published. On the 
other side, the slope effect depends on the fact that with noise voters the conditional 
probabilities of being reelected are an increasing function of the fraction of rational 
citiziens that vote for the incumbent. In turn, because of Bayes’ rule, these fractions 
of rational citizens voting for the incumbent are decreasing functions of p. If rational 
voters read a Republican story and know that p  is very high, they would attribute a 
correspondingly high probability to the fact that the Democratic problem is present, 
but has been disgregarded to leave room to the Republican story. Hence, citizens start­
ing with a moderate bias in favour of the Democrats would not be convinced by the 
Republican story to reelect the incumbent. By the same token, if rational voters read a 
Democratic story and know that p is high, they would attach a high probability to the 
fact that there is no Republican problem out there. In particular, if p  equals one, the 
fact of reading the Democratic story is sufficient to conclude that there is no Republican 
problem to be tackled by the next president. If this is the case, citizens that start with a 
strong bias in favour of the Republicans would be convinced to vote for the Democratic 
candidate.
When there are no uninformed voters, the slope effect is null, as the electoral outcome 
is a deterministic function of the voting behaviour of the citizen with median bias 77 =  0 . 
It follows that ex ante as well the incumbent finds it optimal to fix p = 1.
However, when noise voters are present, the solution of the trade off depends on the 
shape of the distribution of informed voters, as the conditional probabilities of being 
reelected positively depend on the fraction of rational citizens voting for the incum­
bent, and these fractions are in turn decreasing with p. With a U-shaped distribution, 
the rational electorate is polarised, in the sense that there are large groups of strong 
Republicans and Democrats, and a relatively small mass of moderate voters.
With a polarised electorate, the slope effect dominates the weight effect, and the 
incumbent politician ex ante would find it optimal to commit to p = 0. The intuition 
behind this result goes as follows: with a bimodal distribution of the bias, there are few 
moderate citizens that would be induced to tilt their vote towards the incumbent, as 
a function of the piece of news they read. The positive weight effect of increasing p  is 
therefore “emptied” by the scarcity of moderate swing voters. On the other hand, the 
slope effect is still present, and does not depend on the distribution of the bias.
The crucial point here is that a credibility issue emerges, as citizens know that ex 
post the incumbent politician always finds it optimal to fix p = 1 , and push his preferred 
story on the newspaper. It is unclear which kind of commitment technologies the in­
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cumbent politician could adopt, in order to solve the time inconsistency problem. Even 
if private ownership of mass media outlets could increase the transaction costs faced by 
the incumbent government when trying to strike a deal with them, it would not com­
pletely eliminate the comparative advantage of the incumbent vis-a-vis the challenger 
in this relationship.
2.4 Concluding remarks
In accord with the main thread of the dissertation, in this chapter I have developed a 
simple model of electoral competition, characterised by the fact that mass media have 
agenda-setting effects: information conveyed to citizens by a newspaper determine their 
salience structure, on the basis of which they cast their vote. In accord with Petrocik’s 
[1996] concept of issue ownership, voters want to elect the politician who is thought to 
be better at handling the most relevant problem facing the country, and they entertain 
a priori views about the relative abilities of candidates belonging to different parties 
with respect to different problems. Within a simplified setup with one newspaper and 
two issues, I assume that the occurence of a problem regarding each of these two issues 
represents a newsworthy story, which can be published on the newspaper.
The crucial idea is that there is a limited amount of space on the newspaper itself, 
so that -when both problems occur- the managing editor of the newspaper must decide 
which story to publish. In this set up, “spin” stands for the activity through which 
the incumbent politician makes the story about the owned issue more palatable to the 
newspaper’s editor. I compare the case in which the incumbent politician can make 
his favorite story prevail and be published for sure, to the case in which the managing 
editor of the newspaper -if a choice must be made- is indifferent about what to publish, 
i.e. there is balanced reporting. I also look at the case when the newspaper’s editor -in 
a watchdog kind of way- gives priority to the story about the problem over which the 
incumbent is perceived as less competent than the challenger.
The model thus offers two testable predictions about the electoral effects of news, a 
counterintuitive insight about the incentives to manipulate mass media outlets, and a 
suggestion about how to estimate their partisan position.
The first prediction is that there is a causal link between the topics being covered 
by mass media outlets during the campaign and the electoral outcome. In fact, if all 
voters are informed by the newspaper, the model predicts that they would elect for sure 
the candidate whose story is published, i.e. the Republican one if the story about the 
Republican problem is published, and the Democrat if the Democratic story is published. 
This is consistent with some of Petrocik’s [1996] findings about the link between the 
coverage of Democratic and Republican topics during presidential campaigns and the 
electoral outcome.
The second prediction is that voters would more strongly react to news about issues 
owned by the challenger, if it is known that the editorial policy of the newspaper is
captured by the incumbent. In particular, the model predicts that in the spin case the
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(negative) effect on total votes accruing to the incumbent himself of a story about the 
issue owned by the challenger is larger in absolute terms than the positive effect of a 
story about the incumbent’s issue, taking the case of no piece of news being published as 
a benchmark. Vice versa when the editorial policy is of a watchdog type. These effects 
are on the contrary equal if the editorial policy is balanced.
A counterintuitive insight arising out of the model is that the incumbent government 
(or any other politically motivated actor) may face diverging ex ante and ex post incen­
tives to manipulate the news media. While ex post it is always optimal for the incumbent 
to spin the news and have the story about the owned problem being published for sure, 
at the expense of the one owned by the challenger, it might be ex ante optimal for the 
incumbent that the newspaper followed a watchdog-like editorial policy, which would 
give priority to the problem owned by the challenger. This only occurs when there is 
aggregate uncertainty about the electoral outcome (i.e. uninformed voters are present) 
and there is polarisation in the ideological stance of informed citizens. The intuition 
behind this result is that with a polarised electorate there are fewer moderate readers 
that would be convinced to vote for the Republican incumbent by the (ex ante more 
frequent) presence of the Republican story. On the other hand, the Bayesian mechanism 
-through which rational voters take into account the bias of the editorial policy when 
assessing the likelihood of the problem not featured on the newspaper- would still reduce 
the ex post probability of the Republican incumbent being reelected, conditionally on 
the news being published. A commitment problem arises here, because ex post, i.e. 
given the occurence of both problems, the incumbent would always find it optimal to 
spin the news to the maximum extent.
Finally, as similarly argued by Baron [2006], the model suggests to look at the ex 
ante choice of issues covered by media outlets, in order to investigate their ideological 
position. Indeed, to the extent that different policy issues are more or less electorally 
advantageous to different political parties, this ex ante choice might reveal something 
about the political stance of that media outlet. From an empirical point of view, there 
are different ways of implementing this suggestion. First, one can analyse the variation 
in the coverage of owned issues across different media outlets, in order to classify them 
on an ideological scale. A second approach would be to analyse the time series variation 
in the coverage of topics by a given media outlet. The purpose of this exercise is to 
check whether during electoral campaigns (i.e. when the agenda setting power of the 
media outlet has the highest potential of influencing voters’ choices) there is in fact an 
increase in the coverage of issues owned by one political party or the other. This is the 
route followed in the next chapter to investigate the editorial policy of the New York 
Times, from 1946 to 1997.
As mentioned in section 1.2.1, Petrocik [1996] classifies policy issues on the basis 
of the role played by the incumbent’s performance. While on some issues (like health 
care and defense in the U.S.) citizens hold stable views on the more competent party, 
performance issues are those (like foreign policy and the economy) that are favourable to 
the incumbent government if its recent record in dealing with them is satisfactory, and to
CHAPTER 2. THE SPIN DOCTOR MEETS THE RATIONAL VOTER 51
the challenger if it is not. One could then argue that the coverage of these performance 
issues by a given media outlet is favourable to the incumbent if it takes place when the 
situation on the issue itself is good, and unfavourable when this coverage happens during 
bad times. This allows to classify media outlets on an ideological scale according to how 
the coverage of the issue changes with the situation and the political affiliation of the 
incumbent government. While it is rather difficult to come up with a reliable indicator 
of the status and prestige of a country in foreign policy, objective indicators of the state 
of the economy like the unemployment and the inflation rate are readily available. This 
is the approach taken in chapter 4, where data on the coverage of the economy by a large 
sample of U.S. newspapers during the last decade are matched with a measure of the 
explicit political position of their editorial pages: the propensity to endorse Democratic 
versus Republican candidates in statewide and congressional races. 15
Finally, one could empirically investigate the relationship itself between the mass 
media -taken as a whole- and the incumbent government, which is the main focus of 
the model. The idea would be to look at the cross-country variation in issue coverage 
by media outlets, in order to check whether indices of media freedom are systematically 
correlated with the amount of coverage devoted to issues owned by the incumbent party, 
especially during electoral campaigns.
15As discussed in sections 1.2.4 and 2.2, an important caveat regarding the type of claims that can 
be derived from these empirical approaches is that it is particularly difficult to isolate the influence of 
demand and supply factors on issue coverage. In other terms, identifying the political stance of a news­
paper is much easier than identifying its determinants, which would typically require some exogenous 
variation in one of the two sets of factors. More on this in chapter 4, and especially section 4.5.5.
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2.A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. Starting from statement a), the incumbent is reelected for 
sure if G [ E { x r  — x d  \n = R',p)] > Given that G(0) = and the fact that G(.) is 
an increasing function, it will suffice to show that E ( x r  — x p  \R',p) > 0, i.e. that the 
median voter strictly prefers the incumbent over the challenger. But this is exactly the 
case, as
E ( x r  -  x D |R;p)  =  1 - P r P d P P r { 1 ~ P d )
P r { 1 -  P d ) +  P r Pd P P r { 1 -  P d ) +  P r P d P
(2.5)
is strictly greater than zero. Hence ir(p,R) =  1, for all p.
Regarding statement b), the median voter’s utility when n = D  reads as follows:
E ( x r  -  x D |D;p)  = - (1 ~  Pr )p d
(1 -  pR)pD + p r P d (  1 -  P)  ’
(2 .6)
which is always strictly less than zero, for all values of the exogenous parameters. Thus, 
when n = D, a strict majority of voters prefers to elect the Democratic challenger, and 
7r(p, D) =  0. Finally, when n =  0 , citizens are sure that no problem in either field 
has occurred and therefore their voting choice depends only on whether 77 is greater or 
smaller than zero. However, the median voter is exactly indifferent between the two 
candidates: in fact
E ( x r  -  x D 10 ;p) =  0
so that she will mix her voting decision with equal probabilities and 7 r ( p ,  0) =  ■
Proof of Proposition 3. First, it is true that E[f (p,  n  =  0 )] =  G [ E ( x r  — 
x d \ 0 \ p ) \  =  G(0) =  Then, using expression (2.5), one can obtain a closed form 
solution for the share of votes accruing to the incumbent when n  =  R,  i.e.
f {p , R)  = G[E(xR - x D \n = R;p)} = G 
which is decreasing in p. It follows that
\E{f(p,  R) — /(0 ) ) | =  G
p ( l - p )
p{ 1 -  p) + p 2 • p
p ( l - p )
_p( 1 - p )  + p 2 -p (2.7)
as E ( x r  — x d \R]p)  is greater than zero.
On the other side, by making use of expression (2.6), the share of votes the incumbent 
receives when n = D  reads as follows:
f ( p , D ) =  G[E(x r  - x d \n = D\p)\  = G p{ 1 -  p) (2 .8 )
p ( l - p )  + p 2 • ( 1  - p ) _  '
This share is again decreasing in p. Using the previous result about / ( 0 ) ,  expression
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(2 .8 ) and the symmetry of G(.),  one can obtain the following:
\ E ( f ( p , D ) - f ( 0 ) ) \ = G p ( l - p )
1
2 ’
(2.9)p ( l - p ) + p 2 • ( 1  - p )
as ir(D]p) is surely less than zero.
Let us define the function g(p) =  \ E( f (p, D)  — f ( 0 ) )  \ — |E( f ( p , R)  — / ( 0 ))|. From 
equations (2.7) and (2.9), this function boils down to the following:
Proof of Claim 1. When n  =  R,  the Republican incumbent is reconfirmed into 
office if the median citizen votes for him, i.e. if
The right hand side of inequality (2.10) is decreasing in the editorial policy p. This is 
the case, because the larger p, the more readers know that there is a higher ex post 
probability that the Democratic news has been left out from the newspaper. It is easy 
to check that, under the assumption that cdPd < 1 , this inequality is satisfied even 
when p — 1 , hence it is so for all values of p. ■
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof looks at two different cases, as a function 
of whether (as stated by Claim 1 ) the Republican candidate wins the elections for sure 
when the Republican news is published, for all values of p. As discussed in the text, it 
is in fact straightforward to check that -when cd > 1- the Democratic challenger would 
a fortiori always win the elections when the Democratic story is published.
First, suppose that pp  • cd < 1, he. Claim 1 holds. Hence the expected utility of a 
citizen with ex ante bias 77, as a function of the editorial policy p , reads as follows:
It is easy to see how g(p)\p=i =  0, and g'{p) > 0: hence the result in the proposition is 
proven. ■
P 0 - - P )  1 P ( l - P )
P r P d P
P r ( 1 — Pd ) +  Pr Pd P
This condition can be rewritten as
(2 .10)
u(p;v) =  (1 -  P r ) p d  ■ V +  PRPDP ■ ( - c d )  + P r P d ( 1  - p ) [ ~ l  +  v\ +  (1 ~ P r ) ( 1 ~ P d )
which can be rewritten as
u(p] v) =  -jp[I + P D - P R +  P r P d \  ~  P r P d  +  P r P d p (  1 -  c d  -  rj).
If we adopt a utilitarian perspective, the social welfare of citizens is calculated as the
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unweighted sum of their utilities:
/ +oo u{p\ rj)dG(r/) = PrPdP{ 1 -  cD) -  PrPdi (2.11)
-oo
where I have exploited the fact that 77 is a symmetric distribution around zero, and hence 
its expectation is zero. When cp = 1, total welfare does not depend on the editorial 
policy p, while when cr> > 1 the welfare-maximizing editorial policy is p  =  0 .
Second, assume that p& • cd > 1- It follows that there exists a threshold level of the 
editorial policy p* = , such that if p > p* the Democratic candidate is elected
for sure even when n =  R. If p < p* the Republican incumbent is reconfirmed for sure 
while the median voter is indifferent between the two candidates when p = p*. If p > p*, 
the expected utility of a citizen with bias 77 can be written as follows:
u{p\ 77) =  - p R +  77 
so that total welfare is
P d + P r - P r P d  +  t:(1 ~ P r ) {  1 ~ P d )
U(p) = - p r .
If p < p*, the candidate who owns the issue featured on the newspaper wins the elections, 
hence total welfare is again expressed by the function (2.11). On this subdomain the 
welfare-maximizing editorial policy is p = 0 , which implies that total welfare equals 
~ P r P d • This level of total welfare is in turn always larger than ~ p r . »
P ro o f of P ro position  5. The proposition deals with both the case of the two 
problems being equally serious, and the case in which the Democratic problem is more 
serious than the Republican one, but not “too serious” , as implied by the condition that 
P d  • c d  < I- Claim 1 hence implies that the Republican candidate is reelected for sure 
when n  =  R, regardless of the editorial policy p. First, I will show that ex post, namely 
when x r  = x d  = 1 , it is always optimal for the incumbent politician to spin completely 
the newspaper, and fix p  =  1. Indeed, by Proposition 2, when n  =  R  the incumbent is 
reelected for sure, while he is surely defeated when n  — D: hence the incumbent decides 
to spin the newspaper completely, in order to obtain a sure gain of R  > 0. This is also 
true for the case in which the Democratic problem is more serious, but not too much, 
as discussed above.
Second, regarding ex ante incentives in the case of two problems being equally serious, 
let p °  G [0,1] the level of spin to which the incumbent politician can precommit: his 
expected payoff, as a function of pc , can be written as follows:
E U ( f f  ) =  R  { tt(Pc , R )  [p r (1 -  p d ) +  PRPnpC] +  v ( p c , D )  [(1 ~ p r )p d  +  PrP d (1 -  f f ') \  +
(2 .12)
where k  =  ^[(1 — P r ) {  1 — P d )]  is the probability of winning the elections given n  =  0 ,  
weighted by the ex ante likelihood of n =  0 . But in this set up without aggregate 
uncertainty, it is true that 7 t { p ° , R )  =  1 and n(pc , D )  =  0, for all values of pc : therefore 
the ex ante payoff E H ( ^ )  is strictly increasing in and the incumbent, ex ante as
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well, finds it optimal to fix pc  = 1. It is easy to check how the same reasoning applies 
to the case of a comparatively more serious Democratic problem. ■
P ro o f of P ro position  6 . Regarding the first part of the proposition, the proba­
bility of the incumbent being reelected, given n  =  R  and the expected spin pE, can be 
written as follows:
v{pE' R) = W = V ) + Y ^ - f i p E ' R ) ’
which is derived by making use of condition (2.4) and exploiting the fact that £ is 
uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. Given that rj is distributed according to 
the known cdf G(.), f ( p E ,R ) equals G ^ (i -p^1) same token, the 
probability of confirming the incumbent in office when n = D  can be written as follows:
n ( p E ' D )  =  9 7 T ^  + ' T —  ' f i p E ' D ) ’2 ( 1 -  fi) 1 -  n
where f ( p E , D) = G (i-p^pd+p^rpd(l ' ^ ven *-*(•) *s an increasing function,
it is true that n(pE , R) > ir(pE , D ) for all pE G [0,1], and the first part of the proposition 
is proven.
Regarding the second part of the proposition, let p^ G [0,1] the editorial policy to 
which the incumbent politician can commit ex ante: his expected payoff, as a function 
of p*-', is given by expression (2 .1 2 ).
Within the general model with uninformed voters, there is a tradeoff involved in the 
choice of pP\ a higher p^ gives a higher weight to 7r(pP, R) > ^(p 0 , D ), but both these 
conditional probabilities are themselves decreasing in p ° . The static problem solved by 
the incumbent politician is the following:
d  )  F ( P c j !> )  ^ A  ' & )  r
maxEn^p*"7) (P)
!/"
- cs.t. p G [0,1]
In order to prove the second part of the proposition, I will adopt some notational short­
cuts. Let x  ~  —n ? d \~ PD)— =  E ( x r  — x& IR ’,pc ) and y = —j]-----— —
P r V - ~ P d ) + P r P d P c  2  ' i R  J v  ( 1 - p r )p d + P r P d ( 1 - P ° )
E ( x r  — x d  |D\pP).  Moreover, let G(x) = 2(i'-/x) +  I^ G ( x ), and let g(x) be similarly 
defined, i.e. g(x) =  2(1-%) After some manipulation, the first derivative of
E n (p ° )  can be written as:
EH.'(pc ) = M  • [G(x] -  G (y) +  g(y) ■ y -  g(x) ■ x ] ,
where M  =  ^ ^ P r P d - ,  and x  and y are (decreasing) functions of pP.
Regarding point a) in the proposition, the idea is to search for a sufficient condition, 
such tha t E l ( ( p c ) > 0, for all pc  G [0,1]: if this is the case, it is optimal for the 
incumbent to fix p^  =  1. This condition is fulfilled if
G(x) -  g(x) ■ x > G (y) -  g(y) ■ y
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for all pP G [p, 1]. Define M {x) =  G(x) — g (x ) • x: just because x > 0 > y for all 
pP in the relevant range, to obtain the result it will suffice to show that M (x) is an 
increasing function of x. Assuming that g{.) is differentiable, this condition boils down 
to the following:
M '(x) = —g {x) • x  > 0
But this exactly corresponds to the condition that rj is unimodal around zero. Therefore 
the first derivative of .Eli{pP) is positive in the relevant range.
By the same token, if 77 is uniformly distributed, it is true that g'(x) =  0, for all x. 
Then M {x) does not depend on x, and in turn EH(pc ) does not depend on so that 
the incumbent is ex ante indifferent to the level of spin he could possibly commit to.
Finally, when g is U-shaped around zero, it is true that g'(x) • x  > 0. This condition 
exactly implies that M '(x) < 0, so that the incumbent would ex ante prefer to commit 
to pP = 0 , i.e. to a watchdog-like editorial policy. ■
Chapter 3
Being the N ew  York Tim es
3.1 Introduction
In the previous chapter I have developed a simple political economy model to illustrate 
how the agenda setting power of the mass media can influence electoral outcomes, by 
shaping the priorities entertained by voters, who are assumed to be rational Bayesian 
updaters.
In accord with the issue ownership hypothesis, such agenda-setting ability could have 
relevant electoral effects, to the extent that citizens on average think that a given party 
or candidate is more capable of handling problems related to a given issue, and would 
vote for that party if such issue turns out to be the most salient one.
However, there is very little evidence on whether and how mass media make use 
of their agenda-setting power on political matters. On this regard, it is natural to ask 
whether a newspaper or a TV news broadcast systematically changes its coverage of 
issues during electoral campaigns (when this coverage could be more influential), by 
tilting it towars topics over which a given political party is perceived as more capable 
by the majority of citizens. This would be consistent with the said newspaper being 
partisan in favour of that party.
During the electoral campaign a newspaper could behave differently as a function of 
the political affiliation of the incumbent government. It could in fact act as a watchdog, 
by differentially giving less coverage to issues over which the incumbent government’s 
party is perceived as strong. Or vice versa it could act as a lapdog, by devoting more 
space to those issues which are owned by the incumbent’s party. Finally, it would be 
relevant to understand whether outside of the electoral campaign the newspaper gives 
more coverage to topics owned by the incumbent government’s party, controlling for the 
government’s activity on these issues.
I answer these questions by analysing a large dataset of stories published on the 
New York Times between 1946 and 1997, and focusing my attention on U.S. presiden­
tial campaigns. This random sample of articles on the Times was collected by Frank
Baumgartner, Bryan Jones and John Wilkerson within the Policy Agendas Project and 
classified according to the major topic being addressed. Within the set of coded topics,
I classify a given topic as being owned by the Republican or the Democratic party if a
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majority of citizens believes that such party is better at handling problems related to it
t han the opponent.
The main finding of this analysis is that the New York Times has a Democratic 
partisanship, with some watchdog aspects, in that during the presidential campaign it 
systematically gives more emphasis to Democratic topics, but only so when the incum- ^  
bent President is a Republican. This set of Democratic topics comprises stories about 
civil rights, health care, labor and employment, and social welfare.
This effect of more stories about Democratic issues during the presidential campaign 
is sizeable: when the incumbent President is a Republican, there are 26 percent more 
stories about Democratic issues during the three months of the campaign than outside 
of it. The increase is actually larger (around 33 percent) when one considers the period 
starting from the 60s. On the contrary, if the incumbent President is a Democrat, 
there is no discernible change in the count of Democratic stories when the presidential 
campaign starts. This is true both for the entire sample and for the post-1960 subperiod, 
and is consistent with the fact that the partisan effect and the watchdog effect almost 
cancel each other.
The typical claim in the issue ownership literature is that the Republican party owns 
the issues of crime and defense. 1 In fact, an analysis of Gallup polls and the National 
Election Study (NES) shows that this is the case for defense, as in only three campaign 
years over a total of twelve there is a reversal in the ownership of the issue. On the 
other hand, in three cases out of seven (a shorter time series of polls is available here) 
was the Democratic party perceived as more competent than the GOP on the crime 
issue. Therefore I separately analyze the coverage of the two topics on the Times. If 
one considers the entire time span (from 1946 to 1997), one cannot find any systematic 
variation in the count of stories about these two topics during the presidential campaign.
This asymmetric behaviour on Democratic and Republican topics during presidential 
campaigns is consistent with a Democratic partisanship of the New York Times.
However, when restricting the attention to the 1961-1997 subsample, the Times 
gives more room to stories about defense during the presidential campaign, when the 
incumbent president is a Democrat and there is no reversal in the ownership of the xojcc^ 7,
issue. Just because the ownership reversal occurs in 1964, 1980 and 1996, this effect 
would account for the 1968 campaign. When there is ownership reversal the Times ^
ceteris paribus dedicates less room to defense stories during the presidential campaign.
Moreover, under the incumbency of a Republican President there is actually a decrease 
in the count of stories about defense as the presidential campaign starts. Taken together, 
these findings are consistent with a watchdog attitude of the Times, because during the 
presidential campaign there is less coverage of the defense issue when the incumbent 
President is perceived as more competent on it than the opponent. Regarding the Law 
Sz Crime issue, there is no comparable pattern of change in the coverage, both for the 
entire time period and the post-1960 subsample.
Given the more symmetric behaviour with respect to Democratic topics and the
^ e e  Petrocik [1996].
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defense issue, the evidence regarding the 1961-1997 period lends more support to the 
hypothesis that the Times is a watchdog newspaper, and somewhat detracts from the 
Democratic partisanship hypothesis. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, one 
should bear in mind the intrinsic salience of the Vietnam War, which could explain in 
part the results on the coverage of the defense issue during the 60s.
In the interpretation of the econometric results, it is necessary to check whether 
any time variation in the choice of stories by the Times is in fact mirroring some con­
temporaneous variation in the activity of other political actors, and in particular of the 
incumbent President. As a proxy for the intensity of presidential activity on a given sub­
set of issues at a given time, I use the relative frequency of Executive Orders concerning 
these issues, which are enacted by the incumbent President during the time period.
Controlling for this proxy of presidential activity across issues, still the Times - 
outside of the presidential campaign- systematically gives more coverage to Democratic 
issues when the incumbent President is a Democrat, and to defense stories when he 
is a Republican. This finding about Democratic stories helps understand the previous 
results: when the incumbent President is a Democrat, the aggregate count of stories 
about Democratic topics is already high outside the presidential campaign, and the 
presidential campaign does not produce any additional effect.
Such pattern of correlations does hold for both the entire sample and the post-1960 
period, where the magnitude and significance of the effect is stronger for defense stories. 
On the other hand, there is no statistically significant correlation between the political 
affiliation of the President and the coverage of the Law &; Crime issue.
There are three key identifying assumptions which substantiate my empirical anal­
ysis. The first assumption is that the issue ownership hypothesis is correct. In other 
terms, the induced salience of an issue would give an electoral advantage to a given 
candidate, to the extent that there is a majority of voters who believe this candidate to 
be better at handling it, than his opponent.
The second assumption can be summarised by the statement: “all publicity is good 
publicity” . The idea is that any story regarding an issue owned by a given candidate 
or party, no matter how negative, would not induce readers to change their perception 
about the ownership of the issue itself2. The third one is that -as mentioned above- 
Executive Orders proxy for the activity of the incumbent President with respect to the 
various issues.
This analysis of the issue coverage by the New York Times contributes to the growing 
empirical literature on the measurement of mass media bias, which I have reviewed in 
section 1.2.4. The main features of my approach are the following:
1. I am interested in the agenda-setting behaviour of the newspaper, i.e. in its cov­
erage of various policy issues. The agenda-setting framework, coupled with the 
issue ownership hypothesis, provides an intuitive way to think about the political 
stance of the newspaper.
2As better detailed in section 3.4.1, some recent experimental evidence lends support to this assump­
tion.
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2. My focus is on the time variation of the issue coverage by the Times, and in 
particular on how such coverage changes during presidential campaigns.
3. Given the time series framework and the sample length, I am able to investigate the 
differential behaviour of the Times during the presidential campaign as a function  
of the political affiliation of the incumbent President. I use the definitions of lapdog 
and watchdog to classify such differential behaviour.
As a collateral result, this chapter contributes to the literature itself on issue own­
ership, by presenting survey data from Gallup and the National Election Study which 
cover a much longer time period than the one analyzed by Petrocik [1996]. The data 
gathered here broadly confirm, with some qualifications, the issue ownership pattern 
suggested by Petrocik.
The chapter is organised as follows: in section 3.2 I discuss the links between the 
empirical approach taken up here and other contributions in the media bias literature. 
Section 3.3 describes the dataset. In section 3.4 I present the empirical strategy. Section 
3.5 discusses the results, with some robustness checks and refinements. Section 3.6 briefly 
confronts the findings with the theoretical literature on mass media bias and concludes.
3.2 Links to  the literature
As discussed in section 1.2.4, there are two main approaches to measure the political 
position of mass media outlets. According to the first approach, as pioneered by Grose- 
close and Milyo [2005] and Gentzkow and Shapiro [2007], mass media outlets are coded 
on the basis of the similarity between what they report and what political actors of a 
known political stance do. The second approach is instead based on the idea of directly 
investigating the variation in the type of topics covered by media outlets, or in the tone 
of this coverage, as in Lott and Hassett [2004].
The analysis developed in this chapter (and in the next one as well) firmly belongs to 
this second category. It shares with Lott and Hassett the focus on the time variation in 
media coverage. However, while Lott and Hassett focus on the tone of the articles, in the 
analysis performed here I simply look at the topics being covered, i.e. at the agenda- 
setting behaviour. Moreover, my empirical strategy is chiefly based on the variation 
in issue coverage during presidential campaigns, with an ancillary role played by the 
political affiliation of the incumbent President. On the other hand Lott and Hassett 
directly exploit the correlation between the tone of the coverage of economic news and 
the President’s political affiliation.
Because of its relevance and prestige, the other papers on media bias often report 
explicitly the measured ideological stance of the New York Times. Consistently with the 
aggregate trend, Ansolabehere et al. [2006] for example show that an unquestionable 
Democratic slant in the endorsement choices of Times in the TriState area (Connecticut, 
New Jersey and New York) emerged in the first half of the 70s, while during the 40s, 50s 
and 60s there was a slight advantage to Republican candidates. It is however true that
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in New York State the Times endorsed more Democratic than Republican candidates 
already as of the second half of the 50s.
In their study of think tank quotes Groseclose and Milyo estimate for the Times an 
adjusted ADA score of 73.7 (maximum likelihood estimation). (Adjusted) ADA scores 
attribute a larger score to more liberal congressmen, on a 0-100 scale. Just to have a 
rough idea of the relative position of the New York Times, the score for Joe Lieberman 
(D, Ct.) is 74.2, while the one for Constance Morelia (R, Md.) is 68.2. From this 
perspective, the Times appears as a moderately Democratic newspaper.
Similarly to what found by Groseclose and Milyo, Gentzkow and Shapiro [2007] find 
that the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times and the Washington Post are similar 
to one another in the slant of the language used and are noticeably to the left of the 
Washington Times.
Coming to the coverage of economic news, Lott and Hassett find that in the 1985- 
2004 period the Times published fewer positive stories under a Republican incumbent, 
but such effect is mildly significant (at the 1 0 % level) only in one specification.
3.3 D ata description
3.3.1 Evidence on issue ownership
The seminal contribution in the issue ownership literature is Petrocik [1996]. In fact, 
all subsequent contributions that are based on an issue ownership hypothesis take as 
given Petrocik’s partition of issues into Democratic, Republican and performance ones3. 
However, Petrocik substantiates such a classification with survey data covering a rela­
tively short time period, which spans from 1988 to 1991 only. It is therefore empirically 
unclear whether the ownership status of policy issues, as stated by Petrocik, is indeed a 
long-term phenomenon.
My contribution to this literature is to collect survey data on issue ownership which 
cover a longer time period than Petrocik’s. Using Gallup surveys, and the National 
Election Study when Gallup data is not available, I am able to gather issue ownership 
percentages4 that date back to 1972 for the issues of social welfare and crime, to 1956 
for civil rights, and to 1948 for defense. These data are presented in Table 3.1.
I use Gallup polls as the primary source of information, because of the more direct 
way its questions about issue ownership are worded, when compared with the NES. 
According to the typical Gallup format respondents are asked about which party or 
candidate they think is better at handling a given issue; thus, the question itself specifies 
the issue about which respondents must express their views.
By contrast, one can obtain information about issue ownership from the NES only 
in a indirect fashion. Since 1960 the NES has administered a question about the most 
important problem facing the country. Starting from 1972, this question about the most
3See Ansolabehere and Iyengar [1994], Feeley [2001], Benoit, Hansen and Petrocik [2003].
4By issue ownership percentages I am referring to the percentage of respondents believing that a 
Democrat is better able of handling a given issue, minus the percentage trusting a Republican more.
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important problem (henceforth, MIP) has been coupled with one about “[...]which po­
litical party [...]would be most likely to get the government to do a better job in dealing 
with this problem [•••]” .5 Such survey design could suffer from a selection bias (unob­
servable factors determining the answer to the MIP question could be correlated with 
factors affecting the answer to the ownership one), and from a low degree of statistical 
reliability, given the possibly small number of respondents naming a given issue as the 
most salient one.
Regarding Gallup polls, I have searched for all questions about the ownership status 
of a given issue during presidential election years, from 1948 to 1996. In particular, I 
am interested in questions concerning those issues which, following Petrocik [1996], one 
would ex ante code as permanently owned by the Republican or the Democrats, namely 
defense and crime on the Republican side, and civil rights, welfare and health care on 
the Democratic side. When, for a given year, the ownership question about an issue was 
asked more than once (e.g. more than one question about civil rights being administered 
during the same presidential year, or about different facets of the same issue), I average 
the issue ownership percentage, in order to obtain a synthetic measure6.
Regarding the civil rights and the welfare issues, Table 3.1 broadly confirms Petro­
cik’s claim about a permanent Democratic ownership thereof, albeit with some qualifi­
cations.
As discussed by Carmines and Stimson [1990], a more precise stance of the Demo­
cratic party on the race issue emerged during the late 50s, and consolidated during 
the early 60s; this was mainly due to the increasingly weak bargaining position of the 
Southern Democrats within their party. The first column of Table 3.1 shows that in 
1956 and 1960 there was a tiny Democratic advantage on the ownership of civil rights, 
which exploded in 1964, with a lead of almost 35 percent. Since then, the Democrats 
have maintained an advantage of at least 1 0  percent on the issue.
Data concerning the welfare issue, i.e. about which party would be better at “helping 
the poor and the needy” , cover a shorter time span, starting from 1972. Here there is 
a sizeable and permanent perceived advantage for the Democrats, which shows much 
less time variation than for the race issue. Unluckily, pieces of information about the 
issue of health care are available only for 1992 and 1996 (Gallup), with a Democrats’ 
advantage being above 2 0  percent.
On the other hand, the pieces of information I have gathered provide a more complex 
picture of the “Republican” issues of domestic and international security.
Regarding the crime issue, I obtain ownership percentages for seven presidential elec­
tions, from 1972 to 1996: in 1972, 1980, 1984 and 1988 there is a Republican advantage, 
which reaches its peak in 1984, with a lead of almost 39 percent. In 1976, 1992 and 
1996 there is in fact a reversal, with a clear Democratic advantage. Since during three 
presidential years over a sample of seven there is a Democratic lead, it is not entirely
5In the NES, the questions about the most important problem and the ownership status of that 
problem are respectively coded as VCF0875 and VCF9012.
6As Table 3.15 and 3.16 show, the yearly frequency with which Gallup asked questions about the 
ownership status of issues is increasing across time, exponentially so during the late 80s and the 90s.
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clear whether one can safely code the crime issue as a Republican one. 7
Finally, the issue of defense and foreign policy, which is covered by the longest stream 
of Gallup surveys, clearly shows a pattern of Republican ownership. In nine out of twelve 
cases there is a GOP lead, with a minimum of less than one percent in 1948 and a peak 
of more than 44 percent in 1992. The three exceptions occur in 1964, 1980 and 1996. 
In 1964 Gallup posed two survey questions about the handling of the Vietnam war8, 
and respondents largely attributed a primacy to Johnson’s party, with a difference of 
almost 42 percent. In 1980 ten questions about foreign policy and defense were asked, 
with two concerning the Iran situation. A problem with these polls is that the most 
recent ones were administered in the early days of September, so that the final part of 
the hostage crisis in Iran did not receive any coverage by Gallup. In 1996 there was a 
clear advantage of Bill Clinton over Bob Dole on the issue. One should however notice 
how in that year Clinton enjoyed an ownership advantage over Dole on almost all issues.
3.3.2 The N ew  York Tim es dataset
Data about the coverage of issues by the New York Times is taken from the Policy 
Agendas Project9.
Together with data about Congressional Hearings, Public Laws and Executive Or- 
ders, the Project features a random sample of stories from the New York Times Index, 
from 1946 to 1997, for a total of 38,470 stories. Each story is classified according to the 
major topic being addressed, among a set of 27 topics. The dataset provides additional 
pieces of information about the position of the story on the newspaper (on the front 
page or in internal pages), and its geographical and institutional relevance.
Stories are also classified according to whether they deal with local events, i.e. those 
occurring in New York City or in the so called TriState area (Connecticut, New Jersey 
and New York), or not. Moreover, each piece of news is coded according to whether it 
features domestic events, foreign events with U.S. involvement, or foreign events without 
U.S. involvement. Finally, stories are classified according to whether they mention 
actions by some tier of the U.S. government.
While in the original dataset the unit of observation is the single story, I construct 
monthly counts of stories about the different topics. I also interact the major topic 
of the story with its various geographical, institutional and positional features I have 
mentioned above, in order to obtain more specific time series for each given topic.
In Table 3.2 I present some descriptive figures about the relative frequencies of issues 
covered by the New York Times in its articles. For reference, I report the name and
7One should also bear in mind that the crime issue is the one for which I most frequently use the 
NES as an ancillary source of information.
8See Table 3.15 for the specific questions being asked.
9See the Project’s website at h ttp ://w w w .p olicyagen das.org . The data used here were originally 
collected by Frank R. Baumgartner and Bryan D. Jones, with the support of National Science Founda­
tion grant number SBR 9320922, and were distributed through the Center for American Politics and 
Public Policy at the University of Washington and/or the Department of Political Science at Penn State 
University. Neither NSF nor the original collectors of the data bear any responsibility for the analysis 
reported here.
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the identification number of the topic, as coded in the original dataset by Baumgartner 
and Jones. Topics are ordered according to the relative frequency of stories (column
[1]). Column [2 ] displays the relative frequency of stories regarding NYC and dealing 
with the different issues. Column [3] does the same for TriState stories, while column 
[4] refers to stories that do not have a link with either the TriState or NYC.
The most frequent topic for a story in the New York Times is Banking, Finance and 
Domestic Commerce, with 15 percent of stories. International Affairs rank second, with 
more than 13 percent of stories, which confirms the common perception of the Times 
as a newspaper with a clear focus on international events. The third topic is Federal 
Government Operations ( 8  percent of stories), closely followed by Defense, with more 
than 7 percent of stories. Some topics are very relevant at the local level, while they 
are much less so at the federal one: this is the case for stories about State and Local 
Administration (almost by definition), about Law &; Crime and about Housing.
The last two rows of Table 3.2 report the relative frequency of stories about those 
aggregates of topics which, in accord with the issue ownership dataset, I classify as 
Democratic and Republican ones10. The set of Democratic issues comprises Civil Rights, 
Health Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare; the set of Republican ones 
comprises Defense and Law & Crime. As discussed above, the ownership of the Crime 
issue by the GOP is not without dispute.
More than 8  percent of all stories are about Democratic topics, while the correspond­
ing figure for Republican ones is about 13 percent. The relative advantage of Republican 
issues over Democratic ones on the pages of the New York Times is around 6  percent for 
New York City stories, and around 5 percent for federal ones; it is less than one percent 
for TriState stories.
The primacy of Banking Sz Finance as the modal topic on the Times could be due 
to the fact that there is a large number of short stories about the stock market, which 
are picked up by the random sampling. In fact, when one looks at the front page, a 
different pattern emerges, as shown by Table 3.3. The most covered topic on the front 
page is International Affairs (18 percent of stories). Federal Government Operations 
and Defense follow, with slightly more than 15 percent of stories each. It turns out that 
Banking and Finance stories constitute only 3.8 percent of the total stories on the front 
page, compared with almost 16 percent on internal pages.
Coming back to the comparison between Democratic and Republican issues, the last 
two rows of Table 3.3 show that the relative advantage of stories about Republican topics 
over Democratic ones, being less than 5 percent on internal pages, jumps to more than 
1 1  percent on the front page.
3.3.3 The Executive Orders dataset
The Policy Agendas Project features all Executive Orders enacted by Presidents of the 
United States, from 1945 to 2001. As mentioned in the introduction, I use this dataset 
in order to proxy for the activity of incumbent Presidents across issues.
10See section 3.4.4 below.
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Executive Orders are classified according to their major topic, within a set of 19 
issues. There are eight topics less in the Executive Orders dataset than in the New York 
Times one.
In Table 3.41 report some summary statistics about the relative frequency of Execu­
tive Orders dealing with the various issues. Topics have been ordered according to their 
frequency (column [1 ]). The most frequent topic is Federal Government Operations, 
with more than 23 percent of all Executive Orders: it comprises acts of organisation 
of the Executive, presidential appointments, and the like. Defense is the second topic 
by relative frequency, with around 21 percent of all orders, while International Affairs 
comes third, with 1 1  percent.
As in the previous tables about the Times, the last two rows of Table 3.4 display the 
relative frequency of Executive Orders concerning Democratic and Republican issues.
In columns [2] and [3] I report the relative frequency of Executive Orders dealing with 
the various issues, conditionally on the political affiliation of the incumbent President. 
Some sizeable differences emerge: for example, there are almost 26 percent Executive 
Orders about Federal Government Operations under a Republican incumbent, while the 
corresponding figure is 21.5 percent for Democratic incumbents. Under a Democratic 
incumbent almost 12 percent of orders concern Labor h  Employment and around 5
percent concern Civil Rights; the corresponding numbers for Republican incumbents
amount to 7 and 3 percent respectively. On the other hand, around 3 percent of Execu­
tive Orders are about Macroeconomics and Banking & Finance, while the corresponding 
figures under a Democratic incumbent do not reach 2  percent.
Given the conditional behaviour of Executive Orders about Civil Rights and Labor & 
Employment, which is matched by a similar behaviour of Health Care Orders11, there are 
more than 18 percent Executive Orders about Democratic Topics when the incumbent 
President is a Democrat, as compared to 12 percent under a Republican one. On the 
other hand, the share of Executive Orders about Republican topics is quantitatively 
similar for both Republican and Democratic presidents (22 and 23 percent respectively).
3.4 Empirical strategy
3.4.1 Identifying assum ptions
In order to analyse the political behaviour of the New York Times, I focus on the time 
series variation in the choice of issues being addressed in its articles.
In a political system like the U.S., presidential elections play the most crucial role. 
Thus, the presidential campaign is the period during which the agenda setting power 
of a newspaper is most valuable, as it is likely that voters make up their mind about 
whether and whom to vote for President immediately before the elections, i.e. during 
the campaign period.
11 Executive Orders about Social Welfare in fact follow an opposite pattern, but this effect is not strong 
enough to cancel out -within the aggregate of Democratic topics- the pattern found for the other three 
topics.
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The empirical analysis performed here and the interpretation of its findings are based 
on the following set of identifying assumptions:
(1) The issue ownership hypothesis holds.
(2) “All publicity is good publicity”.
(3) The relative share of Executive Orders about a subset of issues proxies the relative 
intensity of the activity of the incumbent President with respect to those issues.
The choice per se of the issues a newspaper covers during the presidential campaign 
has an electoral effect, to the extent that the first two assumptions hold. First, it must 
be the case that the majority of voters reckons candidates belonging to a given political 
party as better capable of handling problems related to a given issue, than candidates 
belonging to the rival party . 12 In fact, the opinion polls I have analyzed in section 
3.3.1 shows that Democrats are perceived as more competent than Republicans on civil 
rights and welfare issues, while the opposite holds (albeit with some time variation) on 
the defense issue.
Second, an increased amount of stories about an issue owned by a given party has 
the predicted effect of favoring that political party, if these stories are never too negative 
about the relative performance -on the issue itself- of the political party in question, or 
at least are so perceived by readers. The experimental evidence gathered by Baum and 
Gussin [2004] provides some support to this assumption. The authors asked 110 coders 
to classify the content of 399 news stories from the 2000 presidential campaign, and to 
assess whether each news item would be favourable to the Republican or the Democratic 
candidate. In a randomised fashion, half of the articles and TV transcripts were not 
identified according to their source, i.e. the authors, before submitting the news story 
to the coders, deleted any reference to the newspaper or TV news broadcast from which 
the story was taken. One quarter of the news stories was on the other hand correctly 
identified, while the last quarter was incorrectly identified, and tagged as originating 
from media outlets with opposite partisan stance with respect to the original source. 
The authors find that coders, when assessing the favorability of a given news story, are 
much more influenced by the balance of owned topics being covered (i.e. whether each 
news story deals more with topics owned by the Republican vs. the Democratic party) 
than by the source of the story itself.
Any change in the issue balance of stories being published by the Times during the 
presidential campaign can be attributed to the strategic choice of the newspaper itself if 
no other newsworthy political actor is changing its behaviour of news creation along the 
same time pattern. The prime suspect from such perspective is of course the incumbent 
President.
12 Of course it would be better to have information about the beliefs entertained by the (potential) 
readers themselves of the newspaper in question. Since this type of data is not directly available, I use 
here data on issue ownership for the entire population.
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Assumption (3) tackles this point, by stating that the relative frequency of Executive 
Orders concerning a given set of issues enacted by the incumbent President at time t 
should proxy for the share of time and effort his administration devotes to those issues.
3.4.2 Some definitions
As it is implicit in the preceding discussion, there are two main control variables which 
are relevant for analysing the political behaviour of a newspaper along the time series 
dimension.
The first of these variables is the political affiliation of the incumbent President.
Within an issue ownership framework, it is natural to ask whether the newspaper 
-during non-campaign periods- systematically gives more coverage to issues over which 
the incumbent President is perceived as strong or weak.
It could be the case that the newspaper gives more coverage to issues owned by the 
incumbent President because it merely reports on his level of activity across issues. In 
order to try and disentangle the presence of a bias by the newspaper, one should therefore 
control for the intensity of the activity of the incumbent administration towards the 
various issues. In my empirical specification I use the relative frequency of Executive 
Orders as a proxy for this relative intensity.
To the extent that the proxy captures the underlying omitted variable, a more intense 
coverage of issues owned by the incumbent President could be due to various reasons 
that do not exclude each other.
First, this bias could be due to the fact that the newspaper is acting as a pressure 
group with respect to these issues, and is taking into account the fact that the incumbent 
could be more responsive to pressures that regard owned issues.
Alternatively, this bias could be explained within a political agency framework. If the 
issue ownership hypothesis holds, citizens would tend to elect a President who is strong 
on issues that they reckon as salient. Ex post, they want to assess the performance 
of the elected president on these issues, and therefore demand pieces of information 
about what the president is delivering during the term. The newspaper responds to this 
demand for specific information by publishing more stories concerning the issues owned 
by the incumbent President.
A third explanation has some behavioural flavor. If citizens expect the incumbent 
President to be more active on owned issues, then they are a priori more interested in 
stories about these issues. The newspaper accomodates this expectation by publishing 
more stories about issues owned by the incumbent, as any deviation that goes against 
the readers’ ex ante bias could create a cognitive dissonance effect, which in turn may 
lower the newspaper’s readership and advertising revenue. 13
Conversely, it could be the case that the newspaper -outside of the electoral campaign- 
features more stories about the topics over which the incumbent President is weak, still 
controlling for presidential activity across issues. Such bias could be due to the fact that
13This argument resonates with the model by Mullainathan and Shleifer [2005], discussed in section 
1.2.4.
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the newspaper acts as a permanent watchdog with respect to the incumbent President, 
and concentrates its attention on the issues over which she is perceived as weak by public 
opinion.
The main focus of this chapter is on the electoral behaviour of the New York Times. 
Indeed, the second control variable which is relevant within a time series framework is 
the campaign status, i.e. the fact of being under the presidential campaign. A crucial 
aspect of the U.S. electoral system is that the date of presidential elections is exogenously 
fixed: the law commands that they must be held on the first Tuesday following the first 
Monday of November, every four years. While the end point of the presidential campaign 
is exogenously fixed by Election Day, the starting point is not exogenous, as it depends on 
the choices made by the agents involved, i.e. the candidates and the candidates’ parties, 
the mass media and the public. Nonetheless, a typical dictum is that the presidential 
campaign starts on Labor Day, namely the first Monday in September. Alternatively, 
one could think about the Convention of the challenger’s party as an earlier starting 
point for the campaign.
My empirical strategy is focused on the comparison between the coverage of elec- 
torally relevant topics inside and outside of the presidential campaign.
The mechanism at play here is that the newspaper, by increasing during the pres­
idential campaign period the frequency of articles about issues owned by a given can­
didate, would induce its readers, at the margin, to go to the ballot and vote for the 
candidate in question. Given the three identifying assumptions stated above, such in­
creased coverage of owned issues during the presidential campaign would be a symptom 
of the fact that the newspaper is partisan towards the candidate owning these issues. 
Moreover, one should check that such increase in the coverage of owned issues does not 
take place with respect to both Democratic and Republican ones. It is the asymmetry 
in the increased coverage of Democratic (Republican) issues that is consistent with a 
corresponding Democratic (Republican) partisanship of the newspaper.
This discussion can be summarised in the following definition:
D efinition 1 A newspaper has a Democratic (Republican) partisanship if  during the 
presidential campaign it devotes more space to issues owned by the Democratic (Repub­
lican) party, with no increased coverage of Republican (Democratic) issues.
It could be the case that during presidential campaigns the Times behaves differently, 
as a function of the political affiliation of the incumbent President. Over and above the 
electoral partisanship of the newspaper, as described by Definition 1, the effects of 
the political affiliation of the incumbent President on issue coverage could be given an 
interpretation within a lapdog/watchdog dichotomy.
The idea is the following: if -during the presidential campaign- the New York Times 
gives less emphasis to Democratic topics and/or more emphasis to Republican topics 
when the incumbent is a Democrat, over and above its Democratic or Republican parti­
sanship, this is consistent with the fact that the newsaper acts as an electoral watchdog 
with respect to the incumbent President. This is so because the newspaper differentially
CHAPTER 3. BEING THE N E W  YORK TIMES 69
focuses the attention away from topics over which the incumbent President is on average 
perceived as strong, towards topics over which he is perceived as weak.
On the contrary, if the newspaper differentially gives more emphasis to Democratic 
topics and less to Republican ones when the incumbent is a Democrat, the newspaper 
is said to behave as an electoral lapdog towards the incumbent President. Again, this 
interaction effect is additive with respect to the partisanship component.
This analysis is summarised in the following definitions:
D efinition 2 A newspaper is an electoral lapdog of the incumbent President if, ceteris 
paribus, during the presidential campaign it devotes more space to the issues over which 
the incumbent is strong, and/or less to issues over which the incumbent is weak.
D efinition  3 A newspaper acts as an electoral watchdog if, ceteris paribus, during the 
presidential campaign it dedicates more space to the issues over which the incumbent is 
weak, and/or less space to the issues over which the incumbent is strong.
3.4.3 A difference in difference approach
Given the three identifying assumptions stated above and the definitions introduced in 
the preceding section, the electoral behaviour of the New York Times can be analyzed 
through a difference in difference approach. In order to illustrate the link between the 
estimated coefficients and the definitions given in the previous section, I will use a simple 
linear specification.
Let yEEM be the relative frequency of stories about Democratic topics the Times 
publishes during period t. One can write the following difference in difference specifica­
tion for y EEM:
y D E M _  ^ o _ | £) )  j32l ( P c a m p t =  1)
+/33 I (incPt= D  &; Pcampt= 1) +  5zEEM+£t (3.1)
where I(incPt = D) is a dummy that equals one when the incumbent President at time 
t is a Democrat, l(Pcampt = 1) is a dummy that equals one during the presidential cam­
paign period14, and the third dummy represents the interaction term, i.e. it equals one 
when there is a presidential campaign and the incumbent President is a Democrat; fi­
nally z EEM stands for the relative frequency of Executive Orders concerning Democratic 
topics enacted by the incumbent President at time t , and e* is the error term.
In a specular fashion, one can write the following linear equation for yEEP, the 
relative frequency of stories about Republican topics published by the Times during 
period t:
14Across all specifications presented in section 3.5, the presidential campaign dummy equals one for 
the months of August, September and October immediately before the presidential elections.
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y?EP= 7 o+7 i l(incP t= R) + 7  2l{Pcampt= 1 )
+ 7 3 I (incPt= R  Sz Pcampt= 1 ) +  ( z PEP+rjt (3.2)
where I(incP t= R) is a dummy for the incumbent President being a Republican, I (Pcampt 
1 ) is defined as above, and the third dummy represents the interaction between the pres­
idential campaign and the incumbent President being a Republican; z PEP is the relative 
frequency of executive orders about Republican topics enacted by the incumbent Presi­
dent during the time period, while rjt is the error term.
The coefficient Pi on the first dummy in equation (3.1) refers to the newspaper’s 
behaviour on Democratic stories during the term, as a function of the political affilia­
tion of the incumbent President. If Pi turns out to be statistically different from zero 
and positive, this is consistent with the newspaper finding it worthwhile to emphasize 
Democratic issues when the incumbent President is a Democrat, even after controlling 
for the pattern of Executive Orders. On the contrary, if Pi happens to be negative, this 
is consistent with the fact that the newspaper is acting as a permanent watchdog with 
respect to the incumbent. A parallel reasoning can be applied to the coefficient 7 1  in 
equation (3.2).
The partisan behaviour of the New York Times, as characterised by Definition 1, can 
be disentangled by looking at the two coefficients P2 and 7 2 : if P2 is statistically different 
from zero and positive, while 7 2  is not statistically different from zero or negative, this 
is consistent with the newspaper having a Democratic partisanship. Conversely, if 7 2  is 
statistically significant and positive, while P2 is indistinguishable from zero or negative, 
this is a symptom of the fact that the newspaper has a Republican partisanship.
The interaction terms are meant to capture the differential behaviour of the newspa­
per during the presidential campaign, as a function of the political color of the incumbent 
President. If Ps is positive and statistically significant, this is consistent with the fact 
that on Democratic topics the New York Times is captured by the incumbent President 
during the presidential campaign, i.e. it acts as an electoral lapdog. Conversely, if $ 3  
is found to be negative and significant, this is consistent with the newspaper acting 
as an electoral watchdog of the incumbent President during the presidential campaign, 
on Democratic issues. Again in a specular fashion, 7 3  represents the electoral lapdog 
or watchdog behaviour of the New York Times on Republican topics. In fact, if 7 3  is 
found to be statistically significant and negative (positive), this is consistent with the 
New York Times acting as an electoral watchdog (lapdog) of the incumbent President 
on Republican topics.
A pair of difference in difference tables can further clarify the interpretation of the 
coefficients:
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Dem ocratic to p ic s campaign no campaign simple difference
Democratic President V d c  =  f a  +  f a  +  f a  +  fa y § n  =  f a  +  fa A y g  =  f a  +  f a
Republican President V R c  =  f a  +  f a II
q
! A y g  =  f a
simple difference V d c  -  VRC =  A  +  # 3 V D u  V R ti — f a A y g  -  A y g  =  fa
Republican to p ic s campaign no campaign simple difference
Republican President yRc =  70+ 71  + 7 2 + 7 3 V R n  =  70 +  71 A y §  =  72+ 73
Democratic President V d c  =  70 +  72 y%n = 70 II
<
simple difference y%c -  yRc =  7 1 + 7 3 yDn ~ yRn = 71 A yg -  Ayg =  73
where the part concerning Executive Orders has been omitted for the sake of clarity. 
The estimated (32 and 7 2  coefficients can be directly read through Definition 1. On the 
other hand, the differential behaviour of the New York Times during the presidential 
campaign as a function of the political affiliation of the incumbent President is captured 
by (33 and 7 3 .
3.4.4 D em ocratic vs Republican topics
Within the set of topics coded by Baumgartner and Jones in the New York Times 
dataset, I classify the following issues as being owned by the Democrats:
1. Civil Rights
2. Health Care
3. Labor and Employment
4. Social Welfare
For each month, I count the total number of stories about these four topics: this 
aggregate count represents the number of stories about Democratic topics. Broadly 
following the survey evidence on issue ownership, I consider Law Sz Crime and Defense 
as Republican issues, but I study them separately in the econometric analysis proper, as 
only the latter can be considered as a firm Republican issue, while there is non negligible 
variation in the ownership status of the former, as witnessed by Gallup and NES polls.
Apart from the unconditional, monthly count of stories about Democratic topics, 
Defense and Law & Crime, I also interact the topic with various characteristics of the 
stories themselves, as classified by Baumgartner and Jones. In the case of stories about 
Democratic topics and Law & Crime, I consider domestic ones, stories that deal with 
New York City, stories regarding the TriState, non-local stories (i.e. those that do not 
deal with NYC or the TriState), front page ones and stories not on the front page. On 
the other hand, in the case of Defense stories I consider the subset of domestic stories, 
non-domestic ones, front page ones and stories on internal pages.
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3.4.5 E conom etric specification
In order to analyze the time series behaviour of the Times in the issue space, I use a 
count data model. As it is standard in the literature (see Cameron and Trivedi [1998] 
and Wooldridge [2001]), I adopt a Poisson model, with a log-linear specification of the 
conditional expectation.
Let x EEM be the count of stories about Democratic issues published by the Times 
during period t. Its conditional expectation can be written as follows:
E (x D E M  I D E MJt )=exp
Po + Pi\{incPt = D) + P2l(Pcampt = 1) 
+Psl(inct = D &; Pcampt = 1) +
(3.3)
where w f £M is a set of controls. Equation (3.3) corresponds to equation (3.1), having 
assumed a log-linear Poisson model.
By the same token, the conditional expectation for x PEP~d, i.e. the count of stories 
about Defense at time f, can be written as:
E { x EEp- d z f ^ - a)=expR E P - d > 7o + 7 il {incPt = R) + 7 2 1 (Pcampt =  1) 
+ 7 3 I{inct = R  & Pcampt =  1) T C'wPEP~d
I adopt the same specification for x PEP~c, namely the count of stories about Law &; 
Crime.
Regarding control variables, the presidential campaign dummy equals one for the 
months of August, September and October immediately before the presidential elections.
The vectors w EEM, w PhP~~d and w PEP~c always include a linear and quadratic time 
trend, a set of monthly dummies (January is the baseline month), and the total number 
of stories at time t. This last variable should control for the time-varying size of the 
Times. Moreover, w EEM includes the relative frequency of Executive Orders about 
Democratic issues enacted by the incumbent President during period t. The same is 
true for w PEP~d and w PEP~c. For each sub-category of stories (e.g. domestic stories 
about Democratic issues) I also control for the total number of stories pertaining to 
that category that the Times publishes in each period (in the example: total number of 
domestic stories per month). Given the observed reversals in the ownership status of the 
Defense and Law & Crime issues (see section 3.3.1 above), I include a separate dummy 
for the presidential campaigns during which such reversals occur. These campaigns are 
1964, 1980 and 1996 for Defense, and 1976, 1992 and 1996 for Law & Crime. Finally, 
in order to control for the underlying real world events, in the case of Defense stories 
I include the number (expressed in thousands) of U.S. soldiers killed-in-action (KIA) 
during the time period15.
Standard errors are calculated using the Huber/White sandwich formula, in order 
to obtain inferences that are robust to non-Poisson heteroskedasticity. 7 
15I thank Douglas Hibbs for kindly providing the KIA data.
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3.5 Results
This section is divided in four parts. In the first part I show results for the baseline 
specification described above. In the second part I add controls that are related to the 
political situation at the local level and the identity of the New York Times publisher. 
In the third subsection I focus on the more recent time sample, i.e. from 1961 to 
1997. In the last subsection I perform some further robustness checks regarding the 
autocorrelation structure of the error term.
3.5.1 Baseline specification
The baseline results concerning Democratic topics and the two Republican ones are 
featured on Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. In each table, the first column refers to all stories, 
while the subsequent ones stand for the different subcategories of stories. For each 
explanatory variable, the incidence rate ratio16 is reported, with robust z-statistics in 
brackets.
The main message stemming from the joint examination of these tables is that the 
New York Times systematically publishes more stories about Democratic topics during 
presidential campaigns, but only so when the incumbent president is a Republican. In 
fact, regarding the Republican issues of Defense and Law &; Crime, there is no sys­
tematic variation in the coverage during presidential campaigns. The only exception 
is represented by front page stories. When the incumbent President is a Republican, 
there are more front page stories about Law & Crime and less about Defense, as the 
presidential campaign starts.
The overall pattern of results is consistent with the New York Times showing a 
Democratic partisanship, with some watchdog aspects, in that there is a systematic in­
crease in the count of stories about Democratic topics during the presidential campaign, 
which occurs only when the incumbent President is perceived as weak on these issues, 
i.e. he is a Republican.
In particular, when the incumbent President is a Republican, there are on average 
around 26.6 percent more stories about Democratic topics as the presidential campaign 
starts (Table 3.5, column [1]). When significant, the magnitude of the effect is compa­
rable across different subsets of stories, apart from NYC ones: in this case, there are 
more than double the number of stories about Democratic topics during the presiden­
tial campaign and under a Republican incumbent. The effect is strongly significant (at 
the one percent level) for all stories, NYC ones and those not on the front page. It is 
significant at the 5 percent level for domestic stories.
The interaction term is always estimated to be negative across all subcategories of 
news (incidence rate ratios below one), and it is significantly different from zero at 
ordinary confidence levels for all stories (10 percent) and domestic ones (5 percent). In
16The incidence rate ratio represents the relative change in the dependent variable which is associated 
with a unitary change of the explanatory variable. In the case of a dummy variable, an incidence rate 
ratio of 1 +  y, with y >  0, stands for the fact that there are on average y  percent more successes (in my 
case: stories) when the dummy equals one, as compared to the case when the dummy equals zero.
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any case, one can never reject the hypothesis that the presidential campaign does not 
produce any change in the count of stories about Democratic topics when the incumbent 
President is a Democrat. This is shown by the p-value on the corresponding t-test, which 
is reported below the coefficients under each column in Table 3.5.
Regarding the effects of the political affiliation of the incumbent President on Demo­
cratic stories, a consistent pattern emerges: during the term there are systematically 
more stories about Democratic topics when the President is a Democrat, even after 
controlling for presidential activity, as proxied by the relative frequency of Executive 
Orders. There are on average around 18 percent more stories about Democratic topics 
under a Democratic incumbent (Table 3.5, column [1]). The magnitude of such an effect 
is comparable for domestic stories, non-local stories and stories not on the front page, 
while it is larger (more than 27 percent) for front page ones. This larger coverage of 
Democratic topics during the term when the President is a Democrat helps understand 
the results concerning the Times behaviour during the presidential campaign: when 
the incumbent is a Democrat the aggregate count of stories about Democratic topics is 
already high outside the presidential campaign, and the presidential campaign does not 
produce any additional effect.
The fourth row in the table displays the effect of the relative share of Executive Or­
ders. In only one cases out of seven is the incidence rate ratio larger than one, indicating 
a positive correlation between the share of Executive Orders about Democratic topics 
and the count of stories on the Times. However, this effect is not statistically significant. 
The same holds true for the six cases in which the point estimate of the incidence rate 
ratio is less than one.
Finally, the larger is the newspaper (as proxied by the total number of stories being 
sampled each month), the higher is the count of stories about Democratic topics (column 
[1]): this is a scale effect, which is very precisely estimated. When considering the various 
subcategories of articles, the total number of stories in each of them is significantly 
correlated with the count of Democratic stories, while the size of the newspaper is no 
longer so.
Table 3.6 shows estimation results for the Defense issue. The presidential campaign 
dummy and the interaction are never significantly correlated with the count of stories 
about Defense (incidence rate ratios are indistinguishable from one). This is also the 
case for the ownership-reversal dummy, which -as said above- equals one for the 1964, 
1980 and 1996 campaigns. However, it turns out that there are systematically less De­
fense stories on the front page during the presidential campaign, when the incumbent 
President is a Republican. This is witnessed by the fact that the p-value on the cor­
responding t-test is around 0.05, thus rejecting the null hypothesis of no effects of the 
presidential campaign under a Republican incumbent.
In a parallel fashion to what found for stories about Democratic issues, there are 
systematically more stories about Defense when the incumbent President is a Republi­
can. This correlation is significant at ordinary confidence level for all categories of news 
but domestic ones. The point estimates imply that there are around 10 percent more
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articles about Defense under a Republican incumbent than a Democrat, if one considers 
all stories, non-domestic ones and stories on internal pages. Such increase amounts to 
2 0  percent in the case of front page stories.
Moreover, one should notice that the correlation between Defense stories and Execu­
tive Orders is always estimated to be positive, but is larger in magnitude and statistically 
significant only for domestic stories. On the other hand, the number of killed in action 
(KIA) is a strongly significant and positive predictor of Defense stories, for all categories 
of news.
Regarding Law & Crime stories (see Table 3.7), the coefficients on the presidential 
campaign dummy and the interaction are never significantly different from zero (inci­
dence rate ratios different from one). This holds for the ownership-reversal dummy as 
well. In fact, when the incumbent President is a Republican, there are significantly 
more front page articles about Law & Crime as the presidential campaign kicks in. In 
particular, one can reject the null hypothesis of no effects of the presidential campaign 
under a Republican incumbent.
Finally, the correlation between Law Sz Crime articles and Executive Orders is always 
estimated to be positive, but it is statistically significant only for the subset of domestic 
stories.
3.5.2 A dditional controls: N ew  York State Governor, N ew  York C ity  
M ayor and publisher’s identity
As discussed in section 3.3.2, the New York Times can be considered the main newspaper 
for the city of New York, and for the states of New York, Connecticut and New Jersey 
(the TriState area). Hence, one would like to check whether the results obtained in the 
preceding section are robust to the inclusion of controls related to the political situation 
in New York City and in the State of New York, which is the most important one within 
the TriState area. In particular, the idea is to control for the political affiliation of the 
incumbent Governor of New York State, and of the incumbent New York City Mayor.
Second, the ownership structure of the Times could have effects on the equilibrium 
supply of stories. The New York Times was founded in 1851 by Henry J. Raymond 
and George Jones, and in 1896 was bought by Adolph S. Ochs. Since then, the Ochs- 
Sulzberger family has continuously kept the ownership of the newspaper. However, in the 
time span covered by the dataset four different members of the Ochs-Sulzberger family 
have played the role of publisher: Arthur Hays Sulzberger, son-in-law of Adolph S. Ochs, 
from April 1935 to April 1961, Orvil Dryfoos, son-in-law of Arthur Hays Sulzberger, from 
May 1961 to May 1963, Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, from June 1963 to January 1992, and 
finally Arthur Sulzberger Jr., son of Arthur Ochs Sulzberger, from February 1992 to 
nowadays.
In Table 3.8 the monthly count of stories about Democratic topics is regressed against 
the set of variables used in Table 3.5, plus five additional dummies, that control for the 
political affiliation of the incumbent NYS Governor, of the incumbent NYC Mayor, and 
the publisher’s identity. The NYS Governor dummy equals one when the incumbent is a
CHAPTER 3. BEING THE NEW  YORK TIMES 76
Democrat, and zero otherwise. The same applies to the NYC Mayor dummy17. Regard­
ing the publisher’s identity, I use three different dummies for the last three publishers, 
and leave Arthur Hays Sulzberger as the baseline publisher.
Tables 3.9 and 3.10 display results for the count of stories about Defense and Law 
& Crime, respectively. Here the dummy variables for the political affiliation of the 
incumbent NYS Governor and NYC Mayor equal one for a Republican incumbent.
The joint inspection of these three tables confirms the findings obtained with the 
baseline specification. There are systematically more stories about Democratic topics 
during the presidential campaign, but less so when the incumbent President is a Demo­
crat. In fact, one cannot reject at ordinary confidence levels the null hypothesis of no 
effects of the presidential campaign under a Democratic incumbent. The size and level of 
significance of the coefficients on the presidential campaign dummy and the interaction 
are very similar to those found under the baseline specification.
On the other hand, some discrepancies emerge when looking at the partial correlation 
with the political affiliation of the incumbent President. It is still the case that -during 
the term- there are more stories about Democratic issues when the President happens to 
be a Democrat, but the size of the coefficient and the significance level are smaller than 
the ones obtained with the baseline specification. The point estimate for all stories and 
domestic ones implies a 10 percent increase in the coverage of Democratic topics when 
the incumbent President is a Democrat, which should be compared with a 18 percent 
increase in the baseline regression. The only exception to this pattern of decreased 
size and significance occurs with TriState stories: when controlling for the political 
affiliation of the NYS Governor and NYC mayor, there are on average around 39 percent 
more Democratic stories under the presidency of a Democrat. This is coupled with a 
77 percent increase in the coverage of TriState stories about Democratic issues, when 
the incumbent NYS Governor is a Democrat (Table 3.8, column [4]). Both partial 
correlations are strongly significant. Moreover, if one considers all stories, there are 10 
percent more articles about Democratic issues when the incumbent NYS Governor is a 
Democrat.
The correlation of Democratic stories with the political affiliation of the incum­
bent NYC Mayor shows an opposite pattern: there are significantly less articles about 
Democratic issues under a Democratic NYC Mayor, i.e. the Times appears to act as a 
permanent watchdog towards Republican NYC Mayors.
Finally, there are more stories about Democratic topics under the last two publishers, 
i.e. Arthur Ochs Sulzberger and Arthur Sulzberger Junior. The effect is large and 
precisely estimated for all stories, domestic and non-local ones.
Regarding Defense stories, there are no significant effects of the presidential campaign 
and of the campaign interacted with the political affiliation of the incumbent President. 
Again, the only exception occurs with front page stories. There are systematically less 
Defense stories on the front page during the presidential campaign, when the incumbent
17Vincent R. Impellitteri was Mayor of New York City from 1950 to 1953, and was in fact elected as 
an Independent. However, because of his lifelong affiliation to the Democratic Party, I have coded him 
as a Democrat.
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President is a Republican, as shown by the p-value on the corresponding t-test (Table 
3.9, column [4]).
Similarly to what found with the baseline specification, there are significantly more 
stories about Defense when the incumbent President is a Republican. The coefficient is 
now larger and more precisely estimated, with the exception of front page stories. In 
particular, if one considers all stories (column [1]) there are around 27 percent more 
Defense stories under the presidency of a Republican. On the other hand, there is no 
significant correlation between Defense stories and the political affiliation of the NYS 
Governor, while there are systematically more Defense articles when the incumbent 
NYC Mayor is a Republican. Regarding the publishers’ effects, the second and the 
third publisher are associated with significantly more stories about Defense.
Coming to the Law h  Crime issue, Table 3.10 shows that the presidential campaign 
dummy and the interaction term between the campaign and the political affiliation of 
the President are not significantly correlated with the count of stories about the topic, 
for all categories of news. This is also the case for the ownership-reversal dummy. As 
with the baseline specification, there are more front page stories about Law and Crime 
during the campaign when the incumbent President is a Republican.
Finally, there is some positive and significant correlation between Law & Crime 
stories and the incumbent NYC Mayor being a Republican (for all stories, domestic and 
TriState ones), and the same is true for the last two publishers.
3.5.3 The N ew  York T im es’ behaviour as of the 60s
The purpose of this section is to investigate the editorial choices of the Times in more 
recent years, namely from 1961 to 1997. A closer look to the behaviour of the New York 
Times as of the 60s is motivated by the availability of more detailed pieces of information 
about issue ownership. Moreover, as illustrated in section 3.3.1, the issue of Civil Rights 
clearly emerges as a Democratic one only with the Kennedy and Johnson presidency.
In the present exercise I control for the same set of additional variables I have used 
in the previous section, i.e. the political affiliation of the incumbent NYS Governor and 
NYC Mayor, and the publisher’s identity.
Table 3.11 displays results about Democratic stories. The overall pattern of findings 
quite closely corresponds to the ones obtained with the previous specification. During 
the presidential campaign there are more stories about Democratic topics, but only so
when the incumbent President is a Republican. The magnitude of the effect is larger 
during the more recent time span. If one considers all stories, the Times publishes 
around 33 percent more Democratic stories during the campaign under a Republican 
incumbent, and 27 percent more in the case of domestic stories. Regarding NYC stories, 
the increase in the coverage of Democratic topics during the presidential campaign is 
more than threefold. In the post-1960 period, there is also a statistically significant 
increase in the count of front page stories about Democratic issues. The size of the 
effect is large, with a more than twofold increase. The interaction term between the 
presidential campaign dummy and the political affiliation of the incumbent President is
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significant at the 5 percent level for domestic stories and NYC ones.
Outside of the presidential campaign, again there are more stories about Democratic 
issues under the presidency of a Democrat. If one considers all stories, there are on av­
erage around 13 percent more Democratic stories under a Democratic President. In the 
post-1960 subsample there is a larger and more significant positive correlation between 
the count of stories about Democratic topics and the incumbent NYS Governor being 
a Democrat. In particular, there are around twice the number of TriState stories under 
a Democratic NYS Governor, and almost three times the number of front page stories. 
The negative correlation between Democratic stories and the incumbent NYC Mayor 
being a Democrat is confirmed in the more recent subsample, as the positive correlation 
with the last two publishers.
Regarding stories about Defense, Table 3.12 shows a pattern of results that is quite 
different from the one found on the entire time sample. When the incumbent President 
is a Democrat and there is no reversal in the ownership of the issue, the Times system­
atically publishes more stories about Defense, as the presidential campaign starts. Such \ 
result should be taken with some caution, just because -in the post-1960 period- the 
only presidential year under a Democratic incumbent during which there is no reversal 
in the ownership of the Defense issue is 1968, i.e. in the middle of the Vietnam War. I
The effect of the 1968 campaign is strongly significant (one percent significance level) 
and large in magnitude for all stories, domestic ones and those not on the front page. 
The correlation is smaller and slightly less significant for non-domestic stories. On the 
other hand, the coefficient on the ownership reversal dummy, when significantly different 
from zero (as it is the case for domestic stories and those on internal pages), is estimated 
to be negative.
The coefficient on the interaction between the presidential campaign and the incum­
bent President being a Republican is estimated to be negative (incidence rate ratios 
less than one) and significantly so for all categories of stories but front page ones. In 
particular, for all stories and front page ones one can reject at the 1 0  percent level the 
null hypothesis that the Times does not change the coverage of Defense stories during 
the presidential campaign under a Republican incumbent. The joint inspection of the 
incidence rate ratios suggests that there is indeed a decrease in the count of all stories 
and front page ones about Defense. Below the p-values on the test about the effect of 
the campaign under a Republican President, I report the p-values of a similar test on 
whether there is a change in the count of Defense stories during the presidential cam­
paigns that are characterised by a reversal in the ownership of the issue. At ordinary 
confidence levels one can never reject the null hypothesis of no effects.
Finally it must be noticed that outside of the presidential campaign there are sys­
tematically more Defense stories when the incumbent President is a Republican, around 
50 percent. The correlation is very precisely estimated (one percent level) for all but 
front page stories. Overall, the set of estimated coefficient is consistent with a watch­
dog attitude of the Times during the presidential campaign, as there are more Defense 
stories during the 1968 campaign, while there is a decrease in such count during the
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campaign when the incumbent President is perceived as more competent on the issue, 
i.e. he is a Republican. Moreover, in those campaign years that are characterised by a 
reversal in the ownership of the issue, which all occur under a Democratic incumbent, 
the Times is marginally less inclined to publish stories about it.
Table 3.13 presents results about Law &; Crime stories. As with the entire time 
sample, there are no remarkable movements in the count of stories about the issue during 
presidential campaigns. Similarly to what found in Table 3.10, when the incumbent 
President is a Republican and the presidential campaign starts there are significantly 
more front page stories about Law & Crime. This is also the case for TriState stories.
Differently from previous results, there are systematically more non-local stories about 
the issue under the incumbency of a Republican President. Finally, there are more Law 
&; Crime stories under a Republican NYC Mayor and under the last publisher.
3.5.4 R obustness checks
One relevant concern about the validity of these findings is that the autocorrelation of 
the right hand side variables might excessively deflate the estimated standard errors.
In order to address this issue, I have run all regressions on collapsed data.18 To do so,
I calculate the average of all variables for each presidential term and each campaign, 
so that I am left with 27 observations for the entire sample, and 18 for the post-1960 
period. On this collapsed data I run Poisson regressions, with heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors., a# ^
The results obtained in the pceVious sections are robust to this check. In Table 3.14 
I summarise the results of the exercise on Democratic topics, Defense and Law & Crime, 
when the baseline specification (see section 3.5.1 above) is applied to all stories19, both 
for the entire time sample and the post-1960 period.
Consistently with what done before, the incumbent President dummy equals one un­
der a Democratic President when dealing with Democratic stories (Table 3.14, columns 
[1] and [4]), vice versa for Defense and Law & Crime stories. The interaction term 
between the presidential campaign dummy and the incumbent President one is defined 
accordingly.
Regarding Democratic issues, there are systematically more articles about them 
during the presidential campaign, when the incumbent President is a Republican. The 
coefficient on the presidential campaign dummy is highly significant for both the entire 
sample and the more recent period, at the one and 5 percent level respectively. The 
point estimates imply a 22 percent and a 25 percent increase in the coverage of these 
topics during the campaign, under the incumbency of a Republican President. The 
coefficients on the interaction term are estimated to be negative (incidence rate ratios 
less than one), but not significantly so.20 Again, in both cases one cannot reject at 
ordinary confidence level the null hypothesis that the presidential campaign does not
18See Bertrand et al. [2004] for a full discussion of the issue.
19Results on the different subcategories of news are available upon request.
20In fact, in the case of domestic stories (not reported in the table) the interaction term is significantly 
different from zero at the one percent level for the entire sample, and at 5 percent for the post-1960 one.
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produce any change in the count of Democratic stories under a Democratic President.
When considering the entire time sample, Defense stories do not display any sys­
tematic change during the presidential campaign (column [2]), as in Table 3.6. The 
coefficient on the ownership reversal dummy is mildly significant at 1 0  percent level, 
implying a 45 percent increase in the count of Defense stories during the presidential 
campaign when such reversal occurs. However, a joint test on the presidential campaign 
dummy and the ownership reversal one cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is 
no overall change in the count of Defense stories, during the presidential campaigns that 
are characterised by such reversal. Apart from this, number of KIA and the relative 
frequency of Executive Orders are strongly and significantly correlated with the count 
of Defense articles.
On the other hand, in the post-1960 sample the analysis of the collapsed dataset 
shows that there are systematically less stories about Defense during the presidential 
campaign, when the incumbent President is a Republican. The effect is large and very 
precisely estimated (one percent confidence level). Under a Republican President there 
are systematically more stories about Defense. The magnitude and significance of these 
two effects correspond to what found on the non-collapsed dataset (see section 3.5.3). 
This is not the case for the presidential campaign dummy, which should account for 
the 1968 campaign: its coefficient is estimated to be positive (incidence rate ratio larger 
than one), but is not statistically significant. The same is true for the ownership reversal 
dummy.
Finally, stories about Law & Crime display the same (absence of) pattern that has 
been discussed in the previous sections.
3.6 Discussion and conclusions
This chapter provides new evidence about the political behaviour of the New York Times, 
by analysing the time series variation in the count of stories about politically relevant 
topics. The main finding is that the Times displays a Democratic partisanship, with 
some watchdog aspects. This is the case, because there are systematically more stories 
about Civil Rights, Health Care, Labour and Social Welfare during the presidential 
campaign, but only so when the incumbent President is a Republican. This is true for 
both the entire sample and the more recent 1961-1997 subperiod.
When looking at the entire 1946-1997 sample, the Democratic partisanship hypoth­
esis finds confirmation in the fact that there is no comparable variation during the 
presidential campaign in the count of stories about Defense and Law h  Crime, which 
-as broadly confirmed by the analysis of Gallup Polls and the NES- represent more 
favourable issues for the GOP.
On the other hand, there are signs of a more symmetric watchdog behaviour of the 
Times when considering the more recent period, as the Defense issue is covered more 
heavily during the presidential campaign when the incumbent President is a Democrat 
and there is no reversal in the ownership of the issue itself. In fact, when the President
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is a Republican, there are less Defense stories overall and on the front page as the 
presidential campaign starts. A caveat here is that the only presidential campaign 
under a Democratic incumbent with no ownership reversal is the 1968 one, i.e. in the 
middle of the Vietnam War.
As an additional caveat, it must be noted that the relative frequency of Executive 
Orders about a given set of topics, which is used here as a proxy for the intensity of 
the activity of the incumbent President on these topics, is not very strongly correlated 
with the news coverage by the Times. This is especially true for Democratic issues. It 
is unclear whether such lack of a significant correlation depends on the fact that the 
Times is not very much influenced in its coverage by the month-by-month variation in 
Executive Orders, or that the unweighted frequency thereof is not an adequate proxy for 
presidential activity. It could well be the case that Executive Orders should be weighted 
by their importance, or that other facets of presidential activity, like speeches and press 
conferences, are a better signal of the intensity of the President’s effort across issues.
The significance of my results about the differential news coverage of the Times 
during presidential campaigns is robust to these arguments, to the extent that the mea­
surement error attached to executive orders is not systematically correlated with the 
political affiliation of the incumbent President and the campaign status. In particular, 
one might be concerned with the possibility that the supposed watchdog behaviour of 
the Times on Democratic issues is explained by the fact that Republican incumbents 
strongly focus their campaign on these Democratic issues, and that this is not captured 
at all by the variation in Executive Orders. However, Benoit, Hansen and Petrocik [2003] 
provide a computer content analysis of acceptance speeches and TV ads of presidential 
candidates from 1952 through 2000: this analysis shows that Republican candidates 
strongly focus their campaign on owned issues (i.e. they relatively shy away from dis­
cussing welfare issues), while Democratic candidates are more balanced in the coverage 
of owned and not owned issues. Such ancillary evidence on candidates’ campaign strate­
gies strongly rejects the hypothesis that Republicans tend to focus on issues owned by 
the Democrats.
Consistently with the main thread of the dissertation, the methodology I have applied 
here to the New York Times is focused on the agenda-setting behaviour of the newspaper, 
i.e. on the time variation in the coverage of policy relevant issues. Such agenda-setting 
framework, coupled with the issue ownership hypothesis, provides a natural way to think 
about the political stance of the newspaper.
How do these findings relate to the theoretical literature on mass media bias? It is 
clearly the case that the systematic variations in the editorial choices of the Times I 
have shown to occur during presidential campaigns are consistent with media bias, i.e. 
with a precise political stance of the newspaper, which emerges outside the editorials’ 
page proper. However, given the structure of the available data, it is hard to test the 
empirical validity of supply-led stories a la Baron against demand-driven ones, as those 
suggested by Mullainathan and Shleifer, and Gentzkow and Shapiro. Moreover, one 
cannot rule out the role played by the political bias of the owner, especially in the case
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of a newspaper like the Times. This latter argument is corroborated by the fact that 
some of the changes in the publisher’s identity have a systematic impact on the count of 
stories about Democratic topics and -to a lesser extent- about Law & Crime, even after 
controlling for a linear and quadratic time trend.
The idea of a watchdog behaviour by news providers is quite well established within 
the journalism literature21, where it works as a normative benchmark, but it also appears 
in the political economy one.22
In this case too both a supply and a demand-led story would be compatible with 
the data. Journalists and publishers alike could trade off monetary rewards against the 
“moral payoff’ of acting as watchdogs with respect to the incumbent government. On 
the other hand, readers and viewers might be exactly demanding a more intense coverage 
of issues over which there is more uncertainty regarding the incumbent’s performance. 
It could also be the case that consumers of news hold a priori beliefs about what policy 
areas are more likely to be characterised by a poor performance by the incumbent. 
A desire to see news providers confirming these beliefs, or a Bayesian inclination to 
attach a higher expectation of quality reporting to those that do so, could contribute 
to explaining what I denote as a watchdog behaviour during presidential campaigns. 
On this account, it would be useful to have some survey-based evidence on the type of 
informational needs and beliefs held by readers.
As further discussed in section 4.5.5 of the next chapter, in order to disentangle these 
different theories of media bias, one would need time series data with some exogenous 
variation in the ownership of media outlets and/or the ideological leaning of readers. In 
the case of the New York Times different individuals belonging to the Ochs-Sulzberger 
have in turn taken up the position of publisher, but their ideological continuity was 
substantial. 23
21 See for example Bennett and Serrin [2005].
22Such concept of “media as watchdogs” is central in the Downsian setup of Chan and Suen [2003] 
and it is largely implicit in the political agency framework of Besley and Burgess [2002] and Besley and 
Prat [2005].
23In section 4.5.5 we instead look at the succession of Otis Chandler as publisher of the family owned 



















COCO Table 3.1: Perceived Issue Handling Competence of Parties, Democrats' advantage







1972 10.94 (NES) 27.36 (NES) -23.82 -20.95
1976 16.98 30.11 9.15 (NES) -14.59
1980 25.55 25.08 -15 (NES) 8.81
1984 29.81 34.67 -38.89 (NES) -8.24
1988 23.26 29.40 -9.30 -5.76
1992 16.76 35.30 27.88 3.94 -44.32
1996 14.46 16.65 21.12 9.79 8.15
Notes: for each issue and each presidential year, I report the difference between the percentage of respondents believing that a 
Democrat would be better able of handling that issue and the percentage of respondents believing that a Republican would be. When 
not stated otherwise, the data come from Gallup polls, as detailed in table 3.A.1 and 3.A.2. NES data are presented in table A.3. Issue 
ownership figures that do not conform with Petrocik [1996] are highlighted.
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Table 3.2: Relative frequencies of stories on the New York Times (1946-1997), by topic and geographical locatior
[1] [2] [3] [4]
Major Topic All stories NYC stories TriState stories Non-local stories
15 Banking, Finance and Dom. Commerce 15.14 6.00 7.12 16.91
19 International Affairs 13.10 1.29 0.41 15.64
20 Federal Government Operations 8.16 1.57 3.79 9.29
16 Defense 7.35 1.01 1.23 8.64
28 Arts and Entertainment 6.34 5.66 2.63 6.81
12 Law, Crime and Family Issues 5.72 15.12 11.30 4.18
24 State and Local Government Admin. 5.21 21.13 26.77 1.31
99 Other 4.80 4.56 2.69 5.05
6 Education 3.98 9.37 8.20 2.99
10 Transportation 3.48 6.63 5.78 2.91
3 Health 2.98 4.18 5.02 2.64
5 Labor & Employment 2.68 2.96 2.89 2.63
17 Space, Science, Technology and Comm. 2.19 0.69 0.79 2.50
18 Foreign Trade 2.13 0.13 0.26 2.54
8 Energy 2.01 1.16 2.07 2.09
2 Civil Rights 1.98 1.82 2.13 1.98
14 Sports and Recreation 1.88 0.82 1.78 2.00
1 Community Development & Housing 1.81 8.17 5.17 0.81
30 Macroeconomics 1.78 0.19 0.50 2.07
29 Death Notices 1.73 0.25 0.61 2.00
7 Environment 1.42 1.82 3.39 1.16
31 Churches and Religion 1.29 1.35 0.96 1.32
4 Agriculture 1.07 0.35 0.93 1.16
13 Social Welfare 0.68 1.35 1.72 0.50
21 Public Lands and Water Management 0.64 1.13 1.28 0.52
27 Fires 0.25 1.07 0.44 0.14
26 Weather and Natural Disasters 0.20 0.22 0.15 0.20
100 8.27 8.91 82.83
DEM Democratic topics 8.32 10.31 11.76 7.75
REP Republican topics 13.07 16.13 12.52 12.82
Notes: Democratic stories comprise Civil Rights, Health Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare ones. Republican stories comprise Defense and Law & Crime
ones.
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Table 3.3: Relative frequencies of stories on the New York Times (1946-1997): front page and internal pages
HI t2] [3]
Major Topic All stories Stories not on the Front page stories
______________________________________________________________ front page______________________
19 International Affairs 13.10 12.74 18.37
20 Federal Government Operations 8.16 7.69 15.23
16 Defense 7.35 6.82 15.19
24 State and Local Government Admin. 5.21 5.07 7.35
12 Law, Crime, and Family Issues 5.72 5.72 5.78
15 Banking, Finance and Dom. Commerce 15.14 15.90 3.76
5 Labor & Employment 2.68 2.62 3.59
1 Macroeconomics 1.78 1.70 2.89
10 Transportation 3.48 3.52 2.81
2 Civil Rights 1.98 1.93 2.77
6 Education 3.98 4.07 2.72
8 Energy 2.01 1.98 2.48
18 Foreign Trade 2.13 2.12 2.39
3 Health 2.98 3.04 2.15
14 Community Development and Housing 1.81 1.79 1.98
17 Space, Science, Technology & Comm. 2.19 2.22 1.86
99 Other 4.80 5.02 1.49
28 Arts and Entertainment 6.34 6.69 1.16
31 Churches and Religion 1.29 1.30 1.16
13 Social Welfare 0.68 0.65 1.11
4 Agriculture 1.07 1.07 1.07
7 Environment 1.42 1.45 0.95
30 Death Notices 1.73 1.81 0.54
29 Sports and Recreation 1.88 1.98 0.41
21 Public Lands and Water Management 0.64 0.66 0.29
26 Weather and Natural Disasters 0.20 0.19 0.29
27 Fires 0.25 0.25 0.25
100 93.70 6.30








Notes: Democratic stories comprise Civil Rights, Health Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare ones. Republican stories comprise Defense and Law 
& Crime ones.
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Table 3.4: Relative frequencies of Executive Orders, 1946-1997
[1] [2] [3]
Major Topic Entire sample Democratic Republican
Presidents Presidents
20 Federal Government Operations 23.43 21.50 25.76
16 Defense 20.79 21.34 20.13
19 International Affairs 11.35 11.31 11.39
5 Labor & Employment 9.56 11.58 7.12
21 Public Lands and Water Manag. 6.16 7.08 5.05
18 Foreign Trade 4.40 3.81 5.11
2 Civil Rights 4.05 4.93 2.98
15 Banking, Finance and Dom. Commerce 2.43 1.82 3.17
1 Macroeconomics 2.38 1.93 2.91
10 Transportation 2.35 2.20 2.52
8 Energy 2.29 2.36 2.20
17 Space, Science, Tech. & Comm. 1.94 1.72 2.20
12 Law, Crime, and Family 1.70 1.72 1.68
7 Environment 1.58 1.61 1.55
14 Community Development and Housing 1.50 1.29 1.75
3 Health 1.44 1.93 0.84
4 Agriculture 1.03 0.86 1.23
6 Education 1.00 0.80 1.23
13 Social Welfare 0.65 0.21 1.17
DEM Executive Orders on Democratic topics 15.69 18.66 12.10
REP Executive Orders on Republican topics______________22.49_______________23.06______________ 21.81_______
Notes: Democratic topics comprise Civil Rights, Health Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare. Republican topics comprise Defense and 
Law & Crime.












[1] [2 ] [3] [4] [5] [6 ] [7]
all stories domestic stories non-local stories TriState stories NYC stories front page stories stories not on the
front page
Incumbent President is a Democrat 1.179*** 1.192*** 1.183*** 1.105 1.204 1.275* 1.167***
[4.29] [3.93] [0.81] [1.38] [1.69] [3.94]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.266*** 1.231** 1.167 1.091 2.635*** 1 .6 8 1.246***
[2.90] \ [2-49] [1.64] [0.28] [3.72] [1.33] [2.69]
interaction: Presidential campaign & 0.810* 0.762** 0.848 0.891 0.541 0.475 0.834
incumbent President is a Democrat V[171] [2.48] [1.13] [0.24] [1.46] [1.16] [1.52]
relative frequency of Executive Orders 07934^ 0.955 0.911 0.828 1.335 0.772 0.948
[0.76] [0.50] [0.92] [0.65] [0.93] [0.69] [0.62]
total number of stories 1.014*** 1.004 0.999 1 0.995 0.997 0.999
[18.78] [1.15] [0 .2 1 ] [0.06] [1.52] [0.90] [0.08]
total number of stories in the considered - 1.014*** 1.019*** 1.113*** 1.166*** 1.226*** 1.016**
subset
\
[2.67] [3.86] [5.36] [7.59] [7.98] [2.23]
p value for no effects, of th§..cam|5aign when 0 .8 2 \ 0.5 0.94 0.94 0.37 0.69 0.72
the incumbent is a Democrat
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 624 624 624 624 624 624 624
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.15 0.13 0 .1 2 0 .1 2 0 .1 1 0.16
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Democratic topics (Civil Rights, Health Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare), for different categories of news. 
For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported, with robust z statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% 
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Table 3.6: Poisson estim ates for count of s tories on Defense, baseline specification
88
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
all stories domestic stories non-domestic front page stories stories not on the
stories front page
Incumbent President is a Republican 1.102** 1.095 1.118** 1.220* 1.089*
[2.02] [1.10] [2.03] [1.82] [1.65]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.064 1.09 1.069 0.879 1.092
[0.35] [0.47] [0.38] [0.35] [0.43]
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent 0.806 0.694 0.923 0.573 0.846
President is a Republican [1.09] [1.35] [0.39] [1.14] [0.73]
dummy for campaign years with issue 1.029 1.04 1.08 0.86 1.056
ownership reversal ('64, '80, ’96) [0.11] [0.14] [0-27] [0.26] [0.20]
monthly Killed In Action (KIA), thousands 1.348*** 1.147** 1.472*** 1.359*** 1.341***
[6.70] [2.53] [6.48] [3.31] [6.14]
relative frequency of Executive Orders 1.127 1.430** 1.069 1.014 1.129
[1.16] [2.35] [0.55] [0.06] [1.11]
total number of stories 1.014*** 0.998 0.997 0.998 1
[15.23] [0.34] [1.48] [1.08] [0.03]
total number of stories in the considered subset - 1.020** 1.063*** 1.224*** 1.016
[2.37] [8.66] [11.26] [1.47]
p value for no effects of the campaign when the 0.22 0.2 0.92 0.07 0.54
incumbent is a Republican
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 624 624 624 624 624
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.16 0.22 0.18 0.22
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Defense, for different categories of news. For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios 




































stories not on the 
front page
Incumbent President is a Republican 0.978 0.963 1.022 0.821 1.031 0.954 0.982
[0.48] [0.78] [0.34] [1.52] [0.29] [0.23] [0.39]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.005 1.033 0.899 1.433 1.107 1.801 0.956
[0.03] [0.18] [0.45] [1.00] [0.33] [1.09] [0.26]
interaction: Presidential campaign & 1.127 0.956 1.31 1.08 0.731 1.36 1.111
incumbent President is a Republican [0.62] [0.24] [1.06] [0.22] [0.79] [0.53] [0.56]
dummy for campaign years with issue 0.966 1.071 0.907 1.358 0.763 0.346 1.034
ownership reversal ('76, '92, '96) [0.21] [0.40] [0.51] [0.87] [0.51] [1.05] [0.20]
relative frequency of Executive Orders 1.215 1.400* 1.181 1.667 1.22 1.723 1.182
[1.01] [1.76] [0.67] [1.11] [0.37] [0.73] [0.86]
total number of stories 1.015*** 1.005 0.992 1.006* 1.001 1.003 1
[15.22] [0.98] [1.46] [1.78] [0.31] [0.86] [0.05]
total number of stories in the considered - 1.015** 1.026*** 1.110*** 1.146*** 1.213*** 1.016*
subset [2.13] [3.70] [6.70] [8.53] [7.17] [1.75]
p value for no effects of the campaign 
when the incumbent is a Republican
0.36 0.92 0.36 0.11 0.49 0.03 0.65
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 624 624 624 624 624 624 624
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.16 0.09 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.15
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Law & Crime, for different categories of news. For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported, with

































stories not on the 
front page
Incumbent President is a Democrat 1 .1 1 0 ** 1 .1 0 1 * 1.05 1.389** 1.265 1.176 1 .1 0 0 *
[2.18] [1.91] [0.85] [2.18] [1.42] [0.84] [1.90]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.267*** 1.230** 1.172* 1.033 2.613*** 1.683 1.246***
[2.96] [2.54] [1.69] [0 .1 0 ] [3.72] [1.34] [2.80]
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent 0.802* 0.755** 0.84 0.891 0.513 0.465 0.825
President is a Democrat [1.69] [2.49] [1 .1 1 ] [0.25] [1.60] [1.18] [1.53]
Incumbent NYS Governor is a Democrat 1.103* 1.08 0.974 1.774*** 1.326 1.17 1.097
[1 .6 8 ] [1.28] [0.43] [3.46] [1.34] [0.69] [1.56]
Incumbent NYC Mayor is a Democrat 0.863** 0.877** 0.933 0.610*** 0.646* 1.058 0.847***
[2.45] [2 .1 1 ] [1.05] [2.75] [1.90] [0.25] [2.70]
Orvil Dryfoos publisher dummy 0.928 0.917 1.038 0.544 0.515 0.915 0.925
[0.58] [0 .6 6 ] [0.25] [1.18] [1.19] [0.19] [0.54]
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger publisher dummy 1.305** 1.378*** 1.428** 0.591 1.108 1.927 1.256*
[2.25] [2 .6 8 ] [2.54] [1.27] [0.23] [1.30] [1.83]
Arthur Sulzberger Jr. publisher dummy 1.483** 1.655*** 1.808*** 0.427 0.78 2.242 1.437*
[2 .1 0 ] [2.69] [2.70] [1.30] [0.35] [1.04] [1.90]
p value for no effects of the presidential campaign 
when the incumbent President is a Democrat
0.9 0.45 0.91 0.83 0.46 0.67 0.81
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend and time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Executive Orders and total number of stories yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 624 624 624 624 624 624 624
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.15 0.14 0.13 0.13 0 . 1 1 0.17
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Democratic topics (Civil Rights, Health Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare), for different categories of news. For each
explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported, with z statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5%
(10%) significance.
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stories not on the 
front page
Incumbent President is a Republican 1.274*** 1.212* 1.319*** 1.214 1.268***
[3.55] [1.75] [3.62] [1.21] [3.21]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.071 1.115 1.083 0.843 1.103
[0.39] [0.58] [0.43] [0.45] [0.48]
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent President 0.838 0.69 0.98 0.617 0.877
is a Republican [0.86] [1.37] [0.09] [0.99] [0.56]
dummy for campaign years with issue ownership reversal 1.073 1.012 1.119 0.95 1.096
('64, '80, '96) [0.28] [0.04] [0.40] [0.09] [0.34]
monthly Killed In Action (KIA), thousands 1.311*** 1.153*** 1.418*** 1.277** 1.310***
[6.51] [2-64] [6.14] [2.14] [6.04]
Incumbent NY'S Governor is a Republican 0.929 1.106 0.885 1.002 0.926
[0.99] [0.87] [1.52] [0.01] [0.97]
Incumbent NYC Mayor is a Republican 1.138 0.903 1.151* 1.214 1.115
[1.59] [0.79] [1.70] [1.01] [1.29]
Orvil Dryfoos publisher dummy 1.642*** 1.23 1.765*** 1.057 1.678***
[2.96] [0.78] [2.88] [0.15] [2.72]
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger publisher dummy 1.880*** 1.289 2.336*** 1.126 1.972***
[3.60] [0.97] [4.42] [0.29] [3.52]
Arthur Sulzberger Jr. publisher dummy 1.378 1.439 1.483 0.451 1.491
[1.11] [0.84] [1.18] [0.96] [1.32]
p value for no effects of the presidential campaign when 
the incumbent President is a Republican
0.4 0.22 0.67 0.07 0.81
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend and time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes
Executive Orders and total number of stories yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 624 624 624 624 624
Pseudo R2 0.25 0.16 0.23 0.19 0.23
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Defense, for different categories of news. For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are 

































stories not on the 
front page
Incumbent President is a Republican 1.025 1.029 1.094 0.804 1.016 1 . 0 1 1 1.029
[0-42] [0.46] [1 .1 1 ] [1.33] [0 .1 0 ] [0.04] [0.47]
Presidential campaign dummy 0.988 1 . 0 2 0.913 1.316 0.986 1.658 0.942
[0.07] [0 .1 1 ] [0.38] [0-76] [0.05] [0.94] [0.34]
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent President 1.165 0.98 1.331 1.082 0 . 8 1.445 1.147
is a Republican [0.78] [0 .1 0 ] [1.09] [0 .2 2 ] [0.58] [0.64] [0.71]
dummy for campaign years with issue ownership reversal 0.954 1.045 0.822 1.663 0.865 0.317 1 . 0 2
('76, '92, ’96) [0.27] [0-25] [0.99] [1.39] [0-27] [1.08] [0 .1 1 ]
Incumbent NYS Governor is a Republican 0.931 0.902 0.819** 0.829 1.242 0.972 0.931
[1.04] [1.44] [2.07] [1.03] [1.49] [0 .1 0 ] [1 .0 2 ]
Incumbent NYC Mayor is a Republican 1 .1 2 2 * 1.188** 1.007 1.810*** 1.206 1.176 1.113
[1.67] [2.29] [0.09] [3-15] [1.23] [0.54] [1.54]
Orvil Dryfoos publisher dummy 0.779 0.808 0.938 0.823 0.477 0.249 0.834
[1.08] [0.92] [0.25] [0.36] [1.59] [1.30] [0.80]
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger publisher dummy 1.452** 1.529** 1.890*** 0.99 0.963 1.167 1.471**
[2.08] [2.29] [2.65] [0 .0 2 ] [0 .1 1 ] [0.26] [2.03]
Arthur Sulzberger Jr. publisher dummy 1.437 1.556* 2.180** 0.523 0.629 1.655 1.441
[1.50] [1.74] [2-57] [0.98] [0.81] [0.52] [1.43]
p value for no effects of the presidential campaign when 
the incumbent President is a Republican
0.3 1 0.28 0 . 2 0.42 0.03 0.56
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend and time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Executive Orders and total number of stories yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 624 624 624 624 624 624 624
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.17 0 .1 0.17 0.16 0 . 1 1 0.16
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Law & Crime, for different categories of news. For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported, with robust z 
statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5% (10%) significance.














stories not on the 
front page
Incumbent President is a Democrat 1.128** 1.115* 1.058 1.399* 1.37 1.086 1.128**
[2.05] [1.74] [0.79] [1.85] [1.57] [0.37] [1.98]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.326*** 1.269** 1 .2 0 1 * 0.934 3.360*** 2.195* 1.290***
[3.18] [2.53] [1.73] [0.19] [4.24] [1.93] [2 .8 6 ]
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent 0.765 0.735** 0.864 0.541 0.412** 0.446 0.787
President is a Democrat [1.56] [2.09] [0.71] [1.16] [2 .0 0 ] [1 .1 1 ] [1.49]
relative frequency of Executive Orders 1.03 1.038 0.976 1.038 1.488 0.616 1.069
[0.30] [0.37] [0 .2 1 ] [0 .1 2 ] [1.30] [1.07] [0.69]
Incumbent NYS Governor is a Democrat 1.237** 1.225* 1.085 1.995*** 1.296 2.885** 1.177
[2.04] [1.89] [0.70] [2.67] [0.75] [2.33] [1.57]
Incumbent NYC Mayor is a Democrat 0.816*** 0.833** 0.893 0.526*** 0.653* 0.749 0.815***
[2.87] [2.54] [1.45] [2.92] [1.73] [1.04] [2.81]
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger publisher dummy 1.457*** 1.593*** 1.455** 0.747 2.919* 2.149* 1.409**
[2.85] [3.69] [2.46] [0.59] [1.83] [1 .6 8 ] [2.41]
Arthur Sulzberger Jr. publisher dummy 1.574** 1 7 8 4 *** 1.723*** 0.697 1.726 2.181 1.525**
[2.53] [3.32] [2.63] [0.54] [0.75] [1.19] [2.30]
p value for no effects of the presidential campaign 
when the incumbent President is a Democrat
0.93 0.59 0.85 0.1 0.45 0.98 0.91
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend and time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Executive Orders and total number of stories yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 444 444 444 444 444 444 444
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.16 0.16
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Democratic topics (Civil Rights, Health Care, Labor & Employment and Social Welfare), for different categories of news. For each
explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported, with z statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the 1% level. ** (*) indicates 5%
(10%) significance.
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stories not on the 
front page
Incumbent President is a Republican 1.519*** 1.523*** 1.506*** 1.473* 1.492***
[5.08] [2.86] [4.40] [1.70] [4.62]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.610*** 2.147*** 1.432** 0.521 1.837***
[3.84] [3.06] [2.47] [1.15] [4.74]
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent 0.483*** 0.390*** 0.602*** 1.007 0.450***
President is a Republican [5.25] [3.05] [2.64] [0.01] [5.47]
dummy for campaign years with issue ownership 0.725 0.539* 0.883 1.204 0.700*
reversal ('64, '80, '96) [1.60] [1.81] [0.49] [0.26] [1.78]
monthly Killed In Action (KIA), thousands 1.338*** 0.825 1.510*** 0.925 1.395***
[2.76] [1.05] [4.05] [0.34] [2.95]
Incumbent NYS Governor is a Republican 0.724** 0.875 0.692*** 0.79 0.724**
[2.37] [0.60] [2.68] [0.63] [2.28]
Incumbent NYC Mayor is a Republican 1.209* 1.059 1.224** 1.478 1.175
[1.83] [0.34] [2.06] [1.56] [1.51]
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger publisher dummy 1.207 1.286 1.206 1.619 1.129
[1.12] [0.96] [0.96] [1.56] [0.66]
Arthur Sulzberger Jr. publisher dummy 1.125 1.617 1.052 0.462 1.175
[0.48] [1.25] [0.18] [1.03] [0.64]
p value for no effects of the presidential campaign 
when the incumbent President is a Republican
0.06 0.43 0.37 0.06 0.16
p value for no effects of the presidential campaign 
during ownership reversal campaigns
0.43 0.6 0.3 0.3 0.2
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend and time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes
Executive Orders and total number of stories yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 444 444 444 444 444
Pseudo R2 0.24 0.11 0.25 0.2 0.22
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Defense, for different categories of news. For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) 


































stories not on the 
front page
Incumbent President is a Republican 1.073 1.071 1 .2 1 0 ** 0.844 0.947 1.217 1.059
[1.16] [1.04] [2.17] [0.92] [0.34] [0.71] [0.90]
Presidential campaign dummy 1.034 1.082 1.079 1.461 0.71 2.065 0.981
[0.17] [0.39] [0.29] [0 .8 6 ] [0.91] [1.17] [0 .1 0 ]
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent President 1.097 0.987 1.025 1.206 1.016 1.117 1.091
is a Republican [0.45] [0.06] [0.09] [0.46] [0.03] [0.18] [0.42]
dummy for campaign years with issue ownership reversal 0.954 1.003 0.837 1.438 1.074 0.301 1.031
(’76, ’92, ’96) [0.26] [0 .0 1 ] [0.82] [0.98] [0.13] [1 .1 2 ] [0.16]
relative frequency of Executive Orders 1.096 1.226 1.183 1.426 0.947 1.462 1.074
[0.44] [0.98] [0.70] [0.62] [0 .1 0 ] [0.48] [0.33]
Incumbent NYS Governor is a Republican 0.830* 0.862 0.641*** 0.733 1.468* 1.045 0.821**
[1.93] [1.45] [3.15] [1 .2 1 ] [1.92] [0 .1 0 ] [2.06]
Incumbent NYC Mayor is a Republican 1.226*** 1.275*** 1.126 1.980*** 1.335* 1.195 1.216***
[2.76] [3.11] [1.30] [3.42] [1.70] [0.54] [2 .6 6 ]
Arthur Ochs Sulzberger publisher dummy 1.384 1.298 1.738** 0.822 0.978 1.897 1.353
[1.61] [1.31] [2.54] [0.45] [0.05] [0.79] [1.50]
Arthur Sulzberger Jr. publisher dummy 1.562* 1.614** 2.152*** 0.581 0.87 4.188 1.46
[1.91] [1.99] [3.07] [0.94] [0.23] [1.40] [1.59]
p value for no effects of the presidential campaign when 
the incumbent President is a Republican
0.38 0.62 0.63 0.06 0.29 0.04 0.65
Monthly dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time trend and time trend squared yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Executive Orders and total number of stories yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 444 444 444 444 444 444 444
Pseudo R2 0.15 0.15 0.09 0.17 0.16 0 . 1 1 0.14
Notes: Poisson regressions of the number of stories about Law & Crime, for different categories of news. For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported, with robust z 



















Table 3.14: Poisson estimates on the collapsed dataset, entire sample and post-1960 subsamplc
CDO)












Law & Crime stories
Incumbent President dummy 1.180** 1.045 0.968 1.316* 1.538*** 0.882
[2.09] [0.39] [0.42] [1.79] [4.12] [0 .8 6 ]
Presidential campaign dummy 1 .2 2 1 *** 0.829 0.979 1.252** 1.305 0.926
[2.76] [1.36] [0.13] [2.52] [1.17] [0.37]
interaction: Presidential campaign & incumbent President 0.817 1.043 1.297 0.766 0.574*** 1.342
dummy [1.46] [0.23] [1.16] [1.38] [2 .6 8 ] [1.26]
dummy for campaign years with issue ownership reversal - 1.451* 0.931 - 0.984 0.982
[1.94] [0.44] [0.05] [0 .1 0 ]
number of Killed In action (KIA), thousands - 1.919*** - - 1.46 -
[4.05] [1 .2 2 ]
relative frequency of Executive Orders 1.036 2.441** 29.055 1.038 2.727* 28.525
[0-16] [2.04] [1.19] [0.18] [1.95] [1.13]
p value for no effects of the campaign when the incumbent 
owns the issue
0.98 0.42 0.09 0.82 0.15 0.13
Time trend and time trend squared 



























Notes: Poisson regressions of the total number of stories about Democratic topics, Defense and Law & Crime. For Democratic stories (columns [1] and [3]) the incumbent President dummy equals one when 
the incumbent President is a Democrat. Vice versa for Defense and Law & Crime (columns [2], [3], [5] and [6]). The interaction term is defined accordingly. Campaign years with issue ownership reversal are 
1964, 1980 and 1996 for Defense and 1976, 1992 and 1996 for Law & Crime. For each explanatory variable, incidence rate ratios (IRR) are reported, with robust z statistics in brackets. *** indicates that the 




















Table 3.15: detailed list of Gallup polls on issue ownership. Defense and foreign policy.
year gallup number question no start date end date topic exact wording _________________ Problem Is better handled by______________________ no of
Democrats Republicans difference yearly average diff. respondents
1948 412T qn3_2 06/02/1948 11/02/1948 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union and other countries 34.15 33.14 1.01
1948 420 qnl5b_K 16/06/1948 16/06/1948 foreign policy deal with worid affairs 34.50 36.67 -2.17 -0.58
1952 496 qnlOb 23/07/1952 23/07/1952 defense/foreign policy keep country at peace 31.62 34.53 -2.91 -
1952 506 q n l8d 07/10/1952 07/10/1952 defense (Korea) handle Korean situation 18.58 65.37 -46.79 -24.85
1960 627 qn53e 26/04/1960 26/04/1960 defense/foreign policy keep US out of Worid War III 27.10 38.87 -11.77 -
1960 627 qn53a 26/04/1960 26/04/1960 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union's leaders 29.77 50.48 -20.71 -16.24
1964 697 qn5b 04/08/1964 04/08/1964 defense (Vietnam) handle situation getting worse in Vietnam 61.03 18.71 42.32 -
1964 696 qn7d 04/08/1964 04/08/1964 defense (Vietnam) handle situation getting worse in Vietnam 56.36 14.77 41.59 41.96
1968 763 q n l l 13/06/1968 18/06/1968 defense (Vietnam) better job of dealing with Vietnam war 41.35 41.13 0.22
1968 766 qn l3 07/08/1968 12/08/1968 defense (Vietnam) better job of dealing with Vietnam war 26.97 54.06 -27.09
1968 767 q n lSa 30/08/1968 30/08/1968 defense (Vietnam) better job of dealing with Vietnam war 27.89 47.20 -19.31
1968 768 qn8 19/09/1968 24/09/1968 defense (Vietnam) better job of dealing with Vietnam war 25.86 44.78 -18.92
1968 770 q n l4 17/10/1968 22/10/1968 defense (Vietnam) better job of dealing with Vietnam war 30.14 45.37 -15.23
1968 637 qn63e 18/10/1968 23/10/1968 defense/foreign policy keep US out of Worid War III 27.14 40.80 -13.66 -
1968 637 qn63a 18/10/1968 23/10/1968 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union's leaders 38.55 43.24 -4.69 -14.10
1972 858 q n l l 19/09/1972 19/09/1972 defense (Vietnam) better job of dealing with Vietnam situation 25.90 58.29 -32.39 -
1972 859 qn9 10/10/1972 10/10/1972 defense/foreign policy keep US out of Worid War III 26.15 35.66 -9.51 -20.95
1976 959 qnl5l 21/09/1976 21/09/1976 defense handle national defense 29.00 43.95 -14.95 -
1976 959 qnlSd 21/09/1976 21/09/1976 defense/foreign policy keep US out of war 27.69 41.62 -13.93
1976 959 qn lSa 21/09/1976 21/09/1976 foreign policy handle relations with other nations 24.94 50.86 -25.92 -
1976 959 q n l5g 21/09/1976 21/09/1976 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union 22.31 47.11 -24.80 -
1976 960 qn9d 05/10/1976 05/10/1976 defense handle national defense 40.95 38.90 2.05
1976 960 qn9b 05/10/1976 05/10/1976 defense/foreign policy keep US out of war 33.25 45.36 -12.11 -
1976 960 qn9a 05/10/1976 05/10/1976 foreign policy handle relations with other nations 34.24 46.75 -12.51 -14.60
1980 GP 156G qn4e 27/05/1980 27/05/1980 defense/foreign policy keep US out of war 46.60 20.14 26.46 -
1980 GP 156G qn4g 27/05/1980 27/05/1980 foreign policy (Iran) handle the Iranian situation 34.04 28.44 5.60
1980 GP 156G qn4f 27/05/1980 27/05/1980 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union 35.11 30.00 5.11
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gD 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 defense/foreign policy keep US out of war 49.73 24.58 25.15
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gK 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 environment deal with environmental problem 37.96 29.05 8.91 -
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gA 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 foreign policy handle foreign relations 43.53 34.69 8.84
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gS 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 foreign policy increase respect for US overseas 31.82 41.22 -9.40
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gG 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 foreign policy (Iran) handle the Iranian situation 33.20 37.99 -4.79 -
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gR 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 foreign policy (Israel) deal with Arab-lsraeli situation 46.54 28.88 17.66 -
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gE 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union 40.16 35.62 4.54 8.81
1984 G P 240G qn7b 10/08/1984 12/08/1984 defense/foreign policy keep country out of war 46.64 35.54 11.10 -
1984 GP 240G qn7e 10/08/1984 12/08/1984 foreign policy handle foreign relations 33.29 49.52 -16.23 -
1984 GP 240G qn7o 10/08/1984 12/08/1984 foreign policy increase respect for US overseas 33.44 48.13 -14.69
1984 GP 240G qn7k 10/08/1984 12/08/1984 foreign policy (Central America) deal with situation in Central America 34.35 41.30 -6.95 -
1984 GP 240G qn7f 10/08/1984 12/08/1984 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union 33.97 48.40 -14.43 -8.24
1988 Ad hoc telephone survey 2 qn3b 13/05/1988 15/05/1988 defense/foreign policy keep country out of war 40.57 36.60 3.97
1988 Ad hoc telephone survey 2 qn3c 13/05/1988 15/05/1988 Soviet Union deal with Soviet Union 29.35 48.49 -19.14
1988 Democratic Convention q n l la 21/07/1988 22/07/1988 defense/foreign policy keep country out of war 49.57 32.09 17.48 -
1988 Democratic Convention q n l le 21/07/1988 22/07/1988 foreign policy (Soviet Union) m anage relations with Soviet Union and other foreign countries 34.05 49.93 -15.88 -
1988 Republican Convention qn8a 18/08/1988 19/08/1988 defense/foreign policy keep country out of war 34.48 49.73 -15.25 -5.76
1992 January In-Depth Survey qn20d 03/01/1992 06/01/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 27.90 56.79 -28.89
1992 March Campaign Benchmark qn20l 20/03/1992 22/03/1992 defense handle national defense 20.64 71.49 -50.85
1992 March Campaign Benchmark qn20d 20/03/1992 22/03/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 21.77 69.66 -47.89
1992 Pre-Democratic Convention Poll qnlOe 06/07/1992 08/07/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 14.06 62.60 -48.54
1992 Pre-Democratic Convention qn7b 09/07/1992 10/07/1992 foreign policy handle foreign policy 16.20 60.71 -44.51
1992 Post-Democratic Convention Poll qn9d 17/07/1992 18/07/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 24.79 64,03 -39.24
1992 Pre Republican Convention Poll q n l2 a 10/08/1992 12/08/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 30.20 61.55 -31.35
1992 Post GOP Convention qn4b 21/08/1992 21/08/1992 foreign policy handle foreign policy 23.99 69.79 -45.80
1992 Post-Republican Convention Poll q n l la 21/08/1992 23/08/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 19.33 72.57 -53.24
1992 Labor Day Benchmark q n l4 a 31/08/1992 02/09/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 24.43 66.93 -42.50
1992 Fall In-Depth Benchmark qn20a 11/09/1992 15/09/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 20.10 72.97 -52.87
1992 Campaign Issues qn5g 11/10/1992 11/10/1992 foreign policy handle foreign policy 21.37 64.38 -43.01 -
1992 Pres Election October Benchmark q n l4b 23/10/1992 25/10/1992 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 18.08 65.53 -47.45 -44.32
1996 July Wave 1 qn9k 18/07/1996 21/07/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 44.93 38.73 6.20
1996 General Election Tracking poll week 5 qn34b 30/09/1996 06/10/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 47.75 39.47 8.28
1996 General Election Tracking poll week 6 qn34b 07/10/1996 13/10/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 48.52 39.44 9.08
1996 General Election Tracking poll week 7 qn34b 14/10/1996 20/10/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 49.10 38.29 10.81
1996 October Pre-Election Roundup q n l lh 25/10/1996 27/10/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 47.56 41.69 5.87
1996 General Election Tracking poll week 8 qn34b 21/10/1996 27/10/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 48.73 38.13 10.60
1996 General Election Tracking poll week 9 qn34b 28/10/1996 03/11/1996 foreign policy handle foreign affairs 49.19 37.82 11.37




















































































Table 3.16: detailed list of Gallup polls on issue ownership. Civil rights, welfare state, health care and crime.
year gallup number question no start date end date topic exact wording
Democrats
Problem is better handled by 
Republicans difference yearly average diff.
no of 
respondents
1956 564 q n l5 08/05/1956 08/05/1956 civil rights handle segregation (relation betw een whites and  N egroes) 28.41 25.99 2.42 2.42 1901
1960 627 qn53f 26/04/1960 26/04/1960 civil rights handle racial integration in schools 33.84 30.38 3.46 3.46 2722
1964 696 q n l2 04/08/1964 04/08/1964 civil rights handle relations betw een the whites and the N egroes 49.33 17.51 31.82 - 3513
1964 696 qn97 04/08/1964 04/08/1964 civil rights handle situation betw een whites and N egroes getting w orse 57.22 19.16 38.06 34.94 3513
1968 637 qn63f 18/10/1968 23/10/1968 civil rights handle racial integration in schools 35.04 23.93 11.11 11.11 2988
1976 959 q n l5 r 21/09/1976 21/09/1976 civil rights guaran tee  civil rights 42.37 25.39 16.98 16.98 2662
1980 G P 156G qn4h 27/05/1980 27/05/1980 civil rights deal with racial problem s 41.13 19.50 21.63 - 2820
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gH 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 civil rights deal with racial problem s 46.93 25.01 21.92 - 2819
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gQ 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 civil rights improve things for minorities (incl. blacks and  Hispanics) 48.32 21.21 27.11 23.55 2819
1984 G P 240G qn7d 10/08/1984 12/08/1984 civil rights improve things for minorities (incl. blacks and Hispanics) 54.38 24.57 29.81 29.81 2720
1988 Ad hoc te lephone survey 2 qn3h 13/05/1988 15/05/1988 civil rights protect the civil rights of minority groups 49.04 25.78 23.26 23.26 1640
1992 January  In-Depth Survey qn20g 03/01/1992 06/01/1992 civil rights handle race relations 50.76 30.44 20.32 - 4852
1992 March C am paign Benchm ark qn20g 20/03/1992 22/03/1992 civil rights handle race relations 40.32 41.73 -1.41 - 1543
1992 May W ave 1 qn21 07/05/1992 10/05/1992 civil rights improve conditions for minorities in urban a reas 35.74 21.40 14.34 - 4007
1992 Pre-D em ocratic Convention qn7d 09/07/1992 10/07/1992 civil rights handle race relations 38.89 23.63 15.26 - 1158
1992 Post-D em ocratic Convention Poll qn9g 17/07/1992 18/07/1992 civil rights handle race relations 57.57 22.27 35.30 16.76 1170
1996 July W ave 1 qn9j 18/07/1996 21/07/1996 civil rights handle gay m arriages 41.33 26.87 14.46 14.46 1010
1976 959 q n l5 m 21/09/1976 21/09/1976 welfare sta te deal with welfare situation 51.88 25.54 26.34 - 2662
1976 959 q n l5 p 21/09/1976 21/09/1976 welfare sta te provide for the poor and  the elderly 57.48 23.59 33.89 30.12 2662
1980 The Gallup Poll qn7gO 09/09/1980 09/09/1980 welfare sta te help the poor and  needy 48.00 22.92 25.08 25.08 2819
1984 G P 240G qn7l 10/08/1984 12/08/1984 welfare sta te help the poor an d  needy 59.61 24.94 34.67 34.67 2720
1988 Ad hoc telephone survey 2 qn3f 13/05/1988 15/05/1988 welfare sta te help the poor an d  needy 53.81 24.41 29.40 29.40 1640
1992 January  In-Depth Survey qn20h 03/01/1992 06/01/1992 welfare state handle poverty an d  hom elessness 62.16 23.98 38.18 - 4852
1992 March C am paign Benchm ark qn20h 20/03/1992 22/03/1992 welfare sta te handle poverty an d  hom elessness 58.07 25.65 32.42 35.30 1543
1996 April W ave 1 q n l7 e 09/04/1996 10/04/1996 handle welfare welfare state 50.32 37.42 12.90 - 1010
1996 July W ave 1 qn9b 18/07/1996 21/07/1996 handle welfare policy w elfare sta te 48.55 30.94 17.61 - 1010
1996 O ctober Pre-Election Roundup q n l l b 25/10/1996 27/10/1996 handle welfare policy welfare state 56.05 36.60 19.45 16.65 461
1992 January  In-Depth Survey qn20c 03/01/1992 06/01/1992 health care handle health c a re  policy 59.39 27.06 32.33 - 4852
1992 March C am paign Benchm ark qn20c 20/03/1992 22/03/1992 health care handle health c a re  policy 54.23 31.26 22.97 - 1543
1992 Pre-D em ocratic Convention Poll qnlO b 06/07/1992 08/07/1992 health care handle health c a re  policy 33.38 23.30 10.08 - 1554
1992 Post-D em ocratic Convention Poll qn9c 17/07/1992 18/07/1992 health care handle health c a re  policy 61.94 20.30 41.64 - 1170
1992 Post G O P Convention qn4g 21/08/1992 21/08/1992 health ca re handle health ca re 58.08 32.12 25.96 - 698
1992 Post-Republican Convention Poll q n l l e 21/08/1992 23/08/1992 health care handle health c a re  policy 54.29 32.54 21.75 - 1191
1992 Labor Day Benchm ark q n l4 e 31/08/1992 02/09/1992 health ca re handle health c a re  policy 61.70 26.76 34.94 - 1573
1992 C am paign Issues qn5h 11/10/1992 11/10/1992 health care handle health ca re 58.05 22.84 35.21 - 424
1992 P res  Election O ctober Benchm ark q n l4 f 23/10/1992 25/10/1992 health care handle health c a re 49.56 23.55 26.01 27.88 1602
1996 April W ave 1 q n l7 d 09/04/1996 10/04/1996 health care handle health ca re 55.68 33.76 21.92 - 1010
1996 July W ave 1 qn9e 18/07/1996 21/07/1996 health care handle M edicare 49.18 30.07 19.11 - 1010
1996 1996 Election q n l2 c 05/08/1996 07/08/1996 health care handle M edicare 48.86 30.33 18.53 - 986
1996 G eneral Election Tracking poll w eek  5 qn34h 30/09/1996 06/10/1996 health care handle M edicare 49.97 29.07 20.90 - 1601
1996 G eneral Election Tracking poll w eek  6 qn34h 07/10/1996 13/10/1996 health care handle M edicare 51.11 30.03 21.08 - 3805
1996 G eneral Election Tracking poll w eek  7 qn34h 14/10/1996 20/10/1996 health care handle M edicare 50.37 30.26 20.11 - 3686
1996 O ctober Pre-Election Roundup q n l l c 25/10/1996 27/10/1996 health care handle health ca re  policy 60.50 33.62 26.88 - 461
1996 O ctober Pre-Election Roundup q n l l e 25/10/1996 27/10/1996 health care handle M edicare 56.69 36.27 20.42 21.12 461
1972 858 q n l2 19/09/1972 19/09/1972 crime better job of dealing with crime and law lessness 26.23 50.05 -23.82 -23.82 3263
1988 Republican Convention qn8d 18/08/1988 19/08/1988 crime fight crime 33.97 43.27 -9.30 -9.30 1382
1992 Pre-D em ocratic Convention qn7c 09/07/1992 10/07/1992 crime handle crime 24.80 24.43 0.37 - 1158
1992 Pre Republican Convention Poll q n l2 e 10/08/1992 12/08/1992 crime handle crime and drugs 51.15 34.66 16.49 - 1531
1992 Post GOP Convention qn4c 21/08/1992 21/08/1992 crime handle crime 41.30 40.89 0.41 - 698
1992 Fall Tracking Poll q n l l b 09/10/1992 11/10/1992 crime handle crime 39.07 33.56 5.51 - 1567
1992 C am paign Issues qn5e 11/10/1992 11/10/1992 crime handle crime 34.04 35.88 -1.84 - 424
1992 P res  Election O ctober Benchm ark q n l4 g 23/10/1992 25/10/1992 crime handle crime 31.88 29.20 2.68 3.94 1602
1996 July W ave 1 qn9g 35264 35267 crime handle crime 43.91 34.68 9.23 - 1010
1996 1996 Election qn12e 35282 35284 crime handle crime 43.6 33.44 10.16 - 986
1996 G eneral Election Tracking poll w eek 4 qn31 35331 35337 crime handle drug ab u se 44.66 37.69 6.97 - 1109
1996 O ctober Pre-Election Roundup qn11g 35363 35365 crime handle crime 53.9 37.71 16.19 - 461





















Table 3.17: National Election Study data on Most Important Problem and Issue Ownership, 1972-1996
year racial problems [8] social welfare [9] public order [7] defense & foreign affairs [3] no of 
respondents% MIP % Dem. Adv. % MIP % Dem. Adv. % MIP % Dem. Adv. % MIP % Dem. Adv.
1972 6.54 10.94 10.76 27.36 19.62 -11.40 33.90 -10.09 994
1976 0.80 14.29 34.85 43.49 8.15 9.15 5.11 -6.74 1742
1980 0.07 -100 14.83 -4.06 1.48 -15.00 32.10 -28.21 1349
1984 0.39 85.71 23.31 11.89 4.04 -38.89 33.48 -7.78 1780
1988 0.84 42.86 21.97 25.82 20.82 -3.21 9.72 -15.72 1657
1992 1.26 41.67 37.09 42.07 11.86 -19.11 3.15 11.86 1906
1996 2.96 45.45 37.58 25.27 28.57 -13.08 4.38 3.45 777
Notes: data being used in table 3.1 are highlighted.
Chapter 4
Partisan Bias in Economic N ew s
4.1 Introduction
In chapter 2 I have presented a simple political economy model that shows the effects 
of issue coverage by the mass media on the priorities entertained by rational voters, 
and hence on their subsequent electoral behaviour. To the extent that the public stably 
believes that candidates belonging to a political party are better at handling a given 
policy issue than those belonging to the other party (or parties), media outlets might 
pursuit a political agenda by giving more coverage -during the electoral campaign- to 
issues owned by one party or the other. In the previous chapter I have thus analysed 
the time variation in the coverage of owned issues by the New York Times from 1946 
to 1997, in order to derive some conclusions on its political position and its attitude 
towards the incumbent President.
Performance issues -like foreign policy or the management of the economy- provide 
another methodologically fertile terrain on which it is possible to investigate political 
biases in the agenda setting behaviour of mass media outlets. A performance issue 
happens to be favourable to the incumbent government if its recent record in dealing 
with them is satisfactory, and to the challenger if it is not. One could then argue that the 
coverage of a performance issue by a given media outlet is sympathetic to the incumbent 
if it takes place when the situation on the issue itself is good, while it is unfavourable if 
taking place during dire times.
In this chapter, which is based on a paper co-written with Valentino Larcinese and 
James M. Snyder, Jr., I study the coverage of economic issues by a large number of U.S. 
newspapers over the period 1996-2005. For a smaller set of newspapers we are able to go 
back to 1988. Running keyword-based searches on the NewsLibrary electronic archive, 
we collected monthly and quarterly data on the number of articles that each newspaper 
published about some relevant economic issues. These data on coverage can be matched 
with the actual economic figures, with the purpose of assessing whether media outlets 
systematically over-report or under-report on given issues as a function of those figures 
and of the party affiliation of the incumbent president. An outlet with a pro-Democratic 
bias might for example devote more space to news on unemployment when the president 
is Republican than when he is a Democrat, and the unemployment rate is high and/or
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rising. Vice versa when the unemployment rate is low and/or declining. We choose to 
focus on the political affiliation of the incumbent president, because - as consistently 
shown by an extensive literature (see e.g. Fair [1978], Tufte [1978], Hibbs [1987], Erikson 
[1989]) - the performance of the economy under his term has a strong influence on his 
(or his party’s) vote during the next presidential elections. 1
Differently from some of the studies surveyed in section 1.2.4 and what done in chap­
ter 3 regarding the New York Times, we do not advance any claims about the absolute 
political position of U.S. newspapers.2 Instead, our focus is on the political position of 
the newspapers relative to each other. In particular, our empirical strategy consists in 
exploiting prior knowledge on the political leaning of newspapers and matching it with 
their observed agenda-setting behaviour. We investigate whether there is any signifi­
cant cross-sectional correlation between the differential coverage of economic issues -  as 
a function of the underlying figure and the political affiliation of the incumbent presi­
dent -  and more explicit measures of political orientation, in particular the propensity 
to endorse Democratic vs. Republican candidates in electoral races. Put another way, 
our exercise amounts to examining if the political orientation of newspapers “spills over” 
from the editorial page, where endorsements are explictly made, to the news section, 
where differential coverage of the same economic figures under presidents of different 
political affiliations can then be interpreted els a partisan usage of agenda-setting power, 
i.e. a manifestation of agenda bias.
We focus on four key economic variables, which all represent “bads”: the unemploy­
ment rate, the inflation rate, the federal deficit, and the trade deficit. The incumbent 
president might be blamed by the public for high values, or rewarded for low values. 
Hence, we check whether newspapers that are characterised by a higher propensity to 
endorse Democratic candidates give less coverage to a given economic issue when the 
incumbent president is a Democrat than when he is a Republican, and the correspond­
ing economic figure is high and/or rising, compared to the coverage of newspapers that 
have a propensity to endorse Republicans. Formally, within a regression framework 
this is accomplished by analysing a three-way interaction term. Moreover, since it is 
a priori unclear whether levels or changes in the economic figures are more newswor­
thy, both specifications that focus on levels and specifications that focus on changes are 
considered.
1 MacKuen, Erikson and Stimson [1992] trace out an indirect mechanism of influence, whereas the 
state of the economy (namely the unemployment rate and GDP growth) affects the perceptions about 
it entertained by voters. In turn these perceptions affect the approval rate of the incumbent president 
and his vote share during the next elections. On the other hand, Erikson [1990] convincingly points out 
that there is no robust evidence about the economy producing any significant effects on the outcome of 
congressional elections.
2As argued in section 4.4, -because of the relatively short time span we consider- unobserved time 
effects might influence the average differential coverage of the same economic figure under presidents 
of different political affiliations. This would for example happen if other newsworthy events occur 
when unemployment is high and Clinton is President, thus displacing unemployment coverage across all 
newspapers, while nothing relevant occurs when the President is George W. Bush and the unemployment 
is equally high. On the other hand, the analysis of the New York Times presented in the previous chapter 
exploits the much longer time span and the differential coverage of Republican and Democratic issues 
in order to make claims about its absolute political position.
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We find some fairly robust evidence of agenda bias in the coverage of the unem­
ployment rate. Newspapers with a pro-Democratic endorsement pattern systematically 
publish fewer pieces about unemployment when the national unemployment rate is high 
and the president is a Democrat, than when the national unemployment is equally high 
and the president is a Republican, as compared to newspapers with a pro-Republican 
endorsement stance. The size of the estimated effects is not negligible. When the un­
employment rate was one percentage point above the average, newspapers with a strong 
propensity to endorse Republican candidates reacted with 15% more articles per month 
under Clinton than under George W. Bush. For the same one percent increase, newspa­
pers with a strong pro-Democratic endorsement policy have 9% less news on unemploy­
ment under Clinton than under Bush. Regarding different time windows, the result on 
unemployment coverage is more robust when looking at the subsample of newspapers 
belonging to a chain or with large circulation. On the other hand, there is no evidence 
of partisan bias in the coverage of any of the other economic variables we consider.
As discussed throughout the thesis, it is important to pin down the respective roles 
played by demand and supply factors in determining the partisan position of media 
outlets. In their study of the ideological slant of the language used by U.S. newspapers 
Gentzkow and Shapiro [2007] conclude that the partisan bias of newspapers depends 
mainly on consumers’ ideological leaning and far less on the identity of owners.
Following this thread, we hence check whether the agenda bias found for unemploy­
ment coverage depends on demand, i.e. the partisanship of readers. While newspapers 
with higher sales in Democratic areas indeed tend to give more coverage to high unem­
ployment under Bush than under Clinton as compared to those sold in Republican areas 
(consistently with Gentzkow and Shapiro [2007]), this correlation is no longer signifi­
cant when controlling for the ideological leaning of endorsements, properly interacted. 
On the other hand endorsement partisanship still matters, i.e. Democratic endorsing 
newspapers ceteris paribus give systematically more coverage to high unemployment 
under Bush than under Clinton as compared to Republican endorsing ones. On this ac­
count, agenda bias in economic news seems more connected with the partisan position 
of editors, i.e. a supply factor, rather than with the ideological tastes of readers.
The chapter is organised as follows: in section 4.2 I discuss the links between the 
empirical approach followed here and the other empirical contributions on mass media 
bias reviewed in section 1.2.4. In section 4.3 I describe the economic news and endorse­
ment data, and lay out our empirical strategy. Section 4.4 presents the main results, 
while section 4.5 is devoted to the robustness checks. Finally section 4.6 concludes, with 
some discussion of the methodological features of our approach.
4.2 Links to  the literature
Similarly to the study of New York Times which is the focus of chapter 3, the analysis of 
economic news performed here firmly belongs to the category of media bias studies that 
are based on the time variation in issue coverage, without relying on the resemblance
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between what media outlets report and what political actors of a known ideological 
position do. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, while the analysis of the 
New York Times is based on the long term ownership of policy issues and the variation 
in issue coverage during presidential campaigns, the empirical strategy employed here 
is grounded on the interaction between the coverage of a performance issue like the 
economy, the underlying economic figures and the political affiliation of the incumbent 
President.
As compared to previous contributions, the novelty of the approach taken up here 
is given by the idea of combining machine-based replicable data on issue coverage with 
information on explicit endorsement patterns. In this sense, the paper I have coauthored 
with Larcinese and Snyder constitutes a methodological bridge between the second cat­
egory of media bias studies and the analysis of the explicit political orientation of media 
outlets. Indeed, the bulk of the endorsement data used here is taken from the already 
cited work by Ansolabehere, Lessem and Snyder [2006].3
Making use of human-based content analysis, Fridkin Kahn and Kenney [2002] ana­
lyze how large newspapers covered 67 Senatorial campaigns across three election years, 
as a function of their explicit endorsement choices. They code the tone of the articles 
and find that newspapers systematically gave a more favourable coverage to endorsed 
incumbents.4
Regarding the other recent contributions on mass media bias, the analysis performed 
here shares with Gentzkow and Shapiro [2007] the focus on relative rather than absolute 
political positions of U.S. media outlets5, and the attempt at disentangling the role 
played by demand and supply as a determinant of partisan bias. From an econometric 
point of view, it is however based on a reduced-form rather than a structural estimation 
approach.
Our approach of course shares with Lott and Hassett [2004] the focus on the coverage 
of economic news. The first point of departure is that our empirical strategy is based 
on the time variation in the amount of coverage (the agenda setting behaviour), while 
Lott and Hassett are interested in the time variation in the tone of coverage (the issue 
framing aspect). Moreover, their study is focused on teasing out the absolute average 
political position of U.S. newspapers, with little emphasis on the estimation of different 
ideological positions for different outlets.
3See section 4.3 for more details.
4 Just to have a rough picture of the amount of data one can gather through keyword-based automatic 
searches, as compared to human-based content analysis, there are about 276,000 articles including the 
words “unemployment” or “jobless” -during the 1996-2005 period- in the 102 newspapers we were able 
to match with endorsement data. The human-based content analysis performed by Fridkin Kahn and 
Kenney [2002] is of course more precise, but it deals with only 5529 articles.
5The analysis of think tank quotes by Groseclose and Milyo [2005] provides both a relative and an 
absolute measure of the ideological positions of U.S. media outlets. In particular, the authors come up 
with an estimate of the absolute political position by putting congressmen and media outlets on the 
same ideological scale, as identified by adjusted ADA scores. From this point of view, Gentzow and 
Shapiro give less emphasis to the possibility of using their measure of language slant to estimate the 
absolute ideological leaning of U.S. newspapers.
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4.3 D ata and empirical strategy
Our data on economic news comes from the NewsLibrary electronic archive. We recorded 
the monthly number of hits on unemployment and inflation, and the quarterly number 
of hits on the federal budget deficit and the trade deficit.6 First, through a number 
of preliminary searches we defined the exact wording of the search strings, with the 
purpose of reducing the number of false positive and false negative hits. Once identified 
the appropriate keywords, we run an automated search, then retrieving the number of 
hits on each topic by time unit. These keywords are reported in Table 4.1. Overall, we 
collected data on 140 U.S. newspapers for which electronic archives dating back to 1996 
aye available to be searched through NewsLibrary.
In this section I will first illustrate the procedure we used to calculate the propensity 
of the various newspapers to endorse Democratic vs. Republican candidates. I will then 
describe the data on economic news, and present a two-stage preliminary investigation 
of the data, which would shed some light on the basic idea behind our empirical strategy. 
In the last part of the section I will move to formally describe our panel specification.
4.3 .1  T h e endorsem en t d ata
Among the 140 newspapers with electronically available data covering the 1996-2005 
period, we were able to gather endorsement data for 102 newspapers. Table 4.8 lists 
the newspapers with endorsement data, together with the chain to which they belong, 
if any.
As mentioned above, we obtained the endorsement data for 85 newspapers from 
Ansolabehere, Lessem and Snyder [2006], and integrated this with data on 17 additional 
newspapers searched via the NewsLibrary archive. For the remaining 38 newspapers, in 
some cases the newspaper is characterised by an explicit policy not to endorse candidates 
for political offices (e.g. the Deseret News in Salt Lake City, the Orange County Register, 
and the Colorado Springs Gazette). In addition, many smaller ones do not bother to 
make endorsements, even though they may not explicitly declare it as a voluntary choice.
Following Ansolabehere, Lessem and Snyder [2006] we calculated the propensity of 
each newspaper to endorse one of the parties during electoral campaigns, controlling 
for possibly confounding factors. We used a linear regression model to estimate the 
“partisan bias” in endorsement behavior. Let i index offices, j  index newspapers and t 
index years. Let
Eijt
1 if newspaper j  endorses a Democrat for office i in year t 
— 1 if newspaper j  endorses a Republican for office i in year t 
0  if newspaper j  makes no endorsement for office i in year t
measure the endorsement behaviour by each newspaper making an endorsement (or
6 Indeed, the official macroeconomic figure is made available to the public monthly for the unemploy­
ment and the inflation rate, and quarterly for the two deficits.
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explicitly refusing to endorse) in a race.7 Moreover, let
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1 if Democrat for office i in year t is the only incumbent 
Iijt =   ^ —1 if Republican for office i in year t  is the only incumbent 
0  otherwise
measure the incumbency status of candidates in each race.8 Finally, as it is standard 
in the literature, we used previous electoral experience to measure the quality of non­
incumbents. Specifically, we defined as “high-quality” candidates those who currently 
hold a U.S. House seat or an elected statewide office other than the office sought. Let
1 if Democrat for office i in year t  is the only high quality non-incumbent 
Qijt  = { ~  1 ^  Republican for office i in year t  is the only high quality non-incumbent
0  otherwise
Exploiting the panel nature of the data9, we estimated the following linear model 
for the period 1992-2002: _ . . /►/ / ;  )
/  /  — 2 O O S '  4*- f n o  r c
E ijt = (N Ey+  0t + p 1 I ijt + (hQijt + etjt 7 °  (4.1)
The newspaper-specific fixed effects, N E j ,  are meant to capture newspapers’ partisan­
ship. 10 The histogram of the resulting estimated variable is reported in Figure 4.1.
In the graphic, 0 is the neutral point, positive values indicate a propensity to endorse 
Democratic candidates and negative values a propensity to endorse Republican ones.
The endorsement variable indicates a slight prevalence, on average, of pro-Democratic 
endorsements. 11 On the other hand, there is also a wider dispersion on the Republican 
side: in other words there is a prevalence of pro-Democratic endorsers but Republican 
endorsers tend to be more systematic. Overall, however, most newspapers appear to be 
moderate, in the sense that they are placed in the range [—0.5,0.5] of the endorsement 
scale (i.e. within the vertical lines in Figure 4.1).
Figure 4.2 presents a scatter plot in which the estimated Democratic endorsement 
score N E j  for each newspaper j  is represented on the horizontal axis, while the vertical 
axis displays the corresponding average circulation figure in 1996. Newspapers selling 
more than 400,000 copies are represented by their name, and smaller papers are repre- ^  
sented with dots. Interestingly, the larger newspapers tend to be relatively centrist in ■
their endorsement choice^ as they are typically located in- the range- [—O.-SylLS] on the
endorsement scale. On the other hand, the more partisan newspapers that lie outside <J
7We dropped from our analysis the few cases in our sample where a newspaper endorsed both can- T
didates in a race. /  p
8After redistricting there are some U.S. House races with two incumbents running, in which case 
hjt  =  0. There are a few such cases in our sample. If we drop them the results are unchanged.




10To capture partisan tides we also included year fixed-effects, 9 t. tJ/ ^
This is in turn consistent with the findings of Ansolabehere, Lessem and Snyder [2006]. J
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this range tend to have more modest circulation.
The question we care about is whether partisan behaviour is only limited to endorse­
ments made on editorial pages or rather, in a less transparent way, it trickles down to the 
coverage of economic news. To investigate the presence of agenda bias it is hence nec­
essary to compare newspapers’ coverage with the actual statistical figures on inflation, 
unemployment, budget deficit and trade deficit.
4.3.2 The econom ic news data: a prelim inary investigation
The key variables in our empirical analysis are the values of the four underlying economic 
figures, and the amount of newspaper coverage devoted to these issues. Since newspapers 
vary greatly in size cross-sectionally (total number of pages, articles, and words), and 
can also vary in size over time, we focus on the relative frequency of stories in each 
newspaper. Table 4.1 reports the keywords that we used. As a proxy for the total 
number of stories in each newspaper in each period we counted the number of articles 
containing the word “and” . 12
Let E \j^  be the value of the economic figure regarding issue i at time t , where 
i E {[/, 7, jB,T} and U stands for “unemployment”, I  for “inflation” , B  for “budget 
deficit” , and T  for “trade deficit” . By the same token, n^t is the relative frequency of 
pieces published by newspaper j  during time t about issue 7 13
In order to properly account for the differences in the average amount of coverage 
devoted to economic news by the various newspapers, the relative frequency of stories in 
newspaper j  on issue i at time t are normalised by subtracting n)., the average relative 
frequency of stories in that newspaper, i.e. we considered
y)t =  n)t -  n y
For each newspaper j  and each economic issue i E {U, 7, B ,T}, we then run separate 
OLS regressions:
y)t = (^ A  P)EVi +  7j DPt + fyEV* ■ DPt) +  <)t +  A’ In sjt +  e% (4.2)
where DPt is a dummy variable that equals one when the incumbent president is a 
Democrat. We also control for a linear time trend and for the logarithm of the total 
number of articles in each newspaper at time t, Sjt. The coefficient Sj thus represents 
the difference in how newspaper j  reacts to bad economic news when the president is 
Democratic, compared to its behaviour when the president is a Republican. Positive 
values indicate that the newspaper is more reactive to bad economic news when the 
incumbent president is a Democrat. 14
12A potential concern is that all the variation in the coverage of economic news might take place on 
editorials themselves. Hence, we have re-run the searches excluding the words “editorial” or “editor” , 
in order to exclude coverage happening on editorial pages. I explore the robustness of our results to this 
narrower definition of coverage in section 4.5.3.
13Table 4.2 presents summary statistics on the relative frequency of stories and the economic figures 
of interest for the 1996-2005 period.
14 As discussed in footnote 2  of this chaper, if data for a period long enough to cover numerous presi­
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Our approach consists in exploiting the information about the explicit political posi­
tion of each newspaper, as proxied by its endorsement pattern. Figures 4.3, 4.4, 4.5 and 
4.6 display the relationship between the estimated interaction terms from equation 4.2 
and the estimated propensity to endorse Democratic candidates obtained from equation 
4.1. Again, the names of newspapers with circulation above 400,000 copies are explicitly 
reported. The two vertical lines -  at N E j  = — 0.5 and N E j  = 0.5 -  crudely divide the 
sample of newspapers into those with pro-Republican endorsement pattern, those with a 
relatively neutral patterns, and those with a pro-Democratic endorsement stance. Each 
graph also features a bivariate regression line, i.e. the fitted values of a regression of 8j 
over N E j  and a constant.
In the case of unemployment news (Figure 4.3), the relationship between the endorse­
ment score and the estimated interaction term is negative and statistically significant 
at the 95%^confidence level (t-value =  2.20), using heteroskedasticity-robust standard 
errors. This finding indicates that newspapers with a Democratic partisanship on the 
editorial page tended to give less coverage to unemployment during periods of high un­
employment under Clinton than under George W. Bush, as compared to newspapers 
with a pro-Republican endorsement pattern. The opposite holds during periods of low 
unemployment.
Figure 4.4 displays results about the inflation rate. The fitted regression line shows 
the presence of a mild and positive relationship between the endorsement variable and 
the estimated interaction terms. However, this relationship happens to be statistically 
insignificant (t-value = 0.49). Figure 4.5 represents the same relationship for the cover­
age of the budget deficit. In this case the estimated slope is negative and statistically 
insignificant (t-value =  1.24). At last Figure 4.6 displays the results for the trade deficit, 
and shows a mildly negative but statistically insignificant relationship (t-value = 0.32) 
between d j  and N E j .
4.3 .3  Panel specification
This simple two-stage graphical analysis offers a mixed picture of the connection between 
endorsement policy and coverage of economic news. On one hand there is some evidence 
of a partisan bias in the amount of coverage devoted to unemployment. On the other 
hand, we found small and statistically insignificant relationships for the three other 
issues of inflation, the budget and the trade deficit.
It is necessary to implement a more structured test about this connection. Rather 
than analyzing newspapers one at a time, we fully exploit the panel nature of our data. 
We hence estimate three-way specifications containing an interaction term between the 
economic variable E V l, the indicator for Democratic president DPt and the newspaper- 
specific endorsement propensity N E j 15. Omitting the indicator i of the economic issue,
dents were available, one could treat this interaction term as a measure of the absolute pro-Republican 
bias of a newspaper. However, the shortness of the available time span implies that the time series 
variation by itself could easily be misleading. In particular, other newsworthy events and issues could 
be crowding out economic news more in some years than others, thus confounding the interpretation of 
the interaction term. More on this at the end of section 4.4.
15From now on, since all specifications include newspaper-specific fixed effects, the dependent variable
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one can write a basic three-way specification as follows: 16
rijt = a , + PiEVt + fo b E V t +  -fDPt + S(EVt ■ DPt) +  t{D P t • N E j)+
-\-,d(EVt • N E j) -(- <f>(EVt • DPt ■ N E j ) + £jt +  A In Sjt + Cj*
(Specification A)
where aj represent newspaper fixed effects, Q is the coefficient on a newspaper-specific 
time trend and A is the coefficient on newspaper size (expressed in logarithm). We also 
control for the change A EVt in the economic variable. The coefficient of interest is 0.
A negative value of 0 implies that newspapers which tend to endorse Democratic candi­
dates have a relatively pro-Democratic agenda bias (on economic issue i), as compared 
to newspapers with a pro-Republican endorsement pattern. a ^
It is of course not possible to include time specific'dummies within this specification, | 
since there are other variables that do not vary across newspapers for each time period. 
However, time dummies could help capture the influence that contemporaneous events 
might exert on the space devoted to economic news by the generality of newspapers. 
This is accomplished by Specification B, where time-dummies 77 are included:
njt = c,j + Q j- £{DP, ■ NEj )  + tf( DP,
A In + 
(Specification B)
Finally, one can devise an even more demanding specification, whereas £(DPt • N E j )  
and d{EVt ■ N E j ) are replaced by newspaper-specific Democratic president effects and 
newspaper-specific reactivities to the underlying economic figure:
njt = aj + Q +  j3jXt +  7 jDPt + 4>{EVt • DPt ■ N E j) +  Qt -|- A In Sjt + €jt (Specification C)
This specification is the most general since newspapers are allowed to react differently 
to the political affiliation of the incumbent President and the level of the economic 
variable, not just as a function of their endorsement partisanship, but also of any other 
unobserved time-invariant newspaper characteristics.
Just because it is a priori unclear which aspect of an economic figure editors and 
journalists reckon as more newsworthy (whether it is the level thereof, or the change, or 
both), we also re-consider the same three specifications with the change in the relevant 
economic figure being properly^ interacted with the Democratic. .President dummy and 
the endorsement score, instead of its level.1' In fact, when focusing on chang£S-UO
is simply n lj t , i.e. the non-normalised relative frequency of stories about topic i. Moreover, to take care 
of the fact that the fixed effects may not absorb the entire within-newspaper correlation in the error 
term, we run all regressions clustering the standard errors by newspaper.
16In the baseline specification we control for the contemporaneous value of the relevant economic figure 
(xt), by itself and properly interacted. For reasons that will be discussed in Section 5.1, we will also 
re-run all regressions by using lagged values of the economic variables.
17The level of the economic variable is kept as a control.
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significant results are found. 18
4 .4  R e s u l t s
Baseline results about the four economic issues are reported in Table 4.3, with t-statistics 
in brackets below each coefficient.
The first three columns in Table 4.3 confirm that newspapers with a pro-Democratic- 
endorsement pattern, compared to pro-Republican newspapers, give less coverage to un­
employment in times of high unemployment under Clinton than under George W. Bush. 
The three-way interaction between the level of the unemployment rate, the Democratic 
President dummy and the Democratic endorsement variable always comes with the ex­
pected negative sign and is significant at the 5% level in all three specifications. More­
over, the magnitude of the coefficient is very stable across the three specifications. On 
the other hand, we find no statistically significant effect for any of the other economic 
variables we consider. In the case of inflation, the budget and the trade deficit is the 
three-way interaction always very far from any acceptable significance level and thus 
statistically indistinguishable from zero.
In order to calculate the magnitude of the effect for unemployment news we group 
newspapers into quantiles according to their endorsement score NEj .  For each group 
we compute the difference between the average predicted change in the number of un­
employment stories under Clinton and under George Bush Jr., if the unemployment 
rate is one percentage point higher than the average under that President. We focus on 
newspapers belonging to the first, third and fifth quintile in the endorsement distribu­
tion, i.e. newspapers that we define as, respectively, strongly Republican, “neutral,” and 
strongly Democratic. The estimated effects turn out to be not trivial. Consistently with 
this idea of agenda bias, newspapers react to a 1 % increase in the unemployment rate 
differently depending on whether the president is a Democrat or a Republican; under 
a Democratic president a strongly Republican newspaper provides 15% more news on 
unemployment than if the same 1 % increase in the unemployment rate occurs under 
a Republican president. On the other side, considering again the benchmark of a 1% 
increase in the unemployment rate, a strongly Democratic newspaper provides 9% less 
news on unemployment under a Democratic president than under a Republican presi­
dent. The differential treatment of the same change under the two presidents is instead 
limited to 1 % for a “neutral” newspaper.
As discussed above, some data analysts might be tempted to consider the average 
difference in slopes across Democratic and Republican presidents (the (5s) els a reliable 
measure of the average absolute level of bias across the newspapers in our sample. This 
is a temptation to resist, for more than one reason. First, the time sample is too short, so 
the regressions end up comparing only two presidents; second, the underlying economic 
conditions were different under the two presidents, so functional form happens to be a 
serious concern; third, many other newsworthy events (terrorist attacks, war in Iraq,
18The corresponding tables are not reported but are available upon request.
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Monica Lewinsky scandal, O.J. Simpson trial) might have crowded out economic news 
differentially under the two presidents for the same underlying unemployment rate. As 
discussed in section 4.2, in comparison with some of the recent literature on media bias 
(in particular Groseclose and Milyo [2005] and Lott and Hassett [2004]), we would place 
little emphasis on such coefficients by themselves.
If one felt confident enough to use the coefficients in this way, the resulting picture 
would still be mixed. The estimated difference in slopes is negative and statistically sig­
nificant in the case of unemployment, inflation and trade deficit, pointing at an overall 
pro-Democratic bias. That is, newspapers on average devoted more attention to unem­
ployment (inflation, trade deficit) during periods of high unemployment under George 
W. Bush than under Clinton, and vice versa for periods of low unemployment. On the 
other hand, the estimates suggest a pro-Republican bias for the budget deficit. At the 
same time, budget deficit and unemployment were generally decreasing under Clinton 
and were increasing during the George W. Bush years. Hence, it is difficult to determine 
whether the coefficients reflect a partisan bias in coverage or simply a judgement about 
the importance of the direction of a change (i.e. increases vs. decreases) for a particular 
economic variable.
Finally, it is worthwhile to notice that the coefficients on the interaction between 
the unemployment rate and the Democratic endorsement score (the $s) are positive 
and statistically significant. Put differently, Democratic-endorsing newspapers are more 
reactive in their coverage to high unemployment than Republican-leaning ones, even 
when controlling for partisan behaviour through the triple interaction.
4.5 Robustness checks
This section is devoted to several robustness checks of the baseline results presented 
above. We implemented a number of checks for all the economic variables considered 
and we noticed no change in the conclusions regarding inflation, budget deficit and trade 
deficit: there is no noticeable statistically significant agenda bias in the coverage of these 
issues. In this section, therefore, I only report results regarding unemployment, the only 
economic variable on which agenda bias seems to take place.
4 .5 .1  L agged values o f th e  econom ic figures
It is a priori unclear whether newsworthy economic events are more correlated with 
contemporaneous values of the relevant economic figures, or lagged ones. Of course 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics (or any statisti­
cal agency assigned to similar tasks) can only publish lagged values of macroeconomic 
variables. However, newspapers do not only report on the release of official data (which 
are related to what happened in the past) but also on day-to-day events which may be 
correlated with the current value of the relevant macroeconomic figure. For example, 
considering the case of unemployment, there might be news stories on large layoffs in a 
given sector or by a particular large firm, or reports of large current spikes in applica-
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tions at local unemployment agencies. It might be useful, therefore, to check if results 
are sensitive or not to whether we control for the current or the lagged value of the 
relevant economic variable.
The first three columns of Table 4.4 thus correspond to the first three columns of 
Table 4.3 but use lagged instead of contemporary unemployment. The results obtained 
with the baseline specifications are all confirmed. The magnitudes of the coefficients 
are also very similar (slightly larger under specifications A and B, slightly smaller using 
specification C). Finally the R-squared show that the overall fit is comparable in the 
two cases.
4.5 .2  C ontrolling for state-level unem ploym ent
It is typical for the readership of newspapers to be locally concentrated. This readership 
would care about local stories, and local aspects of common phenomena. Just because 
there is noticeable variation in unemployment across regions and states, the local unem­
ployment rate in an area or state may represent a newsworthy issue, which is not entirely 
absorbed by reporting on the national rate. The newsworthiness of the local unemploy­
ment rate can potentially cause an omitted variables bias. The idea is the following: 
in Democratic-voting areas the local unemployment rate could be systematically lower 
than its average when the incumbent president is a Democrat and the general economic 
conditions are bad, because of public job-creating projects being targeted to the area.
If there is a positive correlation between the political partisanship of potential readers 
in the area where a newspaper sells and its endorsement policy, then the less intense 
coverage of high unemployment by Democratic-leaning newspapers under a Democratic 
president could be explained by the mere fact that the; local unemployment rate is lower 
in those areas where the newspapers are sold. Then it would not be a matter of a par­
tisan bias trickling down from the editorial page to the economic news section, but of 
honest reporting on local economic conditions. (/J) k j
To address this issue, we re-ran our regressions controlling for both the level and * ** 
change of the unemployment rate in the state where each newspaper is based19. Columns 
4-6 of Table 4.4 display the corresponding results. There is again a systematic correla­
tion between the endorsement policy and the differential coverage of unemployment as 
a function of the political affiliation of the incumbent President. Morever, the size and 
significance of the coefficients on the three-way interaction terms are very close to those 
reported in Table 4.3. The coefficients of the level of the unemployment rate in the state 
are positive and significant at standard confidence levels. By the same token, the cov­
erage of unemployment is positively and significantly correlated with the change in the 
state-level unemployment rate. Consequently, we decided to keep state unemployment 
levels and variations as control variables in the subsequent checks.
19Because of multicollinearity problems, while the slope of unemployment news with respect to the 
national unemployment rate is allowed to be newspaper-specific (specification C), the slopes with respect 
to the unemployment rate and its change at the state level are common across newspapers.
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4.5 .3  Excluding editorials
One might be concerned that the previous results about the differential coverage of 
unemployment are to a large extent driven by what is featured on editorial pages them­
selves. Therefore we repeated our regressions by excluding editorials from our dependent 
variable.20 The results are shown in columns 7-9 of Table 4.4, where the usual A-B-C 
specifications now include levels and changes in state unemployment rates. The results 
are very reassuring: the coefficient of the three-way interaction between the unemploy­
ment rate, the Democratic President dummy and the endorsement variable is again 
negative and significant, and its magnitude is only slightly inferior to what found in the 
previous cases. To sum up, a large part of the differential coverage of unemployment 
happens on the news pages, not merely on the editorial ones. This suggests that agenda 
bias on unemployment spills over into the economic news section.
-/K j -Mi* ^
4.5.4 D ifferent tim e w indows , , ,  s- , P
It is natural to check whether the relationship between the endorsement choices by 
newspapers and the partisan coverage of unemployment is robust to the time period 
being analyzed, and in particular to the consideration of a longer time window. In fact, 
given that we rely for our searches on electronic archives, there is a trade off between the 
length of the time span and the number of newspapers for which data are available. 21 
On this account, it must be noted that our empirical strategy is ultimately relying on the 
cross-sectional relationship between the endorsement policy and the time variation in 
the coverage of economic news as a function of the political affiliation of the incumbent 
president. Along these lines, Table 4.5 compares results regarding the 1996-2005, the 
1992-2005 and the 1988-2005 time windows. As already discussed in section 4.3.1, we 
can match coverage and endorsement data for 102 newspapers in the 1996-2005 time 
span, which shrink to 81 (39) when considering the 1992-2005 (1988-2005) windows.
The table again displays results for the three specifications A-B-C defined in section 
4.3.3; for reference, columns (10)-(12) repeat the regression results obtained for the 
1996-2005 period when controlling for the state-level unemployment rate and its change 
(columns (4)-(6) of Table 4.4).
Columns (l)-(3) refer to the 1988-2005 period and show that the coefficient on the 
three-way effect comes with the expected negative sign and is statistically significant, 
mildly so in specification A and B. One must notice that the magnitude of the coefficient 
is two-thirds of the one obtained with the baseline specification (columns (l)-(3) of Table 
4.3 and columns (4)-(6) of Table 4.4). However, the statistical significance of the three- 
way interaction coefficient disappears if we consider the period 1992-2005, as shown 
by columns (4)-(6 ). Upon inspection of the data, it turns out that two newspapers 
can be reasonably treated as outliers, as signalled for example by a leverage-versus-
20To do so we have re-run the search on unemployment excluding the words “editorial” or “editor”.
To pin down the size of the news section of each newspaper during each month, we have run a search 
on the word “and”, excluding again the words “editorial” or “editor”.
21See section 4.3.1 above and Table 4.8 for the actual number and names of newspapers covered within 
the three different time windows.
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squared-residual plot: the Washington Times and the Manchester Union-Leader. The 
former happens to be endorsement-wise the most extreme newspaper in our sample. The 
Union-Leader, a decidedly Republican paper, is the only one based in New Hampshire, 
which in 1992 was hit by the worst depression of the last forty years. Hence, columns 
(7)-(9) show results for the 1992-2005 when excluding the two newspapers from the 
sample. Now the coefficient on the triple interaction between the unemployment rate, 
the Democratic President dummy and the endorsement score is strongly significant for 
all specifications, with the expected negative sign. However, its magnitude is about half 
of the one found for the 1996-2005 period.
We also explored how results are robust for the subsample of large-scale newspapers, 
i.e. those that sell a large number of copies (above 2 0 0 , 0 0 0  copies per day on average 
in 1996) and/or belong to large chains. 22 One could argue that managing editors and 
journalists of large-scale newspapers are more conscious of the political facets of their 
agenda-setting power, and act accordingly. In other terms, the link between the en­
dorsement policy and the coverage of economic news might be less noisy (and hence less 
susceptible to outliers and sample size) when focusing on this subset of newspapers.
There are 72 large-scale newspapers if one considers the 1996-2005 time-window. 
The number shrinks to 59 in the period 1992-2005 and to 32 for 1988-2005. Results 
about these three periods are reported in Table 4.6. The three-way interaction turns 
up to be statistically significant at ordinary confidence level for all time windows and 
with the expected negative sign. Again, for the period 1988-2005 we notice a reduction 
of about 1/3 in the size of the coefficient, in comparison with the results of Tables 4.3 
and 4.4. This reduction is even stronger for the intermediate 1992-2005 period. On 
the contrary, when we consider the 1996-2005 period, the coefficient turns out to be 
substantially larger for chain-based and large newspapers (columns 7-9 in Table 4.6) 
than for the whole sample (columns 1-3 in Table 4.3). Thus, although the magnitudes 
of the relevant coefficient may vary by a relevant amount across different time periods, 
Table 4.6 substantially confirms all the results we found in the previous regressions.
4 .5 .5  D em and-driven  coverage?
As discussed in section 1.2.4 and elsewhere, Gentzkow and Shapiro’s [2007] thorough 
analysis of language similarity between congressmen and U.S. newspapers points at a 
strong correlation between the ideological position of the latter and the political leaning 
of their readers. On the other hand, once geographical factors are controlled for, the 
identity of the owner has very little or no explanatory power on the political leaning of 
a given newspaper.
In the previous sections we have investigated whether the explicit political position 
of a newspaper, as proxied by its endorsement choices, is correlated with the partisan 
coverage of economic news. However, one might be concerned that editors tune their en­
dorsement choices to the ideological leaning of readers, so that the endorsement variable 
is simply proxying for a demand factor, which also affects economic coverage. According
22Table 4.8 specifies the chain, if any, to which each sampled newsaper belongs.
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to this view, both endorsement choices and the partisan coverage of economic news are 
determined by what customers would like to read, with no independent role to be played 
by the newspaper’s editorial position, i.e. a supply factor.
In order to address this concern we proceeded as follows. First, to proxy for the 
average political position of readers of a given newspaper j ,  we weighted the average 
Democratic vote in presidential, senatorial and gubernatorial elections in each county 
during the time period by the relative sales of that newspaper in that county. Let this 
variable be N R j. We then replicated our three baseline specifications by replacing the 
endorsement variable N E j  with the readership variable N R j .  For all three specifications, 
we also considered an extended model which includes both N E j  and N R j , properly 
interacted with the Democratic President dummy DPt and the level EVt of the economic 
variable.
Table 4.7 displays results for the contemporaneous unemployment rate .23 When 
not controlling for the endorsement behaviour, the coefficient on the triple interaction 
between the unemployment rate, the Democratic President dummy and the voter parti­
sanship variable is negative and statistically significant. However, this triple interaction 
is no longer significant when introducing back the endorsement controls. On the other 
hand, the coefficient on the triple interaction with the endorsement score is negative 
and mildly statistically significant even after controlling for readers’ partisanship. A 
relevant concern here is the correlation between reader and endorsement partisanship, 
- which might create problems of approximate multicollinearity when these variables are 
twice interacted with the same controls (the Democratic president dummy and the level 
of the unemployment rate).
However, the raw correlation between the partisanship of endorsements and that of 
voters is just 0 .2 1 , i.e. quite low. While positive, and statistically significant (p-value 
=  .031), it is hardly overwhelming. 24 Evidently there is a lot of “slack” between the 
political positions of voters and editors.
Since it remains difficult to disentangle the direction of causality with data whose 
relevant variation is ultimately cross-sectional, a possible empirical strategy consists in 
using time series data and exploiting some (possibly) exogenous shock in the partisanship 
of readers across regions, or in the editorial position of newspapers, which could be 
triggered by a change in ownership or management. An interesting case in hand is 
represented by the succession of Otis Chandler in 1960 as publisher of the Los Angeles 
Times, the newspaper owned by his family since 1884. The LA Times used to have a clear 
conservative slant, which Chandler decided to overturn, in order to make the paper a 
credible rival of the New York Times. Figure 4.7 displays the time series variation in the 
propensity of the LA Times to endorse Democratic candidates, and the average yearly
23We obtain very similar results (available upon request) when controlling for the lagged level of the 
unemployment rate.
24One relevant concern here is that this low correlation might be driven by the presence in the sample 
of newspapers that are based in large cities with a politically segmented media market, like Chicago, 
New York and Los Angeles. However, if we exclude those newspapers (in our case the Chicago Sun- 
Times, the Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times and the New York Times), the resulting correlation 
slightly drops to 0.2 (p-value =  .045).
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share of the Democratic vote in presidential, senatorial and gubernatorial elections in 
California. In the 60s, after Otis Chandler took office, the propensity for the LA Times 
to endorse Democratic candidates steeply increased, but this was not matched at all by 
a comparatively rapid surge in the Democratic vote in the relevant geographical area.
The top two scatter plots in Figure 4.8 show the relationship between the actual 
unemployment rate and the relative frequency of unemployment stories on the LA Times, 
before and after 1965. In each graph, coverage-unemployment combinations under a 
Republican (Democratic) President are indexed by a zero (one). The two graphs on 
the bottom parallel the two on the top, depicting the same relationship for the inflation 
rate. I also report regression lines between the economic variable and its coverage, as a 
function of the political affiliation of the incumbent President. The two scatter plots on 
the left show that before 1965 the LA Times systematically gave more coverage to high 
unemployment and inflation under a Democratic President than a Republican one25. On 
the other hand, according to the two graphs on the right, in the post-1965 period there 
is no systematic difference in the slopes under presidents of different political affiliation.
Ideally, it would be necessary to back up this anedoctal evidence with the analysis 
of a large sample of newspapers displaying enough time series variation in their own­
ership and management. However, coupled with our previous analysis of endorsement 
patterns, this case-study suggests that supply side factors might play a non-negligible 
role in determining the political position of mass media outlets, in this case affecting 
the partisan coverage of economic news.
4 .6  D is c u s s io n  a n d  c o n c lu s io n s
In the paper coauthored with Valentino Larcinese and James M. Snyder, Jr. we have 
investigated the relationship between the endorsement policy of U.S. newspapers and the 
coverage of economic issues, as a function of the true economic figure and the political 
affiliation of the incumbent president. Considering the last decade, there is strong 
evidence that newspapers with a propensity to endorse Democratic candidates give 
less coverage to high unemployment (and more coverage to low unemployment) under 
Clinton than under George W. Bush, as compared to Republican-leaning newspapers. 
This relationship is very robust to a number of alternative specifications and robustness 
checks. On the other hand, there is no evidence of a systematic correlation between 
the endorsement policy and the coverage of inflation, the budget deficit and the trade 
deficit.
These findings should of course be further explored. On one side, finding evidence of 
agenda bias only on one economic issue out of four could induce to reject the hypothesis 
that there is any relevant ideologically slanted agenda setting in economic news on 
the U.S. press. On the other side, unemployment is, of the four considered, the most 
salient issue. Moreover, as discussed mTEe introductory section of this chapter, there 
is a large body of evidence according to which citizens assess the incumbent president’s
25This is formally confirmed by proper difference-in-differences regressions.
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performance on the basis of the strength of the economy, and vote accordingly in the 
next presidential elections. It might be also argued that citizens are better able to grasp 
the significance of a high unemployment rate, because of the dire consequences this 
might have on their personal lives.
This latter statement likely applies to the inflation rate as well, but the independence 
of the Federal Reserve makes harder for the general public to establish links between 
what the incumbent President does and variations in this rate. Moreover, even if citizens 
are by and large unaware of the institutional independence of the FED, in the time period 
under consideration inflation was very low26, so that the public did not perceive it as 
a serious problem policy makers had to tackle. It is also interesting to note that - in 
the long run analysis of the LA Times presented in section 4.5.5 - the succession of Otis 
Chandler as publisher seemed to matter not only with regards to the partisan coverage 
of unemployment, but for inflation too. Indeed, during the longer time period considered 
for this case-study, the inflation rate was often higher than in the more recent period, 
sometimes much higher, like in the late 40s, the 70s and the early 80s. At those times 
the public perceived the rise in the cost of living as a very serious issue.
Finally, the budget deficit and the trade deficit are more arcane variables, whose 
influence on presidential approval is far from clear. It is likely that citizens understand 
much less the significance of those variables, perhaps because of the lack of direct effects 
on their personal lives, perhaps because the effects are not immediate and can therefore 
be heavily discounted. On this account, if one looks at the American National Elec­
tion Studies 1992-2004, unemployment came in second as the “most important problem 
facing the nation” (crime being first). Nearly 10% of respondents mentioned it. By 
comparison, less than 0.5% of respondents mentioned inflation, and even counting gen­
erously, only about 1.5% of respondents mentioned trade-related issues (trade deficit 
by itself was mentioned by only 0.33% of respondents, while more respondents men­
tioned “outsourcing” or “international competitiveness” , which might be treated more 
appropriately as employment-related issues) . 27
As stated in the introduction, a salient characteristic of our methodological approach 
is that newspaper articles are coded through an automatic keyword search, instead of 
a human-based content analysis. One clear advantage of this procedure is that, by 
definition, it is not intensive in the usage of (costly) human capital. Its low cost (in terms 
of time and financial resources being spent) implies that it can be used to gather data on 
a large number of news outlets for a long time span. The only restriction is represented 
by what is available in existing digital archives. More importantly, an automatic search 
is easily replicable, because it is based on a known set of words and/or sentences that 
are used as classifiers. Consistently with the agenda-setting hypothesis, articles are only 
classified according to the topic covered, without attempting to code whether their tone 
is positive or negative. This is of course a limitation of our approach, in that we are
26During the 1996-2005 period, the highest inflation rate was about 4.7% (September 2005). In the 
1988-2005 period, the peak of around 6.3% was reached in October 1990.
2 7 Unluckily, it is not possible to separate the government deficit from other mentions about government 
spending being too high.
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not able to detect the framing of issues through an intentional or unintentional choice of 
words. Even using human-based content analysis, coding for tone is difficult, especially 
when dealing with such a nuanced object as a newspaper article: inter-coder reliability 
typically falls far short of acceptable standards. A solution could be for the analyst to 
provide very detailed instructions, but then the instructions themselves are likely to drive 
results. It is in turn reasonable to argue that coding for the tone using an automated 
procedure is also likely to be quite difficult. To devise an automated procedure of this 
kind would however be an important challenge for future research, since the replicability 
of machine-based content analysis constitutes an extremely valuable (if not essential) 
feature for the scientific study of mass media.
Another limitation of the approach followed here is that we simply counted the 
number of articles featuring the chosen keywords, i.e. we gave them equal weights, 
irrespective of their location on the newspaper and their length. On this account, one 
could for example refine the search algorithm to code the page number and newspaper 
section on which each piece appears. In particular, one might attribute a higher weight 
to front page stories, or separately consider them in the analysis. 28 Instead, retrieving 
the length of articles is definitely more computer-time consuming to implement. This is 
the case, because for each article featuring the chosen keywords it would be necessary 
to separately code its length .29
Still, our approach to the study of mass media is very flexible and easily replicable. 
This allows to readily extend the dataset and type of analysis in several directions. First, 
it would be worthwhile to try and gather data on additional newspapers for the early 
90s and late 80s, in order to shed some further light on the robustness of our results with 
respect to the time-window being considered. In addition, historical electronic archives 
like ProQuest can be used to gather long time series on the coverage of economic issues 
by a handful of newspapers. Second, any (heated) discussion on the extent of “mass 
media bias” in the U.S. should be definitely put into a comparative perspective .30 Since 
the economy represents a salient issue in almost all countries, one could use the same 
keywords-based search procedure on the electronic archives of newspapers and media 
outlets in other countries, and construct datasets parallel to the one analyzed here. The 
purpose of this exercise would be to compare -  on a cross-country basis -  the amount 
of within-country variation in the differential coverage of relevant economic figures, as 
a function of the political affiliation of the incumbent government and the level itself of 
the economic figure.
28In fact, in the previous chapter I separately consider issue coverage on the front page and on internal 
pages of the New York Times. This was feasible, because data from the Policy Agendas Project (which 
is based on human content analysis) already features this distinction.
29When searching for articles appearing on page n, one would simply need to specify an additional 
keyword that picks up the position on the archive’s database where the article page is explicitly coded. 
On the other hand, for a given keyword based search, all articles featuring these keywords must be 
sequentially coded according to their length.
30See Gentzkow, Glaeser and Goldin [2006] for a time-series comparison of the extent of bias on the 
U.S. press in the coverage of two political scandals, the Credit Mobilier in the 1870s and the Teapot 
Dome in the 1920s.
Fig. 4.1: Histogram of the endorsement propensity: 1992-2005
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3 Fig. 4.6: Endorsement policy and partisan coverage of trade deficit
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Figure 4.7: Dynam ics o f Dem ocratic vote in California and LA Times endorsements































Figure 4.8: Coverage o f unem ploym ent and inflation on the LA Times.
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Table 4.1: variable definitions
symbol variable definition source
E V v, Unemployment U.S. monthly unemployment rate BLS, LNS 14000000
EV„ Inflation Monthly inflation rate, on annual basis BLS, CPI data, CUUR0000SA0
e v b, Budget deficit Quarterly federal deficit, as percentage of GDP BEA: NIPATables 3.2 and 1.1.5
e v t , Trade deficit Quarterly trade deficit, as percentage of GDP BEA: NIPA Tables 4.1 and 1.1.5
” i
Relative frequency of unemployment stories Relative frequency of unemployment stories during month t on newspaper j electronic search on www.NewsLibrary.com: (unemployment OR jobless)
n 'j'
Relative frequency of inflation stories Relative frequency of inflation stories during month t on newspaper j electronic search on www.NewsLibrary.com: (inflation)
<
Relative frequency of budget deficit stories Relative frequency of budget deficit/surplus stories during quarter t on 
newspaper j
electronic search on www.NewsLibrary.com: "government debt" OR "government 
surplus" OR "government deficit" OR "federal debt" OR "federal surplus" OR 
"federal deficit"
» ;

























Table 4.2: summary statistics, 1996-2005
symbol variable___________________________________ Obs.______Mean_______Median_____ Std. Dev._____ Min_______Max
E V v, Monthly unemployment rate 120 5,013 5,100 0,672 3,800 6,300
E V It Monthly inflation rate 120 2,514 2,579 0,759 1,067 4,687
E V Bt Quarterly budget deficit 40 1,047 1,229 1,936 -2,209 4,114
e v t , Quarterly trade deficit 40 3,432 3,604 1,579 1,070 6,166
Relative frequency of unemployment stories 12124 0,697 0,638 0,381 0 3,138
Relative frequency of inflation stories 12124 0,572 0,478 0,402 0 3,824
Relative frequency of budget deficit stories 4049 0,127 0,102 0,106 0 1,887
Relative frequency of trade deficit stories 4049 0,058 0,040 0,063 0 0,539






























Table 4.3: Partisan Bias in the Coverage of Economic Issues
unemployment inflation budget deficit trade deficit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Specification A B C A B C A B C A B C
DP x EV x NE -0.149** -0.150** -0.150** 0.022 0.024 0.022 -0.016 -0.014 -0.013 0.003 0.003 0.004
[2.38] [2.38] [2.35] [0.82] [0.87] [0.81] [0.89] [0.76] [0.73] [0.29] [0.29] [0.30]
EV 0.165*** - - 0.084*** - - -0.012*** - 0.001 - -
[11.14] [11.04] [6.19] [0.20]
Change in EV 0.094*** - - -0.020*** - - -0.002 - - -0.005* - -
[6.11] [5.30] [1.07] [1.87]
DP 1.090*** - - 0.353*** - - 0.080*** - - 0.141*** - -
[9.33] [9.99] [10.55] [12.08]
D P x EV -0.248*** - - -0.073*** - - 0.029*** - - -0.027*** - -
[8.92] [7.72] [7.46] [10.43]
D P x NE 0.570** 0.575** - -0.130 -0.134 - -0.030 -0.027 - -0.027 -0.027 -
[2.15] [2.15] [1.55] [1.60] [0.91] [0.80] [0.48] [0.48]
NE x EV 0.071** 0.072** - -0.009 -0.010 - 0.005 0.005 - 0.002 0.002 -
[1.99] [2.02] [0.50] [0.55] [1.04] [0.89] [0.32] [0.35]
ln(total number of articles) 0.037* 0.028 0.027 0.011 0.011 0.022 -0.020 -0.020 -0.019 0.004** 0.004** 0.003
ri .881 [1.401 [1-38] [0-79] ro.68i [1.30] [1.111 M.111 ro.901 T2.051 r2 .ooi [1.64]
Newspaper fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Date dummies no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Newspaper-specific time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Newspaper-specific slope w.r.t. EV no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes
Newspaper-specific slope w.r.t. DP no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes
Observations 12124 12124 12124 12124 12124 12124 4017 4017 4017 4021 4021 4021
R-squared 0.56 0.63 0.67 0.66 0.72 0.75 0.39 0.61 0.66 0.66 0.70 0.74
DP is a dummy equal to 1 when the president is a Democrat, EV stands for "Economic Variable", NE is the newspaper endorsement variable. Robust t statistics in parentheses. * 
























Table 4.4: Unemployment News, Robustness Checks
lagged values of the unemployment rate controlling for state-level unemployment excluding editorials
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 0 )
Specification A B C A B C A B C
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unemployment rate (lagged) 0.152***
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change in unemp. rate (lagged) 0.090***
[5.80]
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DP x unemployment (lagged) -0.258***
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ln(total number of articles) 0.037* 0.027 0.027 0.041** 0.032* 0.030 0.038** 0.032* 0.030*
[1.85] [1.36] [1.35] [2.20] [1.73] [1.58] [2.37] [1.95] [1.72]
























Newspaper fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Date dummies no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Newspaper-specific time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Newspaper-specific slope w.r.t. EV no no yes no no yes no no yes
Newspaper-specific slope w.r.t. DP no no yes no no yes no no yes
Editorials included yes yes yes yes yes yes no no no
Observations 12116 12116 12116 12124 12124 12124 12106 12106 12106
R-squared 0.56 0.63 0.67 0.56 0.64 0.67 0.58 0.64 0.67
DP is a dummy equal to 1 when the president is a Democrat, EV stands for "Economic Variable", NE is the newspaper endorsement variable. Robust t statistics in
























Table 4.5: Unemployment News, different time windows, all available newspapers
1988-2005 1992-2005 1992-2005, excluding WT and UL 1996-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Specification A B C A B C A B C A B C
DP x EV x NE -0.095* -0.100* -0.101** -0.034 -0.034 -0.036 -0.069** -0.069** -0.070** -0.149** -0.150** -0.150**
[1.93] [1.98] [2.03] [1.14] [1.13] [1.17] [2.64] [2.59] [2.55] [2.31] [2.30] [2.28]
EV 0.192*** - - 0.123*** - - 0.120*** - - 0.111*** - -
[7.83] [6.17] [7.82] [6.08]
Change in EV 0.090*** - - 0.067*** - - 0.064*** - - 0.092*** - -
[4.21] [3.34] [3.32] [5.21]
DP 1.052*** - - 0.660*** - - 0.641*** - - 1.081*** - -
[11.45] [12.64] [12.66] [9.36]
DP x EV -0.177*** - - -0.133*** - - -0.129*** - - -0.239*** - -
[12.55] [14.72] [15.32] [8.73]
DP x NE 0.489 0.513 - 0.203 0.2 - 0.342** 0.337** - 0.070* 0.071* -
[1.57] [1.61] [1.35] [1.32] [2.27] [2.21] [1.95] [1.97]
NE x EV 0.101 0.104 - 0.048 0.048 - 0.078*** 0.078*** - 0.585** 0.588** -
[1.59] [1.58] [1.37] [1.36] [3.07] [3.03] [2.15] [2.14]
ln(total number of articles) -0.153** -0.189*** -0.135*** 0.009 -0.005 0.021 0.013 0 0.022 0.041** 0.032* 0.030
[2.57] [3.12] [2.71] [0.21] [0.13] [0.61] [0-34] [0.00] [0.65] [2.20] [1.73] [1.58]
state unemployment 0.093*** 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 0.054*** 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.049** 0.061*** 0.065*** 0.061***
[5.40] [5.68] [4.46] [2.70] [3.00] [2.82] [3.28] [3.65] [2.53] [3.37] [3.39] [2.85]
change in state unemployment 0.047** -0.003 -0.011 0.072*** 0.049*** 0.031* 0.071*** 0.049*** 0.038** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.054***
[2.08] [0.13] [0.49] [4.48] [2.89] [1.79] [4.47] [2.97] [2.27] [3.24] [3.27] [3.58]
Newspaper fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Date dummies no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Newspaper-specific time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Newspaper-specific slope w.r.t. EV no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes
Newspaper-specific slope w.r.t. DP no no yes no no yes no no yes no no yes
Editorials included yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8374 8374 8374 13501 13501 13501 13165 13165 13165 12124 12124 12124
R-squared 0.60 0.72 0.77 0.62 0.70 0.74 0.62 0.70 0.74 0.56 0.64 0.67
DP is a dummy equal to 1 when the president is a Democrat, EV stands for "Economic Variable", NE is the newspaper endorsement variable. In columns (7)-(9) the Washington Times and the Manchester




























Table 4.6: Unemployment News, different time windows, newspapers belonging to a chain or with large circulation
1988-2005 1992-2005 1996-2005
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Specification A B C A B C A B C
DP x EV x NE -0.100** -0.105** -0.106** -0.061** -0.061** -0.061** -0.209*** -0.208*** -0.208***
[2.01] [2.06] [2.13] [2.08] [2.06] [2.01] [2.93] [2.88] [2.86]
EV 0.194*** - - 0.115*** - - 0.098*** - -
[7.82] [7.17] [4.70]
Change in EV 0.086*** - - 0.057*** - - 0.091*** - -
[4.00] [2.79] [5.04]
DP 1.039*** - - 0.624*** - - 1.012*** - -
[11.11] [11.50] [8.11]
DP x EV -0.176*** - - -0.126*** - - -0.224*** - -
[12.16] [14.03] [7.58]
DP x NE 0.526 0.548* - 0.278* 0.279 - 0.790** 0.787** -
[1.68] [1.71] [1.67] [1.65] [2.60] [2.56]
NE x EV 0.107 0.109 - 0.071** 0.072** - 0.078** 0.079** -
[1.67] [1.63] [2.55] [2.52] [2.47] [2.48]
ln(total number of articles) -0.154** -0.194*** -0.139*** -0.006 -0.017 0.008 0.035 0.026 0.030
[2.56] [3.17] [2.77] [0.11] [0.29] [0.16] [1.13] [0.84] [0.93]
state unemployment 0.090*** 0.088*** 0.082*** 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.050** 0.063*** 0.067*** 0.061**
[5.10] [5.37] [4.30] [3.52] [3.60] [2.42] [3.05] [3.11] [2.46]
change in state unemployment 0.049** -0.001 -0.012 0.074*** 0.052*** 0.039** 0.061*** 0.058*** 0.059***
[2.12] [0.05] [0.51] [4.31] [2.99] [2.20] [3.52] [3.45] [3.61]
Newspaper fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Date dummies no yes yes no yes yes no yes yes
Newspaper-specific time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Newspaper-specific slope w.r.t. EV no no yes no no yes no no yes
Newspaper-specific slope w.r.t. DP no no yes no no yes no no yes
Editorials included yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 8167 8167 8167 11856 11856 11856 10129 10129 10129
R-squared 0.60 0.72 0.77 0.63 0.71 0.75 0.55 0.63 0.66
DP is a dummy equal to 1 when the president is a Democrat, EV stands for "Economic Variable", NE is the newspaper endorsement variable. Robust t statistics in 
























Table 4.7: Unemployment News: Demand-driven coverage?
reader partisanship reader and endorsement partisanship
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Specification A B C A B C
DP x EV x NR -0.648* -0.663* -0.644* -0,511 -0,526 -0,508
[1.78] [1.82] [1.73] [1.36] [1.40] [1.32]
DP x EV x NE - - - -0.128* -0.129* -0.129*
[1.98] [1.96] [1.96]
unemployment rate -0,02 - - 0,018 - -
[0.17] [0.14]
change in unemp. rate 0.096*** - - 0.094*** - -
[5.40] [5.31]
DP -0,036 - - 0,258 - -
[0.05] [0.32]
DP x unemployment 0,098 - - 0,026 - -
[0.53] [0.13]
NR x unemployment 0,242 0,243 - 0,176 0,176 -
[1.06] [1.06] [0.75] [0.75]
DPx NR 2,141 2,193 - 1,586 1,638 -
[1.43] [1.46] [1.01] [1.04]
NE x unemployment - - - 0.063* 0.064* -
[1.81] [1.83]
DP x NE - - - 0.521* 0.523* -
[1.88] [1.87]
state unemployment rate 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.064*** 0.067*** 0.064***
[3.54] [3.56] [2.97] [3.49] [3.51] [2.94]
change in state unemp. rate 0.048*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.051***
[2.78] [2.69] [3.10] [3.00] [2.96] [3.28]
Newspaper fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Date dummies no yes yes no yes yes
Newspaper-specific time trend yes yes yes yes yes yes
Newspaper-specific slope w.r.t. EV no no yes no no yes
Newspaper-specific slope w.r.t. DP no no yes no no yes
slope w.r.t. log of size yes yes yes yes yes yes
Editorials included yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 12124 12124 12124 12124 12124 12124
R-squared 0.56 0.64 0.67 0.56 0.64 0.67
DP is a dummy equal to 1 when the president is Democratic, EV stands for "Economic Variable", NR is the newspaper readership variable, while NE is the
newspaper endorsement one. Robust t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4.8: list of sampled newspapers with endorsement data
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ID Newspaper State Chain Endorsement score 1988? 1992?
AK Akron Beacon Journal OH Knight Ridder -0,2596636 1 1
AJ Albuquerque Journal NM -0,2178417 0 0
AS Anchorage Daily News AK Mcclatchy Company 0,4845000 1 1
AT Atlanta Journal And Constitution GA Cox Newspapers 0,0399212 1 1
AGCB Augusta Chronicle GA Morris Communications -0,4167508 0 0
AASB Austin American Statesman TX Cox Newspapers 0,0833165 0 1
BS Baltimore Sun MD Tribune Co 0,0977140 0 1
BD Bangor Daily News ME 0,1580255 0 1
BE Bergen County Record NJ North Jersey 0,2171908 1 1
Bl Birmingham News AL Advance Publications -0,4621221 0 0
BK Bismark Tribune ND Lee Enterprises -0,1061684 0 0
BL Bloomington Pantagraph IL Lee Enterprises -0,4447406 0 1
BG Boston Globe MA New York Times 0,2857174 1 1
BNHB Boston Herald MA -0,4891594 0 1
BN Buffalo News NY 0,1022806 0 1
CR Cedar Rapids-lowa City Gazette IA -0,2503612 0 1
CDMB Charleston Daily Mail WV Media News Group -0,7527525 0 0
CIZB Charleston Gazette WV 0,4303231 0 0
CO Charlotte Observer NC Knight Ridder 0,2801360 1 1
CSTB Chicago Sun Times IL Sun Times Media Group -0,0227328 1 1
CHTB Chicago Tribune IL Tribune Co -0,2989278 1 1
CK Cincinnati Post OH E.W. Scripps -0,4586532 0 1
CPDB Cleveland Plain Dealer OH Advance Publications -0,1980308 0 1
CS Columbia State SC Knight Ridder 0,0679328 1 1
CLDB Columbus Dispatch OH -0,5325082 0 1
CL Columbus Ledger-Enquirer GA Knight Ridder 0,4488196 0 0
OK Daily Oklahoman OK -0,5158233 1 1
DM Dallas Morning News TX Belo Corp -0,3449326 1 1
DDNB Dayton Daily News OH Cox Newspapers -0,2455849 0 1
NJ Daytona Beach News-Journal FL 0,5911839 0 0
DP Denver Post CO Media News Group -0,0303445 0 1
RM Denver Rocky Mountain News CO E.W. Scripps -0,2593203 0 1
FP Detroit Free Press Ml Knight Ridder 0,1534508 1 1
NT Duluth News-Tribune MN Knight Ridder 0,3287242 0 0
ET Erie Times-News PA -0,4136883 0 0
EC Evansville Courier And Press IN 0,2850918 0 1
JG Fort Wayne Journal Gazette IN 0,2143500 0 1
FW Fort Wayne News-Sentinel IN Knight Ridder -0,4156261 0 1
ST Fort Worth Star-Telegram TX Knight Ridder 0,0393013 0 1
FB Fresno Bee CA Mcclatchy Company 0,5033402 1 1
GPTB Gary Post-Tribune IN Sun Times Media Group 0,1367000 1 1
GB Greensboro News And Record NC 0,3326626 0 1
HRNB Harrisburg Patriot-News PA Advance Publications -0,2998959 1 1
HC Hartford Courant CT Tribune Co 0,1904112 0 1
HDNB Hays Daily News KS 0,1985943 0 0
HCBF Houston Chronicle TX Hearst Corp -0,0987374 1 1
FTUB Jacksonville Florida Times-Union FL Morris Communications -0,9632423 0 0
KC Kansas City Star MO Knight Ridder 0,0383939 0 1
KYPB Kentucky Post KY E.W. Scripps 0,2022318 0 1
KX Knoxville News-Sentinel TN E.W. Scripps -0,3734314 0 1
LVRB Las Vegas Review-Journal NV Stephens Media Group -0,5088014 0 0
JW Lawrence Journal-World KS -0,7068577 0 1
LH Lexington Herald Leader KY Knight Ridder 0,5206918 1 1
LJSB Lincoln Journal Star NE Lee Enterprises -0,2499532 0 0
Notes: th e  la s t tw o co lu m n s  spec ify  w h e th e r  d a ta  b ack  to  1988 a n d  to  1992 a re  availab le.
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Table 4.8 (cont.): list of sampled newspapers with endorsement data
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ID Newspaper State Chain Endorsement score 1988? 1992?
LB Long Beach Press-Telegram CA Media News Group -0,2664053 0 1
NWDB Long Island Newsday NY Tribune Co 0,2436154 1 1
LA Los Angeles Daily News CA Media News Group -0,5388390 1 1
LAT Los Angeles Times CA Tribune Co 0,2779051 1 1
MT Macon Telegraph GA Knight Ridder 0,3271415 0 0
UL Manchester Union Leader NH -0,7585641 0 1
CA Memphis Commercial Appeal TN E.W. Scripps 0,1279533 0 1
MH Miami Herald FL Knight Ridder 0,2209475 1 1
MWSB Milwaukee Journal Sentinel Wl 0,0230852 0 1
MN Minneapolis Star Tribune MN 0,2833712 1 1
MBRB Mobile Register AL Advance Publications -0,6182148 0 1
MS Modesto Bee CA Mcclatchy Company 0,0079176 0 1
NHRB New Haven Register CT Journal Register Co 0,0342288 1 1
TP New Orleans Times-Picayune LA Advance Publications 0,0230046 0 1
NYT New York Times NY New York Times 0,4166383 1 1
PBPB Palm Beach Post FL Cox Newspapers 0,3089388 0 1
JS Peoria Journal Star IL Copley Press -0,2456197 0 1
DN Philadelphia Daily News PA Knight Ridder 0,4773682 1 1
PI Philadelphia Inquirer PA Knight Ridder 0,1659037 1 1
PG Pittsburgh Post Gazette PA Block Family 0,0521412 0 1
OR Portland Oregonian OR Advance Publications 0,0527399 1 1
AC Press Of Atlantic City NJ -0,2503979 1 1
RTDB Richmond Times-Dispatch VA Media General -0,7922730 1 1
RO Roanoke Times VA Landmark Communications 0,3516304 0 1
SB Sacramento Bee CA Mcclatchy Company 0,6049401 1 1
SAEC San Antonio Express News TX Hearst Corp -0,1073770 0 1
SFCB San Francisco Chronicle CA 0,2157588 1 1
SF Santa Fe New Mexican NM 0,0804830 0 0
SA Santa Rosa Press Democrat CA New York Times 0,3393954 0 0
HT Sarasota Herald-Tribune FL New York Times 0,0381942 0 0
IG Seattle Post-Intelligencer WA Hearst Corp 0,2872044 1 1
SE Seattle Times WA 0,0878302 1 1
JR Springfield State Joumal-Register IL Copley Press -0,3135503 1 1
SL St. Louis Post Dispatch MO Pulitzer Inc 0,3241484 1 1
SP St. Paul Pioneer Press MN Knight Ridder -0,0365371 1 1
SPTB St. Petersburg Times FL 0,3125581 1 1
TNTB Tacoma News Tribune WA Mcclatchy Company 0,1453550 0 1
TD Tallahassee Democrat FL Knight Ridder 0,5688767 0 0
TT Tampa Tribune FL Media General -0,0522953 0 1
TB Toledo Blade OH Block Family 0,0791259 0 0
ADSB Tucson Arizona Daily Star AZ Pulitzer Inc 0,5186767 0 1
TLWB Tulsa World OK 0,1801442 0 1
VC Vancouver Columbian WA 0,1153056 0 0
WP Washington Post DC 0,1321356 1 1
WT Washington Times DC -1,1966380 0 1
WE Wichita Eagle KS Knight Ridder -0,3828387 1 1
WB Wilkes-Barre Times Leader PA Knight Ridder 0,8862112 0 1
WO Worcester Telegram And Gazette MA New York Times -0,5122839 0 1
Notes: th e  la s t tw o c o lu m n s spec ify  w h e th e r d a ta  b ack  to  1988 a n d  to  1992 a re  availab le.
Chapter 5
Conclusions
This dissertation has revolved around the broad theme of how mass media outlets might 
act politically through their agenda-setting power. According to the theory of issue 
ownership, the choice itself of the topic being covered can produce persuasion effects, 
to the extent that citizens are convinced that a given party or candidate is better at 
handling problems related to that issue. In the case of performance issues (i.e. those 
lacking a broad consensus among the public on the comparative ability of parties and 
candidates), one could argue that the favorability of increased media coverage towards 
the incumbent government depends on whether the current situation being reported is 
relatively good or bad.
From a theoretical perspective, in chapter 2 I have built a simple political economy 
model of electoral competition which shows how -within a simple set up with one me­
dia outlet and two different issues owned by two different parties- the agenda-setting 
behaviour of the newspaper can affect the voting decision of Bayesian rational voters. 
Moreover, the model shows how the actual story being published interacts with the edi­
torial policy of the newspaper in affecting voting behaviour. In particular, if the editorial 
policy amounts to give priority to the problem owned by the incumbent government, 
the publication of the story about the problem owned by the challenger’s party would 
trigger a larger vote increase for that party, than what would happen under an editorial 
policy that is less favourable to the incumbent. The model is also suitable to analyse 
the welfare costs of a given editorial policy, which arise when the problem owned by a 
party is more serious than the one that is given priority by the editorial policy itself. 
Finally, the model depicts how ex ante incentives regarding the editorial policy might 
conflict with ex post ones, which are relevant in case both problems have occurred and 
the editor must come up with an excluding choice regarding the story to be published. If 
there is aggregate uncertainty and the distribution of the ex ante bias of rational voters 
is polarised, the incumbent government would ex ante prefer a watchdog editorial policy 
(i.e. one that gives priority to the story owned by the challenger), but ex post it would 
always find it optimal to spin the news about the owned problem, and have it published 
for sure.
Chapter 2 thus provides some theoretical underpinnings for the empirical analyses 
featured in chapters 3 and 4. To the extent that the choices of topics covered by media
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outlets might affect public opinion and voting behaviour, one can derive some inference 
about the political position of those outlets, by studying their editorial choices.
In chapter 3 I have looked at the coverage of issues owned by the Democratic and the 
Republican party on the New York Times, during the 1946-1997 period. Since in the U.S. 
the dates of presidential elections are exogenously fixed by law, I investigate whether the 
Times systematically publishes more stories about issues owned by one political party 
during presidential campaigns. I control for the activity of the incumbent president 
across issues (as proxied by Executive Orders) and his political affiliation, and check 
whether the variation of covered topics during the campaign depends on that affiliation. 
The data show that the Times has a Democratic partisanship, with some watchdog 
aspects, in that during presidential campaigns it systematically publishes more stories 
about Democratic topics (civil rights, health care, labour and social welfare), but only 
so when the incumbent president is a Republican, i.e. he is on average perceived as weak 
on those issues by public opinion. During the post-1960 period, the Times displays a 
more symmetric type of watchdog behaviour, since during the presidential campaign 
it also gives more coverage to the Republican issue of Defense when the incumbent 
president is a Democrat and there is no reversal in the ownership of the issue. One 
might be concerned here about how the extraordinary relevance of the Vietnam war 
might explain this result.
In a nutshell, the empirical analysis performed on the New York Times is based on 
the long-term ownership of policy issues and exploits the “natural experiment” provided 
by presidential elections. Moreover, the availability of data on a wide time window allows 
to derive some conclusions on the absolute political position of the paper. On the other 
hand chapter 4, which is based on a joint work with Valentino Larcinese and James 
Snyder about the coverage of economic news by large sample of U.S. newspapers during 
the last decade, takes on a rather different identification path. First, it deals with 
a performance issue like the economy. Second, it covers a much shorter time period, 
so that only statements about the relative political position of media outlets can be 
legitimately formulated. Finally, a crucial role is played by the political affiliation of the 
incumbent president, in that the empirical exercise amounts to detecting any differential 
coverage of the same good or bad economic news as a function of this affiliation. In the 
presence of a long enough time sample, one could state that a given newspaper has 
an absolute bias in favour of the Democratic party if e.g. it systematically gives more 
coverage to high unemployment under George W. Bush than under Bill Clinton, and 
vice versa when the unemployment rate is low. With a short time sample, unobserved 
time effects might bias the coefficient on the interaction between the unemployment 
rate and the Democratic president dummy. For example, one could wrongly infer that 
a given newspaper is Democratic-biased if strongly newsworthy events take place when 
the unemployment rate is high and the incumbent president is a Democrat, so that all 
newspapers deflect their attention from unemployment during that period.
The idea explored in the chapter is to check whether the differential coverage of 
economic news is significantly correlated with some measure of the explicit political
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position of these outlets. We thus study whether newspapers with a higher propensity 
to endorse Democratic candidates systematically give more coverage to bad economic 
news under Bush than under Clinton, in comparison with Republican-endorsing ones. 
We find robust evidence that this is the case for the unemployment rate, but not so for 
inflation, the budget deficit and the trade deficit.
As pointed out in the introductory chapter, demand for confirmatory information 
and supply of persuasion are likely to be coexisting on the media market: any politically 
slanted agenda-setting behaviour of a given media outlet could either depends on the 
preferences of journalists, editors and owners, or on those of consumers, or on both. The 
model developed in chapter 2  highlights the role of supply, but the empirical analysis is 
not always capable of disentangling the respective roles played by demand and supply 
factors. While in the analysis of the agenda-setting behaviour of the New York Times I 
cannot separately identify those roles, in the study of economic news coverage we check 
whether agenda bias is driven by the partisanship of readers, as proxied by the average 
Democratic vote in areas where each newspaper is sold. Newspapers with higher sales in 
Democratic areas indeed tend to give more coverage to high unemployment under Bush 
than under Clinton as compared to those sold in Republican areas, but this correlation 
is no longer significant when controlling for the ideological leaning of endorsements, 
properly interacted. On the other hand endorsement partisanship still plays a significant 
role, i.e. Democratic endorsing newspapers ceteris paribus give more coverage to high 
unemployment under Bush than under Clinton as compared to Republican endorsing 
ones. On this account, agenda bias in economic news seems more linked with the partisan 
position of editors, i.e. a supply factor, rather than with the one of readers.
In section 4.6 I have underlined how newspaper articles about economic news were 
coded through an automatic keyword-based search on online archives, instead of a 
human-based content analysis. Prom a methodological point of view, an automatic 
search has a low cost in terms of time and human capital being employed, and at the 
same time it is easily replicable, as it is based on a known set of words and/or sentences 
that are used as classifiers. In that section I have already mentioned some of the more 
immediate improvements and extensions that can be performed through the use of au­
tomatic keyword-based searches. For example one could code articles according to the 
page where they appear, and/or on the basis of their length. One could also explore 
agenda bias in economic news coverage for different time periods and/or countries.
In this concluding section I would like to highlight some further extensions in the 
study of the political behaviour of mass media, which are meant to fill the gaps between 
the methodological approaches taken up in chapters 3 and 4.
First, it would be interesting to study the differential coverage of Democratic and 
Republican issues during presidential campaigns (as in the analysis of the New York 
Times) for a large sample of media outlets, focusing on the consistency between this 
coverage and their explicit political position, as proxied by the endorsement partisanship 
(similarly to what done with the analysis of economic news).
Second, one could analyse economic news coverage by a set of media outlets in the
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long run, in order to produce some inference regarding the absolute political position of 
these outlets. Moreover, in the presence of some exogenous variation in the ownership 
of media outlets, it would be possible to investigate more rigorously the respective roles 
played by demand and supply in determining agenda bias. The Los Angeles Times case 
study presented in section 4.5.5 represents a first tentative step in this direction. Along 
the same lines, it would be worthwhile to analyse whether agenda bias on economic 
news takes place on different issues in different time periods, as a function of their 
overall salience. As argued at the end of chapter 4, one could thus expect to find agenda 
bias on inflation during the late 70s and early 80s.
Third, there are other policy issues which are characterised -from the issue ownership 
point of view- by a strong performance component. For example, crime would be a case 
in point: as shown by the survey evidence from Gallup and the NES, during the post­
war period not rarely was the crime issue perceived as owned by the Democratic party 
instead of the GOP, contrary to the common wisdom and the original classification by 
Petrocik [1996].1 A feasible research strategy would consist in studying the coverage of 
the crime issue at the state or city level, as a function of the political affiliation of the 
incumbent governor or mayor.
Foreign policy stands as another interesting policy issue where to investigate the 
political behaviour of media outlets. As discussed in the introductory chapter, it is in 
principle easier to find reliable measures of performance on the economy rather than on 
foreign policy, certainly because of the more qualitative nature of the latter. However, 
some relevant foreign events are to some extent measurable. As pioneered by Herman 
and Chomsky [1988], one could investigate how media outlets cover human rights viola­
tions and political murders happening in foreign countries, as a function of the status of 
the diplomatic relationship between those and the host country. Herman and Chomsky 
for example show that the coverage devoted by the U.S. media to the murder of the Pol­
ish priest Jerzy Popieluszko was more more than twice the one devoted to the murder 
of Archbishop Oscar Romero in El Salvador. The automatic keyword-based approach 
adopted in chapter 4, together with some reliable data on the status of U.S. diplomatic 
relationships with other countries, could be fruitfully exploited in order to investigate 
in a systematic fashion the Herman and Chomsky claim, according to which U.S. media 
outlets extensively cover human rights violations that take place in countries the U.S. 
administration considers as enemies, and pay comparatively little attention to those 
happening in allied countries. On this account, one could explore whether the extent of 
media capture by the government varies across countries, and in particular whether the 
U.S. media display a disproportionate “lapdog” behaviour on these matters.
In the preceding discussion I have deliberately used the generic term “media outlets” , 
while both the theoretical and the empirical chapters of this dissertation deal with the 
specific case of newspapers. To the extent that data on other types of media outlets 
are available in electronic format (e.g. transcripts of TV or radio news broadcasts), all 
the empirical strategies employed or discussed in the thesis can be applied to them, and
'See section 3.3.1.
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comparisons made.
Finally, the theoretical chapter has shown how -in the presence of a limited amount 
of space, time and/or attention- the agenda-setting behaviour of mass media outlets can 
affect rational readers in their attitudes and political choices. Moreover, the magnitude 
of these effects of coverage are shown to depend on the interaction with the known edito­
rial policy of the specific media outlet, with a larger effect of stories that go contrary to 
this editorial policy. While the empirical chapters of the dissertation are focused on me­
dia coverage as a dependent variable, a further and natural step would of course consist 
in matching this data on media coverage with individual data on readers’ (or viewers’) 
attitudes and behaviour. As a methodological first best, one could devise a proper ex­
periment in which the coverage of current events by different media outlet is randomly 
altered for a subset of consumers, and investigate whether the change in attitudes and 
opinions between the treatment and the control group is in turn a function of the known 
editorial policies of the different outlets. If ethical and practical considerations make 
this route unfeasible, the second best would be to find appropriate natural experiments, 
namely situations in which the extreme newsworthiness of a particular event pertaining 
to an issue owned by one party or the other might induce all media outlets to cover it, at 
least in the short run. One could then analyse how changes in the opinions and choices 
of readers and viewers might be correlated with the editorial stance of the different 
media outlets. An interesting hypothesis here (which lies outside the proper boundaries 
of this dissertation) is that issue framing might be an important mechanism through 
which editors and journalists constrain the amount of opinion change by readers and 
viewers, in the presence of newsworthy events that are unfavourable to the political side 
on which producers and/or consumers of news stand.
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